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Sexual minorities (i.e. lesbians and gay men) experience systemic discrimination
throughout the United States. Prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges
(2015), in many states, same-sex couples could not marry and sexual minorities were not
protected from sexual orientation housing discrimination (Human Rights Campaign,
2015). The current, two-experiment study applied Jost and Banaji’s (1994) System
Justification Theory to marriage and housing discrimination. When sexual minorities
question dissimilar treatment, thereby threatening the status quo, members of the
heterosexual majority rationalize sexual minority discrimination to maintain their
dominant status (Alexander, 2001; Brescoll, Uhlmann, & Newman, 2013; Citizens for
Equal Protection v. Bruning, 2006; Jackson v. Abercrombie, 2012; Jost, Banaji, &
Nosek, 2004; Rahman, 2004; Sevcik v. Sandoval, 2012). After sexual minority groups
gained equality victories (i.e. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 2003; Romer v.
Evans, 1996), heterosexual majority group members passed anti-marriage equality laws
and did not pass sexual orientation discrimination protection (Alexander, 2001; Bishop v.
Smith, tenth circuit, 2014; Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 2014; Goldberg-Hiller & Milner, 2003;
Henry & Reyna, 2007; Kitchen v. Herbert, district court, 2013; Wardle, 2005).
Justifications for rights deprivation include stereotypes specific to the legal question (e.g.,

“special rights” discourse) as well as basic sexual stigma (Bruning, 2006; Herek &
Garnets, 2007; Herek, 2004; Jackson, 2012; Rahman, 2004; Sevcik, 2012). However,
once a new status quo becomes likely, both majority and minority group members
support the new status quo (Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009; Kay, Jimenez, &
Jost, 2002).
The present research examined whether threats and new status quo likelihood
impact heterosexual individuals’ sexual orientation equality ballot decisions. The
experiments manipulated current status quo by affirming or threatening it and status quo
likelihood by telling participants that experts believed nationwide equality was 10% (or
30% or 60% or 90%) likely to occur by 2016. Experimental findings provide mixed
support for system justification theory as an explanation for sexual stigma and
discrimination in that individual differences variables determined participants’ equality
ballot decisions. However, threat and uncertainty disrupted this effect. Thus, the current
research informs future system justification research within the sexual minority context.
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Introduction
Objectives of the current research. Sexual minorities (i.e. lesbians and gay men)
experience systemic discrimination throughout the United States (US). Specifically, prior
to the United States Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), in many
states, lesbians and gay men could not marry the person of their choice and, currently, are
not protected from housing discrimination based upon their sexual orientation (Human
Rights Campaign (HRC), 2015). The current research explored (1) how the court battles
involving marriage equality provide the basic blueprint for sexual minority discrimination
in other contexts, (2) that system justification theory partially explains the rationalizations
used, (3) that, therefore, system justification theory points the way for other forms of
sexual minority discrimination, and (4) that, although various forms of discrimination
exist (e.g., employment, education, and so on), housing constitutes a more basic and
important form of discrimination due to its pervasive effects upon people’s lives. The
current research showed (5) how system justification theory provides a partial
explanation for the past and current aspects of marriage equality and applied this logic to
housing discrimination. Finally, (6) the current research tested this model of system
justification theory in the contexts of marriage and housing equality.
To understand the current marriage and housing equality context, one must
examine the legal precedents and legislative acts that impact sexual minority rights.
Therefore, this discussion begins with a legal analysis covering the (1) the current rights
enjoyed by sexual minorities under United States Supreme Court precedent; (2) the
substantive rights of sexual minorities both within the court system and through potential
legislative action; (3) the equal protection rights of sexual minorities under the Fourteenth
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Amendment; and (4) how the state interests and levels of scrutiny through which courts
analyze these rights constitute justifications for maintaining the current system of sexual
minority inequality. The Psychological component of the current paper discusses (1) the
different aspects of system justification theory; (2) how alternative theories used to
understand sexual minority stigma fail to explain key aspects of marriage and housing
discrimination; how, (3) although threatening the status quo leads persons to defend the
system, (4) once it appears likely that a new status quo will replace the current system,
persons endorse justifications that promote the new status quo; and (5) how system
justification explains the treatment of sexual minorities within the marriage context and
can be applied to sexual minority housing discrimination. Finally, the current study tests
this model of system justification theory by varying the threat participants experience and
the likelihood that the nation will experience a new status quo in either marriage (Study
1) or housing (Study 2) equality.
Sexual orientation discrimination and system justification. Within the marriage
equality context, when sexual minorities question dissimilar treatment, members of the
heterosexual majority rationalize sexual minority discrimination (Alexander, 2001; Baker
v. Nelson, 1971; Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 2006; Hernandez v. Robles,
2006; Jackson v. Abercrombie, 2012; Morrison v. Sadler, 2005; Price, Nir, & Cappella,
2005; Rahman, 2004; Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2014; Sevcik v. Sandoval, 2012).
According to system justification theory, members of majority groups use these
rationalizations to support the status quo because they are motivated to maintain their
dominant status (Jost & Banaji, 1994). When minority groups question the status quo,
they threaten the current hierarchical system (Brescoll, Uhlmann, & Newman, 2013; Jost
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& Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost, Kivetz, Rubini,
Guermandi, & Mosso, 2005). In the sexual minority context, heterosexual majority
group members reacted to this threat by passing anti-marriage equality laws designed to
keep same-sex couples from marrying and by not including sexual orientation as a
protected class for purposes of discrimination (Alexander, 2001; Bishop v. Smith, tenth
circuit, 2014; Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 2014; Goldberg-Hiller & Milner, 2003; Henry &
Reyna, 2007; Kitchen v. Herbert, district court, 2013; Wardle, 2005). Justifications for
rights deprivation include stereotypes specific to the legal question (e.g., marriage-centric
reasons or “special rights” discourse) as well as basic sexual stigma (Baker, 1971;
Bruning, 2006; Herek & Garnets, 2007; Herek, 2004, 2007; Hernandez, 2006; Jackson,
2012; Morrison, 2005; Price et al., 2005; Rahman, 2004; Robicheaux, 2014; Sevcik,
2012). However, according to system justification theory, once it becomes likely that a
new status quo will be achieved, both majority and minority group members should
support the new status quo by endorsing different rationalizations that justify it
(Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009; Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002). The current
research examined how threats to the current status quo and the likelihood of becoming
the new status quo impact heterosexual individuals’ tendency to vote for and support
greater sexual orientation equality.
Current status of civil rights. Marriage and housing represent important rights
within the United States (Armstrong, 2013; Campbell & Wright, 2010; Cherlin, 2004;
Freeman, 1999; Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 2003; Turner v. Safley, 1987;
Zablocki v. Redhail, 1978). Prior to 2004, when Massachusetts became the first state to
recognize the inherent right of same-sex couples to marriage, same-sex couples could not
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marry within the United States (HRC, 2015). As of the time in which this research was
conducted (April 20 through June 11, 2015), in thirteen states, same-sex couples still
could not marry (HRC, 2015). Exclusion from marriage negatively affects sexual
minorities in multiple ways, including denying them social and economic benefits
available to heterosexual couples and increasing the experience of negative outcomes for
sexual minority individuals (Badgett, 2010; Goodridge, 2003; Riggle, Rostosky, &
Horne, 2010; Rostosky, Riggle, Horne, Denton, & Huellemeier, 2010; Rostosky, Riggle,
Horne, & Miller, 2009). For example, Riggle and colleagues (2010) found that
Lesbian/Gay/Bisexual (LGB) individuals in legally recognized relationships were
significantly less likely to experience depression, stress, and internalized homophobia and
more likely to experience life as meaningful as compared to single, dating (but not
committed), or committed but not married LGB individuals.
Twenty-nine states have not passed statewide nondiscrimination laws that protect
sexual minorities from housing discrimination (National LGBTQ Task Force, 2015).
Although, according to Herek (2009), only 6.5% of gay men and 5.1% of lesbians report
experiencing housing discrimination, multiple experimental studies indicate that samesex couples experience housing discrimination (Ahmed, Andersson, & Hammarstedt,
2008; Ahmed & Hammarstedt, 2009; Fair Housing Centers of Michigan, 2007; Friedman,
Reynolds, Scovill, Brassier, Campbell, & Ballou, 2013; Lauster & Easterbrook, 2011).
For example, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (Friedman
et al., 2013) conducted 6,833 matched-pair correspondence tests across 50 housing
markets throughout the US. Friedman and colleagues sent two emails to each housing
provider that asked about the availability of advertised units. The emails were identical
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except for couple composition, i.e. one email was from a same-sex couple and one was
from a heterosexual couple (with 3,424 tests involving gay men and 3,409 tests involving
lesbians). The researchers found that both male and female same-sex couples were less
likely to receive a response to their inquiry than heterosexual couples. These results
match the findings of the Fair Housing Centers of Michigan (2007), who found that
heterosexual couples were favored in field studies 27% of the time. Interestingly, in the
Friedman et al. study, the favorable treatment of heterosexual couples disappeared in
states that had nondiscrimination legislation, but only for lesbian couples (i.e. gay male
couples received discriminatory treatment regardless of their state’s nondiscrimination
policy). This finding also matches other research that shows that female same-sex
couples do not experience as much housing discrimination as male same-sex couples
(Ahmed et al., 2008; Ahmed & Hammarstedt, 2009; Lauster & Easterbrook, 2011).
However, as Ahmed and colleagues’ (2008, 2009) and Lauster and Easterbrook’s (2011)
conducted their research outside of the U.S. (in Sweden and Canada, respectively),
possible cultural differences may have impacted these results.
Importantly, marriage exclusion and lack of housing protection reinforce sexual
stigma, i.e. “socially shared knowledge about homosexuality’s devalued status in society”
(Herek & Garnets, 2007; see also Herek, 2004, 2007, 2008). Sexual stigma explains the
dominant-subordinate relationship between heterosexual individuals and sexual
minorities (Herek, 2004, 2007, 2008). System justification theory explains how the
dominant-subordinate relationship is maintained in society. According to system
justification theory, individuals (both dominant and subordinate) support the current
status quo by rationalizing differences in power and status using stereotypes (Jost &
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Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004). Because of the shared knowledge of sexual stigma, both
dominant and subordinate group members stereotype sexual minority individuals as sick,
immoral, unnatural, and “less than” heterosexual individuals, i.e. as inferior (Herek,
2002, 2004, 2007). Anti-marriage equality proponents and judges use these stereotypes
to rationalize the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage (Baker, 1971; Bishop v.
Holder, district court, 2014; Bruning, 2006; DeBoer v. Snyder, district court, 2014;
Geiger, 2014; Hernandez, 2006; Jackson, 2012; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Lewis v.
Harris, 2006; Sevcik, 2012), which reinforces the status quo of heterosexual couple only
marriage. As both heterosexual and sexual minority individuals value marriage, which
has many benefits besides social acceptance, restricting marriage to the sexual minority
reinforces heterosexual dominance (Geiger, 2014).
When same-sex couples question the constitutionality of heterosexual couple only
marriage, thereby threatening the status quo, they may engender backlash from members
of the dominant group (Bishop, district court, 2014; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Wardle,
2005). This backlash takes the form of anti-marriage equality statutes, amendments, and
arguments against same-sex marriage within court cases, all justified using stereotypic
rationalizations regarding sexual minorities and marriage (Bishop, district court, 2014;
Bruning, 2006; DeBoer, district court, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Kitchen, district court, 2013;
Lewis, 2006). For example, after the Supreme Court of Hawaii (Baehr v. Lewin, 1993)
held that denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the equal protection
clause of Hawaii’s constitution, twenty-seven states and the federal government enacted
statutes and state amendments that explicitly prohibited same-sex couples from marrying
(Bourke v. Beshear, 2014; In re Marriage Cases, 2008; Jackson, 2012; Latta v. Otter,
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district court, 2014; Whitewood v. Wolf, 2014). Then, after the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts (Goodridge, 2003) held that the state’s denial of marriage to same-sex
couples represented a violation of Massachusetts’ state equal protection articles of their
constitution, twenty-seven states amended their constitutions to exclude same-sex couples
from marriage (Bishop, district court, 2014; Bourke, 2014; In re Marriage Cases, 2008;
Kitchen, district court, 2013; Latta, district court, 2014). Thus, after both Baehr and
Goodridge, when the status quo for marriage was threatened, persons within different
states took steps to preserve the status quo. However, when a change to the status quo
appears likely, individuals provide rationalizations to justify the new status quo (Kay et
al., 2002). Thus, system justification explains the history of the marriage equality
movement, from backlash to the tipping point of United States v. Windsor (2013) to
potential nationwide acceptance. Prior to Windsor, several lower courts held that bans
against same-sex marriage did not violate the Constitution (Baker, 1971; Bruning, 2006;
Hernandez, 2006; Jackson, 2012; Sevcik, 2012). After Windsor, courts representing
thirty-two states held that bans on same-sex marriage violate the Constitution (HRC,
2015). As such, the litigation after Windsor provides a template for additional civil rights
reform for sexual minorities.
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CHAPTER 1
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Definitional concerns. As an initial note, the term sexual minorities, within this
paper, refers to individuals who self-identify as lesbian or gay, i.e. their sexual orientation
involves affectional, sexual, and relational tendencies towards individuals who identify as
having the same sex or gender (Moradi, Mohr, Worthington, & Fassinger, 2009).
Admittedly, this definition lacks the sophistication needed to fully understand the
complex, overlapping aspects of gender and sex, e.g., the social construction of both
terms, the assumption of sex and gender binaries, sexual orientation fluidity, etc. (Moradi
et al., 2009; Savin-Williams, 2008; Yarhouse, 2001). Additionally, bisexual and
transgender individuals (often included within the term sexual minority) are not the main
focus of this paper. The current research limits sexual minority to self-identified lesbians
and gay men because marriage equality law focuses almost exclusively upon the gender
composition of couples (i.e. defining marriage as between a man and a woman) (Bostic v.
Schaefer, fourth circuit, 2014; DeBoer v. Snyder, sixth circuit, 2014; Windsor, 2013).
Even those marriage equality cases that describe marriage as an individual’s fundamental,
substantive due process right still focus upon the gender or sex of the partner whom the
individual wants to marry because the relevant law impedes marrying the person of one’s
choice (Bishop, tenth circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Kitchen v. Herbert, tenth
circuit, 2014; Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2010).
In addition, equal protection suspect and quasi-suspect classification analyses also
focus on the characteristics of the members of the proposed class, who tend to be lesbians
or gay men in cases involving sexual minorities (Baskin v. Bogan, seventh circuit, 2014;
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Whitewood, 2014). In equal protection cases, courts ask whether there are sufficient
reasons to treat groups of persons differently for the purposes of a law (City of Cleburne,
TX v. Cleburne Living Center, 1985). However, when laws make classifications based
upon characteristics that could not rationally further a legitimate state purpose (e.g., race,
national origin, or alienage), the law is considered to be constitutionally suspect and must
meet a higher standard of review to remain in effect (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014;
Cleburne, 1985; Whitewood, 2014). As couples usually claim that marriage equality bans
violate their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law, courts ask
whether the current law treats individual plaintiffs differently based upon their sexual
orientation (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Varnum v. Brien, 2009; Whitewood, 2014).
In treating sexual orientation and gender in ways similar to race and ethnicity by
requiring individuals to belong to concrete, identifiable groups, courts reinforce the
notion of gender and sexual orientation as binary constructs (Moradi et al., 2009; SavinWilliams, 2008). Although this paper acknowledges the importance of encompassing a
broader, more nuanced interpretation of sexual minority, it focuses on how dominant
groups reinforce the status quo through system justification (i.e. how members of the
heterosexual majority create and sustain a subordinate, sexual minority class). Therefore,
I will make use of the terms utilized within the relevant legal contexts (i.e. marriage and
housing equality). Thus, although great fluidity exists within the concepts of gender and
sexual orientation, the current paper limits the discussion to the terminology within the
marriage equality context. As housing equality remains an underdeveloped area of law
and the current study seeks to apply system justification concepts initially constructed
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within the marriage equality context to the housing context, the current paper will limit
its analysis to sexual minorities who self-identify as lesbian or gay.
Legal Status Quo for Sexual Minority Rights
The current state of the law puts lesbian and gay (LG, or sexual minority) people
in a precarious position with regard to their civil rights. Sexual minority individuals lack
the protection that the Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 1964 grants to many other similarly
situated groups because they are not explicitly listed as a protected group. Additionally,
most courts have held that the CRA’s prohibition against sex discrimination does not
include sexual orientation discrimination, although it does include gender discrimination,
i.e. individuals cannot be discriminated against for failing to conform to stereotypes of
sex or gender (Centola v. Potter, 2002; Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 1999;
Ianetta v. Putnam Investments, Inc., 2001; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc.,
1996; Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 2000; Simonton v. Runyon, 2000). Currently,
only the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009,
which criminalizes hate crimes, provides sexual minorities with nationwide, federal
protection from dissimilar treatment based solely on their sexual orientation.
Marriage equality status quo.
Although, as of April 2015, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia
(D.C.) had granted marriage equality to same-sex couples (including only those states in
which same-sex couples may currently wed), thirteen states did not afford them this right
(HRC, 2015). The Supreme Court’s refusal to hear five same-sex marriage cases from
Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin allowed the lower rulings to stand (all
of which were for same-sex marriage) (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Bishop, tenth
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circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Fantz & Mears, 2014; Kitchen, tenth circuit,
2014; Wolf v. Walker, seventh circuit, 2014). Thus, although these cases appeared to
affect only five states, the three circuit court precedents (North Carolina, South Carolina,
Virginia, and West Virginia for the fourth circuit (Maryland already has marriage
equality) affect eleven states; Indiana and Wisconsin for the seventh circuit (Illinois
already has marriage equality); and Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming
for the tenth circuit (New Mexico already has marriage equality)) (Fantz & Mears, 2014).
In addition, on October 7, 2014, the Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit held that the
same-sex marriage bans in Idaho and Nevada violated the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment (combined opinion of Latta v. Otter and Sevcik v. Sandoval). In
contrast to the trend for marriage equality within other circuits, the Court of Appeals for
the sixth circuit held that state bans in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee on
same-sex marriage and recognition do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process or equal protection clauses (DeBoer, 2014). The sixth circuit ruling prevented
same-sex couples within the four states in which same-sex marriage is not recognized
from enjoying some of the same rights as their heterosexual couple counterparts, e.g.,
hospital visitation rights, access to partner’s health insurance, ability to file joint tax
returns and tax benefits, spousal rights upon the death of one partner, and joint parenting
rights (Goodridge, 2003; Hernandez, 2006; Marriage Equality USA, 2015).
The recent Supreme Court decision on same-sex marriage (Obergefell, 2015) held
that the fundamental, substantive Due Process clause right to marry includes same-sex
couples. The Court discussed the facets of the fundamental right to marriage, including
the right to choose one’s spouse; the nature of marriage as a unique, intimate institution
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within the United States; marriage’s importance within the realm of childrearing and
family creation; and marriage’s position as the building block of society. By then
affirming that same-sex couples do not differ substantially from opposite-sex couples in
any of the key characteristics associated with the right to marriage, the Court held that
denial of the right to marriage to same-sex couples violates the Constitution. Without
engaging in a thorough Equal Protection clause analysis, the Court held that denial of the
right to marry infringed upon guarantees of equal protection. By focusing upon the lack
of equal protection within the context of marriage, the Court avoided the larger
constitutional question of whether sexual minorities constitute a protected or suspect
class. Thus, although sexual minorities have the right to marry the person of their choice,
the equality concepts contained in Obergefell (2015) apply only within the context of the
fundamental right to marriage.
Although not the focus of this piece, it is important to acknowledge that
transgender individuals’ marriage rights are also largely uncertain, depending, in many
cases, upon an individual’s assigned sex at birth, their partner’s sex, and both individuals’
sexes at the time they apply for a marriage license (Lambda Legal, 2015). Whether a
transgender individual has transitioned (i.e. is living as the gender with which they
identify, as opposed to the sex they were assigned at birth) before or after applying for a
marriage license often impacts their marriage rights (HRC, 2015; Lambda Legal, 2015).
According to Lambda Legal, the way states identify the sexes of the members of the
couple (although this determination may not match the sex with which individuals
identify), determines whether the couple constitutes a heterosexual or same-sex couple,
and, therefore, whether the state can apply the marriage laws in place for same-sex and
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heterosexual couples (2015). Thus, the analysis for same-sex marriage applies to
transgender individuals when states have identified them as belonging to a same-sex
couple seeking marriage.
Prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell (2015), thirteen states prohibited
marriage equality through state constitutional amendments (HRC, 2015). Whether the
prohibition on marriage equality applied to domestic partnerships and civil unions
depended upon the wording of the legislation involved (Howenstine, 2006). For
example, the wording of the Georgia constitutional marriage amendment restricted the
definition of marriage to heterosexual couples and prohibited granting the same benefits
to same-sex couples as marriage for heterosexual, married couples (Constitution of the
State of Georgia, 2007). In contrast, Arkansas merely denied same-sex couples the same
legal status as marriages between heterosexual couples (Constitution of the State of
Arkansas of 1874, 2004). Arkansas law could provide same-sex couples with some
rights (i.e. domestic partnership rights), as long as the scope or effects of the rights
granted did not approximate those of marriage. The wording of these kinds of
amendments varied the exclusiveness of coverage for same-sex couples and, as a result,
the extent of the prohibition on partnership rights was, often, a matter of judicial
interpretation at the district court or appellate level (Howenstine, 2006). Thus, the state
partnership rights of individuals in same-sex relationships depended upon their state of
residency and the judicial interpretation of jurisdictional courts.
Additionally, although same-sex couples could marry in one state, other states
might not recognize their marriages (HRC, 2015). Within the US, the rule of lex loci
contractus provides that states will recognize out-of-state marriages as valid as long as
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the marriages were valid in the states in which they were performed (Obergefell v.
Wymyslo, 2013; Henry v. Himes, 2014). However, some states refused to recognize the
relationship statuses (whether marriage, domestic partnership, or civil union) in the
instance of same-sex couples (DeBoer, sixth circuit, 2014; HRC, 2015). Although, after
Windsor, the federal government provides some federal benefits to married same-sex
couples (e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act coverage), some federal benefits depend
upon the state in which the married couple lives (Bernard, 2014). For example, the
Social Security Administration must follow the law of the state in which the couple
resides, not where they married, to determine marriage validity (LaVelle, 2014).
Similarly, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (2015) determines spousal eligibility
for services and benefits by whether the state in which the spouse lived during their
marriage recognized the couple as married or if the state in which the spouse lived when
they filed a claim recognized the couple as married. In addition, states determine whether
various economic benefits (e.g. health insurance, inheritance tax exemptions) and
personal rights (e.g. presumption of parentage and the right to make decisions for
children within the family unit) available to heterosexual, married couples are also
available to same-sex married couples according to whether the state does or does not
recognize a couple as married (Bourke, 2014; Henry, 2014; Obergefell, 2013; Tanco v.
Haslam, 2014). Therefore, prior to Obergefell (2015), the rights of married same-sex
couples varied according to the laws of each state.
Housing equality status quo.
In most jurisdictions within the United States, sexual minorities lack protection
from housing discrimination (HRC, 2015). At the federal level, the Fair Housing Act
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(Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968) does not include sexual orientation within its
list of protected classes (Armstrong, 2013). However, as of 2012, the US Department of
Housing and Human Development (HUD) prohibits housing discrimination against
individuals based upon sexual orientation or gender identity in HUD-funded housing
(Equal Access to Housing in HUD Programs Regardless of Sexual Orientation or Gender
Identity, 24 C.F.R. § 5.105(a)(2)(ii)). Eighteen states (California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington) and the
District of Columbia (D.C.) prohibit housing discrimination based upon both gender
identity and sexual orientation (HRC, 2015). In addition, New Hampshire, New York,
and Wisconsin prohibit housing discrimination based upon only sexual orientation. Thus,
twenty-nine states currently lack statewide housing protection for sexual minorities.
Local municipalities differ as to the amount and kind of protection they provide.
In nine states (Alabama, Alaska, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming), none of the local municipalities offer housing
non-discrimination protection (Movement Advancement Project (MAP), 2015). Of the
remaining twenty-three states that do not offer both sexual orientation and gender identity
statewide housing protection, local municipalities in seven states (Florida, Indiana, New
Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Virginia, and Wisconsin) distinguish between sexual
orientation and gender identity housing protection, with sexual orientation garnering
greater protection than gender identity. In the sixteen states in which sexual orientation
and gender identity receive the same amount of housing non-discrimination protection
from local municipalities, the percentage of state populations protected varies greatly by
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state. For example, whereas 54% of the state population of Utah is protected from
housing discrimination (representing the state with the greatest amount of protection for
all sexual minorities), only 1% of the state population of South Carolina is protected from
housing discrimination. Overall, of the LGBT population, 39% currently lives in a state
that prohibits housing discrimination based upon gender identity and sexual orientation,
48% lives in a state that prohibits only sexual orientation housing discrimination, and
52% lives in a state that does not prohibit housing discrimination based on either gender
identity or sexual orientation at a state level (MAP, 2015).
United States Supreme Court Analysis of Sexual Minority Rights (Bowers v.
Hardwick through Lawrence v. Texas)
By analyzing the legal precedents and legislative actions that impact sexual
minorities, one can understand how the current context of inequality for sexual minorities
arose. Within the context of sexual minority rights cases, the United States Supreme
Court’s views on fundamental liberties have broadened substantially. Initially, in Bowers
v. Hardwick (1986), the Court held that the fundamental substantive liberties protected by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ due process clauses only included those rights
historically protected (see also Moore v. East Cleveland, 1977). The Court found that
because throughout much of our history, the US and many of the States outlawed sodomy
(regardless of the sexual orientation or sex of the individuals involved) that a
fundamental liberty did not exist. Therefore, a state only needed a rational basis for
establishing anti-sodomy laws. Thus, after the Bowers decision, state and federal law
prohibiting homosexual sexual conduct did not violate the US Constitution.

17
After Bowers, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on this issue slowly evolved,
providing more rights to sexual minorities. First, in Romer v. Evans (1996) the justices
considered whether an amendment to the Colorado constitution that withdrew protections
previously established for LGB individuals in specific municipalities within Colorado
and prevented those municipalities from providing protection in the future violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause (Romer, 1996; US Constitution,
Amendment 14). The Court held that the statute did not pass the rational basis test
because it targeted a specific group (sexual minority individuals) and therefore showed
animus on the part of the people of Colorado when they enacted this statute. Statutes
motivated by animus alone, i.e. those that target specific, unpopular minorities, “cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest” and therefore violate the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection clause under rational basis scrutiny (p. 634; see also
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 1973).
On the heels of Romer, the Court struck down anti-sodomy statutes altogether,
reversing Bowers (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003). Drawing from Griswold v. Connecticut
(1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), and Roe v. Wade (1973), Lawrence held that antisodomy criminal statutes violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process
liberty interest in privacy. The Court recognized that the statute constituted a violation of
the plaintiffs’ liberty interest in privacy by regulating, through criminal law, the private
lives of individuals in matters related to sexual intimacy. The Court held that the state
did not have a legitimate interest in denying to individuals their choices in adult,
consenting, sexual partners. Thus, sexual minority sexual conduct between consenting
adults carried out in one’s home is protected because it exists within a sphere of privacy.
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Although the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process clause protects sexual
conduct between consenting adults within the privacy of one’s home, the Supreme Court
only recently ruled whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process right to
marriage includes same-sex couples (Obergefell, 2015).
Substantive Rights for Sexual Minorities
Marriage as a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause.
Supreme Court analysis.
Although, prior to Obergefell (2015), protection for sexual minority individuals
for same-sex marriage did not exist nationwide, several cases indicated that same-sex
marriage may be included within the fundamental right to marry. To understand how the
trend has evolved, it is necessary to consider Loving v. Virginia (1967), where the court
struck down anti-miscegenation statutes that prohibited individuals of different races
(specifically, white and black) from marrying. The court held that the statute in question
violated both the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection and due process clauses.
Regarding the equal protection clause, the statute did not survive the “most rigid
scrutiny” (i.e., the strict scrutiny test) required for racial classifications because the state
failed to show how the statute was “necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible
state objective” (11; see also, Korematsu v. United States, 1944), that is, the state failed to
show a compelling interest to support its anti-miscegenation statutes. Furthermore, the
Court recognized marriage as one of the “‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our
very existence and survival” (12; see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 1942) and, therefore,
held that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause by denying
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the Lovings their liberty without due process of law. Thus, the Loving case established a
substantive due process right to marriage, although it did not extend the right to sexual
minorities.
In contrast to the court’s expansive language in Loving, in 1996, the federal
government enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which prohibited same-sex
couples from accessing federal rights and privileges given to citizens based upon
marriage (Pub. L. 104-199). In 2013, the Court struck down the part of DOMA that
defined marriage as only existing between heterosexual couples (Windsor). The Court
held that the Fifth Amendment due process clause included an implied equal protection
aspect, based on cases like Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena (1995), and that statutes motivated by animus towards an unpopular group could
not serve a legitimate governmental interest (Romer, 1996). In Bolling (1954), the Court
held that school segregation within Washington, DC, violated the Fifth Amendment due
process clause because the state could not restrict the liberty component of the clause
could without a “proper governmental objective”, which did not include segregation.
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the federal government needed to secure the same
level of equality as did the states. In Adarand (1995), the Court reaffirmed that equal
protection claims under either the state (through the Fourteenth Amendment) or federal
framework (through the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause) should be treated exactly
the same for constitutional purposes. Thus, because DOMA singled out a specific group
(same-sex married couples) for dissimilar and detrimental treatment, it could not
withstand rational basis review.
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Same-sex marriage context: Precedential impact of Baker v. Nelson.
In Baker v. Nelson (1971), the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that barring
same-sex couples from marriage did not violate either the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process or equal protection clause. The US Supreme Court summarily dismissed the
Baker appeal for “want of a substantial federal question” (Baker, 1972; see also Hicks v.
Miranda, 1975; Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 1979; Mandel v.
Bradley, 1977). The Supreme Court dismissal acted as a decision on the merits of Baker
because an appellate dismissal requires lower courts to follow the conclusions that were
decided in the case (Mandel, 1977). According to Hicks v. Miranda, “unless and until the
Supreme Court should instruct otherwise, inferior federal courts had best adhere to the
view that if the Court has branded a question as unsubstantial, it remains so except when
doctrinal developments indicate otherwise…” (Jackson, 2012, quoting Hicks, 1975).
Accordingly, because the higher court did not rule on the specific challenge presented in
Baker and because sufficient doctrinal developments did not indicate that the question
was substantial, lower courts may not consider deciding in a way contrary to the original
holding (i.e. in favor of same-sex marriage and against precedent) (Baskin, seventh
circuit, 2014; Bishop, tenth circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit 2014; Brenner v. Scott,
2014; Costanza v. Caldwell, 2014; De Leon v. Perry, 2014; DeBoer, sixth circuit, 2014;
Geiger, 2014; Hernandez, 2006; Jackson, 2012; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014; Latta, ninth
circuit, 2014; Love v. Beshear, 2014; McGee v. Cole, 2014; Morrison, 2005; Wilson v.
Ake, 2014; Wright v. Arkansas, 2014). Following the precedent established in Baker, the
US District Courts in Jackson (2012) and Sevcik (2012) held that the heterosexual
marriage legislation excluding gays and lesbians did not violate the equal protection
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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (see also Hernandez, 2006; Wilson, 2005). In
addition, the court in Jackson and in DeBoer (sixth circuit, 2014) also ruled that Baker
precedent applied to the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim (2012). In
the alternative, each court ruled that the plaintiffs’ cases failed on their merits.
Unlike the courts in Jackson, Sevcik, and DeBoer, most courts that have
considered same-sex marriage after Windsor held that, due to the significant doctrinal
developments that have occurred in equal protection and substantive due process law
since the Baker dismissal, it is proper to set aside the precedent in Baker and decide the
issues regarding same-sex marriage (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Bishop, tenth circuit,
2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Brenner, 2014; De Leon, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Kitchen,
tenth circuit, 2014; Latta, ninth circuit, 2014; McGee, 2014; Love, 2014; Whitewood,
2014; Wright, 2014). The significant doctrinal developments include the creation of
intermediate scrutiny for quasi-suspect classes involving illegitimacy and sex (Craig v.
Boren, 1976, Rehnquist, J., dissenting; Frontiero v. Richardson, 1973; Lalli v. Lalli,
1978), the rejection of statutes that make discriminatory class distinctions based solely on
sexuality (Romer, 1996), and the rejection of statutes that criminalize consenting, adult
sexual intimacy (Lawrence, 2003). Most importantly, the Supreme Court’s recognition
of the violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection clauses for
those marriages permitted by the states (Windsor, 2013) may constitute doctrinal
development with the potential for far reaching changes in broad areas of sexual
orientation and sexual identity law. Indeed, these doctrinal developments led the
Supreme Court to overturn Baker (Obergefell, 2015), thereby establishing that the
protection guaranteed by the fundamental right to marriage includes same-sex couples.
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Defining the fundamental right to marriage.
Prior to Obergefell (2015), in applying the substantive aspect of the due process
clause, courts disagreed as to whether same-sex marriage fell within the fundamental
right to marriage established in Loving or constituted a new right. When a law infringes
upon a fundamental right, it must pass strict scrutiny, i.e. it must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997; see also Moore, 1977,
and Reno v. Flores, 1993). By requiring strict scrutiny analysis for laws that infringe
upon fundamental rights, the Supreme Court makes it more likely that these laws will be
struck down as unconstitutional because the laws need to pass a much more difficult test
than the rational basis test that measures most laws. Therefore, the Court only declares
fundamental those rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”
(Moore, 1977, p. 503; see also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 1934) and “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,” to the extent that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed” (Palko v. Connecticut, 1937). If the law does not infringe upon a
fundamental right, nor involve a suspect classification (Equal Protection Analysis, see
below), courts apply the rational basis test (DeBoer, sixth circuit, 2014; Jackson, 2012;
Robicheaux, 2014).
The crucial aspect for substantive due process analysis is whether the fundamental
right asserted involves marriage (broadly) or same-sex marriage (specifically). Both
Loving (1967) and Zablocki (1978) established that a fundamental right to marry exists
within the substantive aspect of the due process clause. What, then, constitutes marriage?
In Goodridge (2003), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that the right to
marry must include the right to choose whom to marry. In the case of lesbians and gay
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men, this entails the right to marry someone of the same sex. Similarly, in Kitchen
(2013), the US District Court for the District of Utah weighed the interests of the state in
regulating marriage against the rights of the individual under the US Constitution. The
District Court found that the fundamental right to marry is a substantive part of the
liberty, privacy, and association rights contained within the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process clause and that when the state tried to limit marriage to heterosexual couples, it
infringed upon this right to marry (Kitchen, district court, 2013). Following the reasoning
of Loving, the District Court defined marriage as “the right to make a public commitment
to form an exclusive relationship and create a family with a partner with whom the
person shares an intimate and sustaining emotional bond”, i.e. the companion model of
marriage (Kitchen, district court, 2013, p. 1202-1203; Bishop, district court, 2014;
Goodridge, 2003). Thus, for those courts that held that marriage included “same-sex
marriage”, the essential aspects of marriage only include the forming of a committed
relationship based upon intimacy and love between two consenting adults for the purpose
of creating one household with the desire to have the state recognize this relationship
(Bishop, district court, 2014; Goodridge, 2003; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Perry,
2010). As discussed in Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010), this definition of marriage is
deeply rooted in the traditions and history of this Nation and is implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty. Although the Supreme Court followed the companion model of marriage
in Obergefell (2015), it also distinguished the fundamental right to marriage from other
fundamental rights by citing Supreme Court precedent that established a broader
conception of the right to marry. According to the Court, precedent established that the
right to marry did not require a “careful description” of the right at stake (as required
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when determining whether a fundamental right is at stake under Washington v.
Glucksberg, 1997). Loving (1967), Zablocki (1978), and Turner (1987) only inquired as
to whether those plaintiffs still had a fundamental right to marry in cases where their
states had denied them that right due to their specific circumstances. Thus, the Court
determined that the right to marry encompasses a broad right not to be limited in the same
way as other rights when conducting fundamental rights analysis.
In contrast, other courts ruled that the substantive due process right to marriage
excludes same-sex couples because, prior to Goodridge (2003), same-sex marriage did
not exist within the US (Freedom to Marry, 2015; HRC, 2015). When analyzing whether
this right is fundamental, such that it falls within the substantive due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, these courts narrowed the right to one involving only same-sex
marriage, rather than marriage in general (Baehr, 1993; Baker, 1971; DeBoer, sixth
circuit, 2014; Hernandez, 2006; Jackson, 2012; Lewis, 2006; and Robicheaux, 2014).
Baehr and Baker relied upon the reasoning in Griswold (1965) for the notion that
marriage as a union between heterosexual individuals, being a traditional institution, is
the fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. DeBoer (sixth circuit),
Hernandez, Jackson, Lewis, and Robicheaux followed the reasoning in Glucksberg that
Courts must carefully define the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right
brought forth by petitioners to keep from making constitutional law in accordance with
judicial preferences (see also Baker, 1971; Collins v. Harker Heights, 1992; and Reno,
1993). The courts remained reticent in expanding Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process rights because declaring a right to be constitutionally protected removes the
right from the democratic process, i.e. unlike other legislation, the right cannot be
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repealed through the traditional legislative process (Glucksberg, 1997; Marbury v.
Madison, 1803). A constitutionally protected right may not lose its constitutional
protection without a federal constitutional amendment (The Constitution of the United
States, Article 5, 1787). Additionally, laws that infringe upon this right are subject to
strict scrutiny, thereby making it difficult for these laws to pass constitutional muster
(Glucksberg, 1997; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 1992; Reno,
1993). If courts ruled that the fundamental right to marriage included same-sex marriage,
it would be difficult for the state to remove this greater level of protection. Thus, wary of
putting their own values before those of the populace, judges often hesitate to place a
right within the substantive due process realm unless it is deeply rooted within US history
(Collins, 1992; Glucksberg, 1997; Moore, 1977; Snyder, 1934). Following the doctrine
of judicial restraint, the right defined in the anti-marriage equality cases involved only the
right to same-sex marriage (Lewis, 2006, p. 436).
Then, according to the reasoning in Glucksberg, courts must analyze whether the
right asserted is fundamental (Moore, 1977; Palko, 1937; Snyder, 1934; United States v.
Salerno, 1987; Reno, 1993). In DeBoer, Lewis, Jackson, and Robicheaux, the Court of
Appeals for the sixth circuit, the New Jersey Supreme Court, the US District Court for
the District of Hawaii, and the US District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,
respectively, noted that, though the US Supreme Court held that there is a fundamental
right to marriage, all of the couples involved in Supreme Court marriage cases have been
heterosexual couples (Loving, 1967; Skinner, 1942; Zablocki, 1978; and Turner, 1987).
Lewis (2006), then, discussed how the intent of the framers of the New Jersey
Constitution and the drafters of New Jersey’s marriage statutes did not envision marriage
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to include same-sex couples. Additionally, the court in Jackson discussed how judicial
precedent regarding the right to marriage has, often, turned on procreation, implying that
same-sex marriage cannot be a fundamental right because procreation cannot occur in a
same-sex relationship (2012; see also DeBoer, sixth circuit, 2014). All three courts, and
the District Court in Robicheaux, relied upon the language in Lawrence (2003) to show
that the US Supreme Court, in determining that lesbian and gay individuals have a
Fourteenth Amendment due process substantive liberty right to engage in private, sexual
conduct, explicitly stated that their holding did not necessarily imply whether states had
to give recognition to same-sex relationships. In addition, DeBoer (sixth circuit),
Jackson, and Sevcik distinguished Loving from the same-sex marriage cases because
Loving still involved a marriage between heterosexual individuals, which the courts
considered to be the traditional conception of marriage. Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia and Alito, in their dissents in Obergefell (2015) echoed these concerns
when they stated that they would have held that same-sex couples do not fall within the
fundamental right to marriage; rather, these justices opined that states should decide
whether to allow same-sex marriage as only those rights “deeply rooted in this Nations’
history and tradition” should be withdrawn from the traditional legislative process
(Glucksberg, 1997). I will analyze the state interest within rational basis scrutiny in the
“Equal Protection Analysis of Sexual Minorities within Marriage Context” section
(below).
In contrast, some courts that ruled for same-sex marriage held that it falls within
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process clause protection as part of the
fundamental right to marriage (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014;
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Brenner, 2014; Brinkman v. Long, 2014; Burns v. Hickenlooper, 2014; De Leon, 2014;
Goodridge, 2003; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014; Latta, district court, 2014; Lee v. Orr,
2014; Perry, 2010; Whitewood, 2014). Also, the Circuit Court of Pulaski County,
Arkansas, Second Division, granted summary judgment for the same-sex couple
plaintiffs, holding that the marriage statute and amendment in Arkansas violated the
plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to privacy and right to
equal protection (Wright, 2014). These courts held that marriage includes the right to
choose whom to marry (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014;
Goodridge, 2003; Griego v. Oliver, 2013; In re Marriage Cases, 2008; Kerrigan v.
Commissioner of Public Health, 2008; Latta, ninth circuit, 2014; Perry, 2010;
Whitewood, 2014).
For example, Bostic (fourth circuit, 2014) held that Glucksberg’s requirement of a
careful analysis before defining a right as falling within the substantive aspect of the due
process clause does not apply within the same-sex marriage cases because Glucksberg
analysis only applies in cases where individuals seek recognition of a new fundamental
right (see also Latta and Sevcik, ninth circuit, 2014; Whitewood, 2014). Upon
considering the “marriage as a fundamental right” cases (i.e., Loving, Zablocki, and
Turner) courts held that marriage constitutes a broad, individual right that depends upon
choice (Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Goodridge, 2003; Griego, 2013; Kerrigan, 2008;
Latta, ninth circuit, 2014; Love, 2014; Perry, 2010; Whitewood, 2014). Courts went on to
rely upon the reasoning in Lawrence (2003) that Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) (in which
the Court held that there was not a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy)
was wrongly decided because it too narrowly defined the liberty interest (Bostic, fourth
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circuit, 2014; Hamby v. Parnell, 2014; In re Marriage Cases, 2008; Kerrigan, 2008;
Latta, ninth circuit, 2014). Thus, as the liberty interest in Lawrence involved a broad
right to choose with whom to be intimate, the liberty interest described in same-sex
marriage cases involves a broad right to choose whom to marry (Bostic, fourth circuit,
2014; Goodridge, 2003; Hamby, 2014; In re Marriage Cases, 2008; Latta, ninth circuit,
2014; Whitewood, 2014). In Obergefell (2015), the Supreme Court agreed with the lower
courts by holding that the right to marry is broad in scope. Because same-sex marriage
involves the fundamental right to marry, protected by the substantive aspect of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, some courts have held that states
prohibiting access or recognition of same-sex marriage must pass strict scrutiny analysis
by providing a compelling state interest for the law and by showing that the law is
narrowly tailored to accomplish the compelling interest (Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014;
Brenner, 2014; Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 1977; In re Marriage Cases, 2008;
Perry, 2010). Other courts have evaluated marriage bans using heightened (intermediate)
scrutiny or rational basis scrutiny (Bourke, 2014; Griego, 2013; Hamby, 2014; Henry,
2014). The Supreme Court did not expressly discuss the level of scrutiny required for
analyzing whether same-sex couples fall within the right to marry; rather, the Court stated
that the right was fundamental and that, because same-sex couples did not differ from
opposite-sex couples in the aspects of marriage that make the right fundamental, samesex couples may marry (Obergefell, 2015). I will discuss whether these state interests are
compelling (strict scrutiny), important (intermediate scrutiny), or rational and whether the
laws created to accomplish these state objectives are narrowly tailored, substantively
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related, or rationally related in the “State Interests and Levels of Scrutiny Application
within Marriage Context” section (below).
Housing as a substantive right.
Protection from housing discrimination for sexual minorities represents an
underdeveloped area of law, and as a result, is an area ripe for new empirical research.
Unlike the marriage equality cases, the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause does
not contain a substantive right to housing (Jaimes v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing
Authority, 1985; Lindsey v. Normet, 1972). However, sexual minorities may have a valid
claim of housing discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) (1968) if Congress
extended it to include sexual orientation. The FHA makes it illegal to discriminate
against persons based upon their color, race, sex, religion, national origin, familial status,
or handicap in the rental or sale of a dwelling (42 U.S.C. § 3604). In 2012, the US
Department of Housing and Human Development (HUD) prohibited housing
discrimination against individuals based upon sexual orientation or gender identity in
HUD-funded or insured housing (Equal Access to Housing in HUD Programs Regardless
of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, 24 C.F.R. § 5.105(a)(2)(ii)). Although HUD
prohibits sexual minority housing discrimination within HUD-funded and insured
housing, this protection only covers approximately seven million households and does
not extend to the large majority of housing options, i.e. privately owned housing
(Armstrong, 2013; Kravis, 2012). If Congress included sexual orientation as a protected
class under the FHA, then there would exist a statutory right not to be discriminated
against within both the public and private housing context for sexual minorities.
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Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Rights for Sexual Minorities
Sexual minorities as a suspect or quasi-suspect class.
Although substantive rights provide a potential remedy for sexual minority
discrimination, equal protection arguments afford an alternative legal avenue. Courts,
traditionally, apply a specific test when conducting an equal protection analysis. Laws
may not distinguish between similarly situated classes of individuals for the purposes of
that law (City of Cleburne, TX v. Cleburne Living Center, 1985; Kerrigan, 2008; Plyler v.
Doe, 1982). In Cleburne (1985), the US Supreme Court stated that classifications based
upon alienage, race, or national origin are suspect classes subject to strict scrutiny. The
Court also applies an intermediate (or, heightened) standard of review for classifications
based upon gender/sex or illegitimacy, i.e. quasi-suspect classes, but declined to extend
this protection to the mentally handicapped and aged (Cleburne, 1985; Massachusetts
Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 1976). Although the Supreme Court declined to extend
suspect or quasi-suspect class protection to the mentally handicapped and aged, these
groups enjoy some protection in certain situations under statutory law (e.g., the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 1990, and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 1967). Unlike these groups, sexual minorities do not have
federal legislative protection against discrimination.
Specifically, the US Supreme Court has not determined whether sexual
orientation constitutes a suspect, quasi-suspect, or unprotected class for purposes of equal
protection, though it used a form of somewhat elevated rational basis scrutiny for laws
that are directed at sexual minorities when animus motivates the substance of those state
actions (Romer, 1996). When deciding whether a group constitutes a quasi-suspect or
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suspect class, courts examine whether: “(1) the group has suffered a history of invidious
discrimination; (2) the characteristics that distinguish the group’s members bear ‘no
relation to [their] ability to perform or contribute to society’…[3] the characteristic that
defines the members of the class as a discrete group is immutable or otherwise not within
their control, [and] [4] the group is ‘a minority or politically powerless’” (Kerrigan,
2008, citing Frontiero, 1973 (plurality opinion); Bowen v. Gilliard, 1987). Groups that
have these characteristics face greater discrimination from more powerful groups and are
less able to remedy their disparate treatment through traditional democratic means, thus
necessitating their quasi-suspect or suspect status for equal protection purposes
(Kerrigan, 2008; Varnum, 2009; Jackson, 2012; Sevcik, 2012; Griego, 2013). Although
several courts found equal protection violations against sexual minorities even under the
deferential rational basis standard of scrutiny, by holding that sexual orientation
constitutes a suspect or quasi-suspect class, courts increase the likelihood that
classifications based upon sexual orientation will be found to violate the equal protection
clause through the application of heightened or strict scrutiny review (Baskin, seventh
circuit, 2014; Kerrigan, 2008; SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 2014;
Varnum, 2009). Given the history of discrimination and bias against sexual minorities,
determining that sexual minorities constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class provides an
amount of protection that could counter the weight of such manifest prejudice.
Quasi-suspect class status represents a compromise between securing rights for
minority groups under the equal protection clause and providing the government with the
means to distinguish between dissimilar groups (Craig, 1976; Frontiero, 1973;
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 1982; Reed v. Reed, 1971). Unlike
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legislation involving suspect classification, which requires strict scrutiny of legislation
that makes distinctions between groups based upon race, alienage, or national origin,
legislative classification based upon gender/sex or illegitimacy constitutes quasi-suspect
classification (Cleburne, 1985). Intermediate scrutiny for quasi-suspect classes provides
less protection because it requires classifications to be “substantially related to a
sufficiently important governmental interest”, rather than requiring that classifications be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest (i.e. strict scrutiny) (Cleburne,
1985). In Reed (1971), which involved a legislative distinction based upon gender for the
purpose of administering a decedent’s estate, the Supreme Court established that,
although states may distinguish between different classes of persons through legislation,
the statutory creation of different classes must be related to the purpose of the statute (i.e.
the classification must not be arbitrary). In fact, the classification must be based on
actual differences between the groups such that these differences bear a “‘fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike’” (Reed, 1971, quoting Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 1920). Although Reed applied the substantial relationship test to gender/sexbased discrimination, the Supreme Court, in Frontiero (1973), stated that sex-based
classifications must be subjected to strict scrutiny because they are inherently suspect. In
Stanton v. Stanton (1975), the Supreme Court held that the substantial relationship test
applied in Reed should be used for sex-based classifications. In Craig (1976), the
Supreme Court reaffirmed both Reed and Stanton by holding that gender/sex-based
classifications must meet the lower threshold of intermediate scrutiny by being
substantially related to furthering an important state interest. Then, in Hogan (1982), the
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Supreme Court reiterated its stance that the lesser form of intermediate scrutiny applies to
gender/sex-based classifications and, in Cleburne (1985), the Court firmly established the
levels of scrutiny for different minority groups (e.g. race, alienage, national origin,
gender, illegitimacy, age, and mental disability).
The creation of a lesser form of review through intermediate scrutiny presents an
issue for protecting rights of minority groups. Although both race and sex are,
theoretically, immutable characteristics, courts distinguish between the protections
provided to the two classes. The Supreme Court justifies using intermediate scrutiny for
gender/sex-based classifications through biological differences between men and women
(Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2001). For example, in Nguyen
(2001), the Court held that, when deciding whether a child born out of wedlock may have
US citizenship through his citizen father, Congress was free to choose different forms of
verifying the child’s status given the important governmental interest in showing that a
biological parent-child relationship exists. The biological difference between men and
women in regards to child-bearing allowed for different rules for establishing biological
parentage as the birth mother could show her relationship through the birth itself (i.e. she
could produce witnesses to confirm that she gave birth to the child). Thus, the Court held
that men and women were not similarly situated in this regard. Relying on this biological
difference, the Court held that Congress had the important interest of ensuring that the
citizen parent and child, at least, had the potential or opportunity to have a meaningful
relationship. Again, the Court distinguished between men and women such that women
have this opportunity because they give birth to the child and men may not know that
they have this opportunity. The Court found this opportunity to be an important
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governmental interest because it establishes the real connection to the US required to
obtain citizenship. The Court then held that the means used by the statute, i.e. the
additional lengths to which a citizen father must go in order to prove the citizenship of his
offspring, is substantially related to ensuring that, at least, the opportunity for a real
relationship exists between the father and his offspring. The Court’s analysis shows that
gender/sex may not require the same level of scrutiny as race because there may be
instances when a state has an important reason for distinguishing between sexes in a way
it would not for race, thereby making the legislation only somewhat suspect.
Within the context of sexual minorities, if the Supreme Court chooses to apply a
heightened form of scrutiny, it is likely that they will apply intermediate scrutiny given
the tendency for lower courts to apply it. For example, both Courts of Appeals for the
seventh and ninth circuit courts applied heightened scrutiny when examining equal
protection violations of sexual minority rights. In its combined opinion, the seventh
circuit court held that sexual orientation discrimination in the marriage context
constituted violation of the equal protection clause because the statute did not
substantially further an important government interest (intermediate scrutiny) (Baskin v.
Bogan and Wolf v. Walker, 2014). Similarly, the ninth circuit court held that sexual
orientation discrimination in the context of a Batson challenge (i.e. a challenge involving
the striking of a potential jury member for an impermissible reason, such as belonging to
a protected group) involved a violation of the equal protection clause (SmithKline, 2014).
Prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence (2003), lower courts often declared
that sexual orientation could not be a suspect or quasi-suspect class for purposes of equal
protection because, if states could criminalize same-sex sexual conduct (i.e. Bowers,
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1986), then individuals who engaged in such conduct could not be considered a suspect
or quasi-suspect class (Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 1989; Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 1997; High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security
Clearance Office, 1990; Woodward v. US, 1989; but see Citizens for Responsible
Behavior v. The Superior Court of Riverside County, 1991).
With regard to the criteria of protected class status, after the Supreme Court held
that laws criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s
substantive due process right to liberty in ordering one’s private life (Lawrence), most
courts have little difficulty finding a history of discrimination against sexual minorities
and finding that the distinguishing characteristic of sexual orientation is irrelevant to the
purpose of specific laws (Andersen v. King County, 2006; Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014;
Conaway v. Deane, 2007; Golinski v. United States Office of Personnel Management,
2012; Obergefell, 2013; SmithKline, 2014; Varnum, 2009; Whitewood, 2014). However,
the immutability of the distinguishing characteristic (i.e. whether sexual orientation can
be changed) and whether the group lacks political power to change the classification are
the factors on which most courts focus (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Bassett v. Snyder,
2013; Conaway, 2007; Golinski, 2012; Griego, 2013; In re Marriage Cases, 2008;
Kerrigan, 2008; Obergefell, 2013; Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Management, 2012;
Varnum, 2009; Whitewood, 2014). Although more recently courts have found the trait of
sexual orientation to be immutable, and, therefore, that it is a core aspect of identity
which would make it wrong for the government to attempt to change, several courts have
found that sexual orientation is modifiable in ways that other suspect or quasi-suspect
class’s distinguishing traits are not (e.g. race or sex) (Conaway, 2007; Equality

36
Foundation, 1995; Woodward, 1989). Similarly, some courts have found that sexual
minorities have too much political power to be considered a suspect or quasi-suspect
class (Andersen, 2006; Conaway, 2007; High Tech Gays, 1990). Given these divergent
holdings, and the Court’s reticence to apply strict scrutiny in cases not involving race,
national origin, or alienage, it becomes far more likely that the Court will place sexual
minorities within the quasi-suspect framework if they choose to apply a heightened form
of scrutiny. The possibility that the Court will hold that sexual minorities constitute a
quasi-suspect class for the purposes of classification provides sexual minorities with a
greater level of protection than rational basis review, but allows the government to
discriminate against sexual minorities if the classification substantially relates to an
important governmental interest. Thus, intermediate scrutiny only provides a moderate
level of protection.
Equal protection analysis of sexual minorities within marriage context.
All of the courts that have analyzed equal protection within the same-sex marriage
context found that a the law had made a distinction between different sets of people,
whether based upon sex, gender, sexual orientation, or couple composition (i.e. same-sex
v. heterosexual couples) (Baehr, 1993; Baker, 1971; Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014;
Bishop, tenth circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; De Leon, 2014; DeBoer, sixth
circuit, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Goodridge, 2003; Griego, 2013; Jackson, 2012; Kerrigan,
2008; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Latta, ninth circuit, 2014; Lewis, 2006; Perry, 2010;
Robicheaux, 2014; Sevcik, 2012; Varnum, 2009; Whitewood, 2014; Windsor, 2013; and
Wright, 2014). The US District Courts for the Northern District of Oklahoma, Western
District of Kentucky, and Oregon ruled that the relevant legislation that limited marriage

37
to heterosexual couples violated same-sex couples’ Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection of the law (Bishop, district court, 2014; Love, 2014; Geiger, 2014). In Lewis,
Kerrigan, Varnum, Garden State Equality v. Dow (2013) and Griego, the Supreme
Courts of New Jersey, Connecticut, Iowa, and New Mexico held statutes that limited
marriage to heterosexual couples violated each state’s equal protection clause. In Lewis,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the state must provide the full provisions of
marriage to same-sex couples (i.e. the substantive rights), but allowed the state legislature
to decide whether to grant same-sex couples access through the term marriage or by
providing a parallel institution (2006). The New Jersey legislature created civil unions
for same-sex couples as a parallel to marriage (Garden State, 2013). After Windsor, the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, of Mercer County held that the civil union
statute deprived same-sex couples of federal marriage rights, thereby violating the state
constitutional requirement of equal protection (Garden State, 2013). Thus, the court held
that New Jersey must grant access to the designation of marriage to same-sex couples.
In the context of same-sex marriage, some courts consider whether a
classification, based upon sex, sexual orientation, or couple status, is permissible for the
purposes of the marriage statute or amendment, i.e. whether there is a reason for the
distinction (Cleburne, 1985; Kerrigan, 2008). For heightened or strict scrutiny, this
reason must be sufficiently important or compelling and the means (i.e. the anti-marriage
equality law) must be substantially or narrowly tailored to accomplish this interest
(Cleburne, 1985). For rational basis scrutiny, the legislation must simply be rationally
related to the accomplishment of a legitimate state interest (Cleburne, 1985; Perry,
2010). The courts in Lewis, Kerrigan, Varnum, Perry, Griego, and Bishop v. Holder held
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or found that same-sex couples are similarly situated to heterosexual couples for the
purpose of marriage. The district courts in Jackson, Robicheaux, and Sevcik and the
Court of Appeals for the sixth circuit in DeBoer held that sexual orientation did not
constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class and, under rational basis scrutiny, the states of
Hawaii, Louisiana, Nevada, and the sixth circuit (Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and
Tennessee), respectively, had legitimate interests that were rationally furthered by their
anti-same-sex marriage legislation.
Lack of equal protection clause violation.
When they decided Jackson and Sevcik, the US District courts were bound by the
ninth circuit precedent established in High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security
Clearance Office (1990), which held that being gay is not an immutable characteristic
and that sexual minorities are not politically powerless (see also Woodward, 1989;
Equality Foundation, 1995; and Conaway, 2007). Examining the merits of the claim, the
Jackson (2012) and Sevcik (2012) courts also held that the marriage statute (in Jackson)
and amendment (in Sevcik) did not violate the equal protection clause by drawing a
distinction based upon gender because men and women receive the same treatment, i.e.
neither a man nor a woman may marry someone of the same sex. In addition, the courts
stated that without clear indication that either the ninth circuit court or the Supreme Court
hold sexual orientation to be immutable, they would continue to follow the precedent set
in High Tech Gays (1990). However, the recent ninth circuit holding in SmithKline
(2014) clarifies that laws that classify according to sexual orientation must overcome
heightened scrutiny within the equal protection context. Finally, the courts stated that
sexual minorities are not politically powerless because they enjoy political success at the
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local and national level. The court in Sevcik pointed to the increase in anti-discrimination
legislation and acceptance of sexual minorities within US society as countering the
history of discrimination that sexual minorities have experienced, suggesting that sexual
minorities do not need equal protection and can use the democratic process to achieve
their ends. According to Sevcik (2012), courts must be wary when classifying a group as
a suspect or quasi-suspect class because this classification limits the ability of the
legislature to pass laws regarding specific groups or in certain contexts. Recently, the
Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit reversed the decision of the US District Court for
the District of Nevada (Sevcik, 2012) in its combined opinion of Latta v. Otter and Sevcik
v. Sandoval (2014). Applying heightened scrutiny due to sexual orientation
discrimination, the circuit court held that Nevada’s proffered purposes for discrimination
lacked empirical basis and the means used for accomplishing these purposes were both
under- and over-inclusive (Sevcik, 2014).
The court in Robicheaux (2014) found that sexual orientation did not constitute a
suspect or quasi-suspect class because the US Supreme Court declined to apply
heightened scrutiny in Windsor. Rather, the “careful consideration” that the Court paid in
Windsor resulted from Congress’ intrusion into a context that the state traditionally
defined (i.e. marriage). Distinguishing the current case from Windsor, the District Court
observed that it was bound by the Supreme Court and fifth circuit jurisprudence, neither
of which have declared sexual orientation to be a suspect class. Similarly, the Court of
Appeals for the sixth circuit held that they would follow Supreme Court and sixth circuit
precedent, neither of which have treated sexual minorities as a suspect or quasi-suspect
class (DeBoer, 2014). Additionally, according to the sixth circuit, the recent political
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power of sexual minorities indicate that they do not need to be treated as a suspect or
quasi-suspect class because they have the power to achieve their ends through the
democratic process (DeBoer, 2014).
Equal protection clause violation.
After Windsor was decided in 2013, many courts (in sixteen different states) held
that the laws of their respective states (NJ, NM, UT, OK, VA, TX, MI, AR, ID, OR, PA,
WI, IN, FL, KY, and CO) violated either the US Constitution or the relevant state
constitution by not allowing same-sex couples to marry (Garden State, 2013; Griego,
2013; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Bishop, district court, 2014; Bostic v. Rainey, district
court, 2014; De Leon, 2014; DeBoer, district court, 2014; Wright, 2014; Latta, district
court, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Whitewood, 2014; Wolf v. Walker, district court, 2014; Baskin,
district court, 2014; Brenner, 2014; Love, 2014; Brinkman, 2014; Burns, 2014).
Subsequently, the Courts of Appeals for the fourth, seventh, and tenth circuits upheld the
lower courts’ decisions (Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; combined seventh circuit opinion for
Baskin v. Bogan, 2014, and Wolf v. Walker, 2014; and two tenth circuit opinions: Bishop
v. Smith, 2014, and Kitchen v. Herbert, 2014). The Court of Appeals for the seventh
circuit, in its combined opinion for Baskin v. Bogan (IN) and Wolf v. Walker (WI), held
that both Indiana and Wisconsin’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage within state and
recognition of out-of-state marriages violated the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because sexual orientation constituted a suspect class (2014).
Regarding whether sexual orientation constitutes a suspect or quasi-suspect class,
the courts in Baskin (seventh circuit), De Leon, Griego, Latta (ninth circuit), Love,
Varnum, Whitewood, and Wright stated that sexual minorities have experienced, and still
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experience, discrimination historically and are relatively powerless in the context of
marriage rights. Following the reasoning in Kerrigan, the courts in Baskin (seventh
circuit), Griego, De Leon, Love, Varnum, and Whitewood emphasized that the
immutability question did not simply depend upon whether the characteristic is
changeable at all, but, rather, “whether the characteristic is so integral to the individual’s
identity that, even if he or she could change it, [it would] be inappropriate to require him
or her to do so in order to avoid discrimination” (Griego, 2013, p. 884). The courts in
Bostic (fourth circuit), Brinkman, De Leon, DeBoer (district court), Geiger, Kitchen
(tenth circuit), and Wright held that the state justifications for heterosexual-only marriage
failed under the most deferential rational basis standard of review. The court in Bishop
(tenth circuit) followed the logic in Romer by holding that the marriage legislation in
Oklahoma failed under rational basis review due to the animus of the citizens in
amending their constitution (2014). Finally, the courts in Baskin (seventh circuit),
Griego, Latta (ninth circuit), Love, Varnum, and Whitewood held that a form of
heightened scrutiny must be used to analyze the relevant legislation because it involved
the potentially suspect or, more likely, quasi-suspect class of sexual orientation. Each
court then held that the relevant legislation failed under heightened scrutiny.
The Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit court held that sexual orientation
represents a suspect class and the Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit court held that
classifications based upon sexual orientation require heightened scrutiny for the purposes
of equal protection (combined opinion of the seventh circuit court for Baskin v. Bogan,
2014 and Wolf v. Walker, 2014; Smithkline, 2014). According to the seventh circuit
combined opinion, sexual minorities constitute a suspect class because of the historical
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discrimination they have faced based upon an immutable characteristic. The state may
only overcome this presumed violation of equal protection through a “compelling
showing that the benefits of the discrimination to society as a whole clearly outweigh the
harms to its victims” (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014, p. 4). For the ninth circuit,
Smithkline (2014) asserted that the Supreme Court’s analysis in Windsor indicated that
classifications based upon sexual orientation require heightened scrutiny for the purposes
of equal protection. The ninth circuit found that the Supreme Court did not use rational
basis review because it did not give deference to post-hoc rationalizations, focused upon
Congress’ actual purposes for DOMA (rather than potential hypothetical purposes), and
required Congress to justify its dissimilar treatment of sexual minority individuals and
couples (an analysis not normally required in rational basis review). The Windsor
analysis lacked a strong presumption of constitutionality of the law and deferential
treatment of the government. Thus, the ninth circuit held that Windsor requires
heightened scrutiny for laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. The
holdings of these two circuit courts present the possibility of sexual orientation becoming
a suspect or quasi-suspect class for purposes of equal protection. In Obergefell (2015),
the Supreme Court did not directly discuss whether sexual orientation requires
heightened protection under the equal protection clause. Rather, the Court cited the
Equal Protection clause as bolstering the fundamental right of marriage in its application
to same-sex couples. Thus, the question of whether sexual orientation constitutes a
suspect or quasi-suspect class remains open.
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Equal protection analysis of sexual minorities within housing context.
As of 2012, the US Department of Housing and Human Development (HUD)
prohibits housing discrimination against individuals based upon sexual orientation or
gender identity in HUD-funded housing (24 C.F.R. § 5.105(a)(2)(ii)). Although this
regulation does not protect sexual minorities from discrimination in non-HUD-funded
housing, it provides a potential avenue for bringing claims of discrimination based upon
sexual orientation discrimination under both the regulation itself and the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs have successfully brought claims of
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause due to racial
discrimination within the housing context, thereby providing precedent for discrimination
of other suspect or quasi-suspect groups (Heyward v. Public Housing Administration,
1956, Hunter v. Erickson, 1969, and Shelley v. Kramer, 1948). An initial issue regarding
the equal protection clause is that it only protects citizens from state action, not private
action (Fourteenth Amendment; Blum v. Yaretsky, 1982; Buchanan v. Warley, 1917; City
of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, 2003; Civil Rights Cases,
1883; Harmon v. Tyler, 1927; Richmond v. Deans, 1930). However, the Supreme Court
construes state action to include any action by the legislative, executive, or judicial
branch, which could, then, limit the actions of private individuals (Ex parte Virginia,
1880; Shelley, 1948; Strauder v. West Virginia, 1880; Virginia v. Rives, 1880). For
example, in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), the Supreme Court held that although private
covenants between land owners that restricted property ownership or use based upon race
did not violate the equal protection clause because they were the actions of private
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individuals, a court’s enforcement of these covenants did constitute state action that
violated the equal protection clause.
Thus, even private discrimination can constitute a violation of the equal protection
clause if it rests on the actions of state actors for its enforcement and has either an explicit
discriminatory purpose or a discriminatory impact to such an extent that a discriminatory
purpose must be inferred (Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corporation, 1977). Regarding claims of sexual orientation discrimination
in housing under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, sexual
minorities have not successfully brought a case of violation of equal protection.
However, as more courts recognize the potential for sexual minorities to represent a
suspect or quasi-suspect class, an equal protection claim based upon sexual orientation
discrimination becomes viable (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Golinski, 2012; Smithkline,
2014).
Given the holdings of courts regarding sexual minority equal protection in other
contexts, suspect and quasi-suspect class questions of immutability and political
powerlessness would likely arise within the housing context. As the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to state action against individuals or
classes (Blum, 1982; Buchanan, 1917; City of Cuyahoga Falls, 2003; Civil Rights Cases,
1883; Harmon, 1927; Richmond, 1930), HUD’s 2012 decision to include sexual
orientation within the classes of individuals who may not be discriminated against for
HUD-assisted funding makes equal protection violation a viable claim for sexual
minority individuals.
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Analysis of same-sex marriage litigation within the system justification
framework provides a template for sexual minority housing discrimination. Although not
a fundamental right, housing does constitute a substantive civil right because of the Fair
Housing Act (FHA). If the FHA were extended to include sexual orientation, sexual
minorities could have a civil rights claim akin to the substantive due process right to
marriage equality. Furthermore, this right would extend beyond state action (which is
involved in due process protection) to private action. As state interests for not providing
civil rights protection are specific to context (i.e. a state action involving housing would
involve different state interests than a state action involving employment), and sexual
minorities have not brought an equal protection claim within the housing context, it is
difficult to postulate the state interests that might be brought from a legal perspective.
Therefore, the current research applied both the social science construct of sexual
minority stigma and the political rhetoric equating sexual minority equality to “special
rights” in the context of system justification theory to help understand the conditions
under which lay people would support or refute an expansion of housing policy to include
sexual minorities (See “System Justification Theory within the Sexual Minority Context”
and “Housing equality: Application of system justifications”).
State Interests and Levels of Scrutiny Application within Marriage Context
The differences in the holdings between courts that upheld heterosexual-only
marriage statutes and amendments and those that struck down these laws revolve around
differences in the definitions of marriage, the applicability of equal protection principles,
and the application of rationality concerning state interests. When cases do not involve a
fundamental right or suspect or quasi-suspect class, courts apply rational basis scrutiny to
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the relevant law (Cleburne, 1985; Federal Communications Commission v. Beach
Communications, Inc., 1993; Heller v. Doe, 1993; Romer, 1996). This lower level of
scrutiny provides a very deferential standard toward state rationales for same-sex
marriage exclusion because a court must simply find one plausible reason for the state’s
legislation (DeBoer, sixth circuit, 2014; Jackson, 2012; Sevcik, 2012). In the context of
same-sex marriage, the question is whether the marriage amendments could further a
legitimate state interest motivated by a factor other than animus (Romer, 1996). For
example, the Jackson court held that encouraging heterosexual couples to marry
constituted a legitimate state interest and that the prestige that formal marriage bestows
upon heterosexual couples rationally furthered that interest (2012). Courts that upheld
anti-marriage equality laws have found that interests involving natural procreation,
“ideal” parenting and child-rearing environments, defending “traditional” marriage, and
being wary of social experimentation constitute legitimate state interests and plausible
rationales, under rational basis scrutiny, that allow the state to limit marriage to
heterosexual couples (Baker, 1971; Bruning, 2006; DeBoer, sixth circuit, 2014;
Hernandez, 2006; Jackson, 2012; Obergefell, 2015, opinion of Roberts, C.J., dissenting;
Morrison, 2005; Robicheaux, 2014; Sevcik, 2012). By narrowing the right that same-sex
couples seek to only same-sex marriage, rather than a broad, general right to marriage,
and rejecting sexual minorities as members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class, courts can
hold that plaintiffs do not seek fundamental rights, that states may have legitimate state
interests that are furthered by banning same-sex marriage, and that bans on same-sex
marriage do not violate the US Constitution.
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The various courts that have upheld same-sex marriage analyzed the states’
proffered interests and means of accomplishment using both rational and heightened
forms of scrutiny. Courts that struck down anti-marriage equality laws stated that any
state interests involving procreation and “ideal” child-rearing environments are not
rationally related to the laws against same-sex marriage, as scientific research
demonstrates that children fare as well in same-sex households as in heterosexual-couple
households (Biblarz & Stacey, 2010; Crowl, Ahn, & Baker, 2008; Goldberg & Smith,
2013; Obergefell, 2015; Potter, 2012; Pratesi, 2012; Rimalower & Caty, 2009; Wainright
& Patterson, 2006, 2008), and that defending “traditional” marriage or being wary of
social experimentation, alone, are not legitimate state interests (Bishop, district court,
2014; Bostic, fourth circuit 2014; Brinkman, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Goodridge, 2003;
Kerrigan, 2008; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014; Latta, ninth circuit, 2014; Love, 2014;
Perry, 2010; Varnum, 2009). For example, the Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit
held that some of the state interests were not important (e.g. tradition) and, for those that
were important, the means that the states utilized were not substantially related to
achieving those interests (Baskin, 2014; see also Bishop, tenth circuit, 2014; Bostic,
fourth circuit, 2014; Kerrigan, 2008; Varnum, 2009). Thus, although the welfare of
children (i.e. providing an optimal child-rearing environment) constituted a legitimate
state interest, the court held that prohibiting same-sex marriage actually hindered this
interest by disallowing the children of same-sex couples the same security of having their
parents married as the children of heterosexual couples (see also Bostic, fourth circuit,
2014; Geiger, 2014; In re Marriage Cases, 2008; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014; Latta,
ninth circuit, 2014; Obergefell, 2015; Perry, 2010; Windsor, 2013). These courts defined
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the purpose of marriage laws as creating “stability and order to the legal relationships of
committed couples by defining their rights and responsibilities as to one another, their
property, and their children, if they choose to have children” (Griego, 2013, p. 878;
Kerrigan, 2008; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014; Obergefell, 2015; Varnum, 2009; Windsor,
2013).
Many courts have explicitly stated that the sole purpose of the states’ marriage
laws is not to further procreation, which is in direct contrast to the reasoning of the courts
in Jackson and Sevcik (Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Goodridge, 2003;
Griego, 2013; In re Marriage Cases, 2008; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014; Obergefell,
2015; Perry, 2010). Going further, these courts held that other courts that found a
legitimate state interest in promoting procreation within marriage (i.e. responsible
procreation, rather than accidental procreation) supported anti-marriage equality bans that
actually hindered this purpose because the children of same-sex couples do not have the
same family stability and support as their peers who have heterosexual, married parents
(Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Goodridge,
2003; Griego, 2013; In re Marriage Cases, 2008; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014; Latta,
ninth circuit, 2014; Obergefell, 2015; Perry, 2010; Windsor, 2013). These holdings align
with scientific research, which finds that children, on average, fare better in stable, twoparent households than in single-parent households (Chiu, 2007; Gibson-Davis &
Gassman-Pines, 2010; Griffin, Botvin, Scheier, Diaz, & Miller, 2000; Harris, Greco,
Wysocki, Elder-Danda, & White, 1999; Lonczak, Fernandez, Austin, Marlatt, &
Donovan, 2007; Roy & Raver, 2014; Turner, Finkelhor, & Ormrod, 2007).
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Additionally, several courts held that the classifications for marriage according to
couple composition were both over- and under-inclusive for the purpose of procreation
and keeping children within heterosexual-couple families (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014;
Bishop, tenth circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Griego, 2013; Kitchen, tenth
circuit, 2014; Latta, ninth circuit, 2014; Varnum, 2009). A statute is under-inclusive if
the classification it makes “does not include all who are similarly situated with respect to
the purpose of the law” (Tussman & tenBroek, 1949, p. 348). A statute is over-inclusive
if the distinction it makes “includes more persons than those who are similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the law” (Varnum, 2009, p. 900). In Varnum (2009), the
Iowa Supreme Court held that the state’s civil marriage statute’s classification did not
further the state’s interest in providing children with the ideal family because it failed to
exclude other, objectively poor parents (e.g., sexual predators, child abusers and
neglectors). In addition, the classification was also under-inclusive because it did not ban
same-sex couples from adopting children. Finally, the classification was over-inclusive
because some same-sex couples wish to marry, but do not wish to raise children (i.e. the
statute excludes them from marriage, but they do not want to raise children). Thus,
regardless of their attitudes regarding raising children, Iowa prohibited same-sex couples
from marrying. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the statute could not survive
heightened scrutiny because the statute was not related to the state interest of providing
the optimal environment for raising children.
Similarly, other courts held that the statutes or amendments that were supposed to
encourage the state interests in providing optimal child rearing environments or
supporting procreation by prohibiting same-sex marriage fell short of the required fit
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between state interest and legal classification, that is, the legislation allowed infertile
heterosexual couples to wed, but similarly situated same-sex couples could not (Baskin,
seventh circuit, 2014; Bishop, tenth circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Griego,
2013; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014; Latta, ninth circuit, 2014). Finally, many courts have
held that states do not rationally have an interest in raising children only in heterosexualcouple households (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Geiger,
2014; Goodridge, 2003; Griego, 2013; Kerrigan, 2008; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014;
Latta, ninth circuit, 2014; Perry, 2010; Varnum, 2009). These holdings follow scientific
evidence that suggests that children thrive as well in same-sex-couple households as in
heterosexual-couple households (Biblarz & Stacey, 2010; Crowl et al., 2008; Goldberg &
Smith, 2013; Potter, 2012; Pratesi, 2012; Rimalower & Caty, 2009; Wainright &
Patterson, 2006, 2008). Furthermore, many courts have rejected the argument that
allowing same-sex couples to marry will negatively affect heterosexual, married couples
(Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Kerrigan, 2008; Kitchen, tenth circuit,
2014; Latta, ninth circuit, 2014; Obergefell, 2015; Varnum, 2009).
As will be explained in the system justification section, the use of “traditional”
definitions of marriage, being wary of social experimentation, concerns regarding natural
procreation, and “ideal” parenting and child-rearing environments constitute attempts to
maintain the status quo (Henry & Reyna, 2007). Additionally, stating that sexual
orientation is changeable and that sexual minorities are politically powerful may also
represent attempts to justify the status quo (Haslam & Levy, 2006; Hegarty & Pratto,
2004). By applying principles of system justification theory, I will next show that
support for these interests and rationalizations serve as a system justifying stereotype that
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maintains the current dominant-subordinate relationship between the sexual majority and
sexual minorities.
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CHAPTER 2
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS
System Justification Theory
System justification, as Jost and Banaji (1994) conceptualize the concept,
involves legitimizing present social arrangements (see also Jost et al., 2004; Jost & Kay,
2005). System justification is a psychological process that operates with the primary goal
of maintaining the status quo. Researchers theorize that the motivation to maintain the
status quo stems from an individual’s need to believe that they have personal control over
their life (Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008; Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, &
Galinsky, 2009). For example, Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan and Laurin (2008) studied
whether individuals who felt like they had less personal control over their lives would be
more likely to believe that their government is responsible for providing for its citizens.
Beliefs were collected through the World Values Survey via face-to-face interviews with
93,122 participants from 67 countries. The authors found that participants who felt that
they lacked personal control over their lives believed that the government should be
responsible for providing for its citizens, thereby endorsing the current governmental
system within their country. When individuals perceive the social world as random, they
tend to experience high levels of anxiety and fear (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Landau,
Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Martens, 2006; Landau, Johns, Greenberg,
Pyszczynski, Martens, Goldenberg, & Solomon, 2004). In order to avoid or offset that
anxiety, people strengthen their beliefs in their own personal control over their lives or in
the justness of an external system, which has the capability of protecting them (Jost &
Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004; Jost, Hawkins, Nosek, Hennes, Stern, Gosling, & Graham,
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2014; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Kay, Czapliński, & Jost, 2009; Kay et al., 2008; Kay,
Whitson et al., 2009; Laurin, Kay, & Moscovitch, 2008; Shepherd & Kay, 2012).
For example, Laurin, Kay, and Moscovitch (2008) asked students to visualize an
anxiety-provoking scenario, with half of the participants thought about a scenario in
which they had little personal control and the other half, a scenario in which they had
great personal control. The authors then measured participants’ levels of anxiety through
self-report and skin conductance levels. Laurin and colleagues found that participants
with greater levels of self-reported anxiety were more likely to believe in the existence of
a controlling God. Although both sets of participants experienced increased arousal as
measured by skin conductance level, self-reported anxiety predicted belief in the
existence of a controlling God only for those participants induced to feel a lack of
personal control. Thus, those without personal control felt the need to affirm their belief
in a system of external control (i.e. religion).
This central psychological mechanism, that individuals seek to reduce their
uncertainty and fear by strengthening their beliefs in the external system, draws from
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and just world theories (Lerner, 1980) (Jost,
Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway, 2003). According to just world theory, individuals
who have a strong need to believe that the world is fair, i.e. that people are punished or
rewarded according to what they deserve (Hafer, 2000) respond with high levels of
anxiety to threats to this belief (e.g., innocent victims or evidence that the world is not
just). In order to reduce this anxiety, people try to restore justice, which may take both
positive (i.e. victim helping) or negative forms (i.e. rationalization, derogation, and
blame) (Hafer, 2000).
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Cognitive dissonance, within the context of system justification, involves an
ideological dissonance that results from the contradictory thoughts that disadvantaged
groups hold that place individuals in those groups in a subordinate position.
Furthermore, by allowing themselves to be disadvantaged through acquiescence, their
group supports that system (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003). To reduce the
anxiety caused by this dissonance, members of disadvantaged groups may engage in
enhanced system justification. Applying these concepts (i.e. just world and cognitive
dissonance) in the context of system justification theory, individuals may defend an
external system even when that defense results in their own, personal disadvantage (i.e.
members of minority groups may defend the status quo, even though it results in them
having less power) (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2005). Rather than
questioning the existing social arrangement, most people will accept the arrangement as
normal and will create or accept explanations (i.e. rationalizations) that maintain the
system (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Kay, 2005; Kay, Czapliński, & Jost, 2009; Kay,
Gaucher, Peach, Laurin, Friesen, Zanna, & Spencer, 2009). Similarly, most people will
create rationalizations for specific outcomes that further the status quo. Whether these
explanations are objectively true or false is irrelevant because people accept them and use
them to justify the current status quo.
Explanations for the current social system often take the form of stereotypes, i.e.
shared conceptions regarding a group of people (Jost & Banaji, 1994). People infer these
stereotypes “directly from information about status or position, mainly in order to justify
differences in status or position” (Jost & Banaji, 1994, p. 12) and as a result often attach
associations of stigma to the stereotypes (Herek, 2000). Interestingly, the valence of the
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stereotypes matters little as long as they enhance the maintenance of the status quo (Glick
& Fiske, 2001a; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009; Kay
and Jost, 2003; Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005). For example, within the context of
ambivalent sexism, endorsement of benevolent, seemingly positive, stereotypes of
women (i.e. that women are “pure creatures” who need to be protected, loved, and adored
by men) helps produce a greater inequality between men and women (Glick & Fiske,
2001a). Furthermore, so-called benevolent, sexist stereotypes maintain the current
system of inequality by making men defensive towards women who resist their
subordinate status and by making women, in general, more accepting of their subordinate
position as it appears to be subjectively positive.
Kay and Jost (2003) found similar results when they exposed participants to
complementary stereotypes (e.g., “poor but happy” and “rich but miserable”) which led
to greater system justification within an economic context. Forty-seven undergraduate
students read about an individual who varied in terms of wealth (wealthy v. poor) and
happiness (happy v. unhappy), and then completed a series of items measuring their
beliefs in system justification. As hypothesized, participants were more likely to support
the current system when exposed to complementary pairings (i.e. “poor but happy” and
“rich but unhappy” over “poor but unhappy” and “rich but happy”). The positive
component of these stereotypes allowed marginalized groups to support the current
system by compensating their lower status with a positive trait. By accepting and
defending the status quo, individuals from marginalized groups increase positive
emotions and satisfaction with their current situation and decrease distress regarding their
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lower status (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost, Pelham et al. 2003; Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, &
Chen, 2007).
Increasing system justification: Dependency, inescapability, and threat.
Research has found a number of factors that can increase the likelihood that
individuals will justify systems that support subordinate groups. The more that
individuals feel they are dependent upon a system, that it is inescapable, or that the
system is threatened, the more they will engage in system justification (Jost, Kivetz,
Rubini, Guermandi, & Mosso, 2005; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009; Kay & Zanna, 2009;
Laurin, Shepherd, & Kay, 2010). Regarding system dependence, Kay, Gaucher, and
colleagues (2009) manipulated whether undergraduate participants believed that their
university or their country controlled aspects of their lives (i.e. participants were either
dependent upon their university or their country). Then, participants read that funds were
unequally distributed either throughout their university or throughout their country and
answered a series of questions that measured the degree that they supported the current
funding system. Participants who read that they were dependent upon their country
(university) agreed with their government’s (university’s) funding system but not their
university’s (government’s) funding system, demonstrating that reminding individuals of
their dependency upon a system increases their support for that system.
In an example of system inescapability, Laurin, Shepherd, and Kay (2010)
manipulated the ease with which Canadian participants believed one could emigrate from
Canada. Next, participants read that men were more likely to be financially successful
than women in Canada and were asked whether this difference was due to systemic
inequality or actual differences between men and women. The authors found that
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participants in the difficult-to-emigrate condition were more likely to believe that actual
gender differences caused financial inequality between men and women, whereas
participants in the easy-to-emigrate condition were more likely to question the legitimacy
of the current system. Apparently, when people feel they are dependent upon a system
and that they cannot escape that system, they must defend it as legitimate and just in
order to reduce the anxiety caused by their dependency (Jost, Pelham et al., 2003).
Other researchers have shown that threats to a system motivates people to defend
it (Brescoll, Uhlmann, & Newman, 2013; Kay et al., 2005). Participants from an online
database read that people in the US (their country) either believed that the country was at
a low point (system threat) or was at a high point (system affirmation) (Brescoll et al.,
2013). In addition, the authors created an existentialist threat condition unrelated to their
country in which participants wrote about a vivid and important scene from their
childhood or youth and how it would change in the future, thereby creating a sense of
insecurity. Others in the control condition simply completed the dependent measures,
items measuring beliefs about biological essentialism and immutability as explanations of
gender differences, as well as basic gender differences beliefs. While basic beliefs about
gender differences did not differ by condition, participants in the system-threat condition
were more likely than participants in the other three conditions to believe in biological
essentialism and immutability, with immutability acting as a mediator between system
threat and biological essentialism. These results indicate that threatening the status quo
elicits the need to defend the hierarchical system as the immutable natural condition.
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Widespread stereotype knowledge.
Other justification theories (i.e. ego-justification and group-justification) are
limited in scope as compared to system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994). For example,
ego-justifications suggest that stereotypes of groups should be specific to the needs of
individuals justifying their higher status in society. For example, because white people
have higher status within American society, only whites should hold the stereotype that
other, more disadvantaged groups are in some way inferior because only whites have a
need for justification. In the same way, group-justification predicts that the stereotype of
an outgroup should depend upon the specific relation between that outgroup and the ingroup (i.e. stereotypes of groups should not be consistent across groups) (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986). For example, though African Americans may have stereotypes about
Latinos and Latinos about African Americans, those stereotypes should be unique to each
in-group because they were developed by in-group solidarity (i.e. differentiation) and
outgroup derogation (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). How, then, to explain why some members
of the in-groups also self-stereotype in the same way that the out-group would stereotype
those individuals? In addition, how could one explain the notion that stereotypes are
well-known across groups? System-justification, by focusing on the ideological need to
defend the current status quo at the societal level and not in-groups, accounts for why
different groups can hold the same stereotypes about other groups and why group
members may negatively self-stereotype (Jost & Banaji, 1994).
In order for the status quo to be maintained, individuals throughout the social
hierarchy must accept the same rationalizations regarding the system. Thus, an
individual’s need for a stable, rational system, trumps their needs for personal or group
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self-esteem (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost & Hunyady, 2005). Jost
and Burgess’s (2000) study had undergraduates read a vignette about a female student
who was suing her university for gender discrimination after she was not admitted into
the university’s honors program. Jost and Burgess had participants complete measures of
their attitudes about the female student and the university, their level of social dominance
orientation, and their belief in a just world and found that women who were high in belief
in a just world were more likely to have ambiguous (i.e. both positive and negative)
attitudes towards the plaintiff than women who were low in just world belief. Thus,
women who have a strong need to believe in a just world tend to hold ambiguous
attitudes towards members of their in-group (women) when one of those individuals
threatens the fairness of the social system. Thus, in this situation, the need for a stable,
rational system trumped these women’s needs for group based self-esteem.
Using an experimental paradigm, Haines and Jost (2000) manipulated the extent
to which a group of students possessed power and legitimacy to judge another group of
students and found that less powerful groups had stronger acceptance and more positive
stereotypes about the judges when the judges were powerful and legitimate. Specifically,
researchers informed college students from Hunter College that students from Brooklyn
College would either complete the same task as the Hunter College group or would judge
how successful the Hunter College students were at their task to determine whether the
Hunter College students would continue in the study. Here, the Brooklyn students either
possessed or did not possess power over the Hunter students. The experimenters either
gave the Hunter College students a legitimate explanation, that the Brooklyn College
students had experience within the specific task, or an illegitimate reason, that the lead
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investigator had received his degree from Brooklyn College and had picked the Brooklyn
students because he knew them, or no reason at all. Regardless of whether the reasons
were legitimate or not, participants had greater positive affect when given any reason for
why Brooklyn students would judge them and they rated the Brooklyn students as more
responsible and intelligent (i.e. positive stereotypes) when they had power over the
Hunter participants (Haines & Jost, 2000). Furthermore, in comparison to those with no
explanation, participants with an explanation believed that the Brooklyn students had a
right to judge them on their task (again, regardless of legitimacy). Finally, within the
powerful condition, participants (regardless of the reason condition) were more likely to
remember that they had received legitimate reasons for why the Brooklyn students would
be judging their completed task. Thus, when group dominance is manipulated,
individuals are likely to not only engage in stereotyping to justify the power differential,
but also misremember the reasons for the power differential as being more legitimate
than they actually are. Jost and Burgess found similar results when they manipulated the
status of different groups of university alumni (2000). Thus, it appears that simply being
in a more powerful position within the system can give the high status group greater
legitimacy and maintain the system itself.
Alternative Theories
Alternative theories, such as dehumanization theory, social dominance theory, and
stereotype content model, explain aspects of sexual minority stigmatization, but do not
account for the marriage and housing discrimination towards LGBT populations. Sexual
minority stigmatization involves the belief that sexual minorities are morally wrong,
immature, criminal, sick, and less worthy than heterosexuality or at least, less than
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optimal (Geiger, 2014; Herek, 2004, 2007; Herek et al., 2009). Dehumanization involves
denying to another human being aspects of humanness (Bastian, Denson, & Haslam,
2013; Haslam, 2006). Although there are two forms of dehumanization (animalistic and
mechanistic), based upon sexual minority stigma, the animalistic form of dehumanization
appears to apply to sexual minority stigmatization (Haslam, 2006; MacInnis & Hodson,
2012). Animalistic dehumanization involves denying to others uniquely human (UH)
traits, such as “cognitive sophistication, culture, refinement, socialization, and
internalized moral sensibility” (Haslam, 2006, p. 256; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014;
Leyens, 2009). Mechanistic dehumanization involves denying traits involving human
nature (HN), such as emotional responsiveness, interpersonal warmth, cognitive
openness, agency, individuality, and depth (Haslam, 2006; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014).
Others see animalistically dehumanized individuals as immature, driven by their desires,
and immoral or amoral, whereas others see mechanistically dehumanized individuals as
inert, cold, rigid, passive, and superficial (Haslam, 2006). Animalistic dehumanization
explains the hierarchical categorization that differentiates heterosexual and sexual
minority groups (as sexual minority individuals are seen as less than heterosexuals) as
well as the disgust felt by some heterosexuals towards sexual minorities because denial to
the outgroup uniquely human features, such as sophistication, maturity, and morality,
allows in-group members to distance themselves from their own animalist nature by
casting it onto the outgroup (Balzer & Jacobs, 2011; Cunningham, Forestell, & Dickter,
2013; Embrick, Walther, & Wickens, 2007; Haslam, 2006; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, &
Bloom, 2009; Lyons, 2006; MacInnis & Hodson, 2012; Zeichner & Reidy, 2009).
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However, only one study of dehumanization investigated whether individuals ascribe
different levels of uniquely human and human nature traits to others based upon sexual
orientation (MacInnis & Hodson, 2012) and found that, although undergraduate students
were more likely to ascribe uniquely human traits to heterosexuals than homosexuals
(indicating animalistic dehumanization), undergraduates were more likely to ascribe
uniquely human emotions to homosexuals than heterosexuals (indicating a lack of
animalistic dehumanization). Thus, the current understanding of dehumanization may
not fully accommodate different aspects of sexual minority stigma.
Other obstacles exist in applying dehumanization to sexual minority stigma. As
Haslam (2006; Leyens, 2009) states, animalistic dehumanization requires the dominant
group to view the minority group in essentialist terms, i.e. it is categorically different
from the majority. Therefore, the trait that distinguishes the two groups must stable.
From an equal protection perspective, then, animalistic dehumanization cannot fully
explain disparate treatment of sexual minority members because lack of immutability (i.e.
the theory that sexual minorities can choose to be heterosexual through behavioral
modification) remains a cornerstone for denying suspect and quasi-suspect class status
based upon sexual orientation (Conaway, 2007; Equality Foundation, 1995; High Tech
Gays, 1990; Jackson, 2012; Woodward, 1989). Another problematic aspect of using
animalistic dehumanization to explain sexual minority treatment is that it does not readily
provide predictions for what happens when dehumanized individuals assert their
humanity. From a dehumanization perspective, when sexual minorities fight for marriage
and housing rights they claim ownership of uniquely human traits by seeking access to
institutions that, in society, signal maturity (i.e. the responsibility of becoming a part of a
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family and home ownership or rental) (Haslam, 2006). Although animalistic
dehumanization helps to explain the content of sexual stigma and the reactions of some
heterosexual individuals toward sexual minorities, it does not provide guidance for how
the majority group will react when the minority group claims ownership of uniquely
human traits and attempts to shake off their dehumanized treatment.
Similar to system justification, social dominance theory concerns the maintenance
of hierarchical systems by individuals in dominant and subordinate groups (Bahns &
Crandall, 2013; Lee, Pratto, & Johnson, 2011; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, Devereux, &
Pratto, 1992; Sidanius & Pratto, 1993; Sidanius, Pratto, Martin, & Stallworth, 1991).
Both at the institutional and individual level, discrimination against the subordinate group
and its members creates a stable social system with the dominant group at the top of the
hierarchy. To maintain the hierarchical status quo and reduce inter-group conflict,
societies create legitimizing myths, which can be any set of beliefs, values, attitudes, or
opinions that provide legitimacy for the superior position of a dominant group within
society, thereby resulting in differential distribution of power and resources (Pratto et al.,
1994; Sidanius et al., 1992; Sidanius & Pratto, 1993; Sidanius et al., 1991). In terms of
theory, then, social dominance theory resembles system justification theory in that both
theories focus on how hierarchical systems are maintained through ideologies (whether
called legitimizing myths or system justifications).
One interesting difference between the theories involves the focus of social
dominance theorists on an individual difference variable, i.e. social dominance
orientation (SDO) (Bahns & Crandall, 2013; Lee et al., 2011; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius
& Pratto, 1993). SDO involves the extent that an individual desires their in-group to hold
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power over other groups within a hierarchical social system (Pratto et al., 1994).
Although research suggests that dominant group individuals display greater levels of
SDO, there should be variation in SDO within the dominant group (Lee et al., 2011).
How, then, does one account for the large percentages by which anti-marriage equality
legislation passed in states that held referendums and ballot initiatives? For example,
59% of Michigan voters (DeBoer, sixth circuit, 2014), 74% of Kentucky voters (DeBeor),
62% of Ohio voters (DeBoer), 80% of Tennessee voters (DeBoer), 69% of Hawaii voters
(Jackson, 2012) all voted to ban same-sex marriage. Does a high level of SDO account
for the decisions of the majority of the voting populaces within these states? It is
unlikely, that the all those who voted against same-sex marriage are at the highest levels
of SDO. Although social dominance theory may provide theoretical guidance in
understanding sexual minority discriminatory treatment, SDO, a trait-like concept, cannot
account for the majority of individuals who voted for marriage bans. By ignoring the
importance of situational variables, such as the anxiety created by the threat of allowing
same-sex couples to marry, social dominance theory provides only a limited
understanding of sexual minority stigma.
Another possible theoretical explanation for sexual minority stigma, stereotype
content model involves the use of two dimensions (warmth and competence) to explain
the stereotypes held about different groups within society (Brambilla, Carnaghi, &
Ravenna, 2011; Clausell & Fiske, 2005; Fiske, 2012; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002).
Individuals experience feelings of warmth based upon the intentions of others (i.e. do
they intend to harm or help?) and make appraisals of competence based upon the status of
others (i.e. does their status indicate that they have the ability to carry out their

65
intentions?) (Brambilla et al., 2011; Fiske, 2012). Individuals ascribe differing levels of
warmth and competence to groups, thereby resulting in specific stereotypes for those
groups in a 2 (Warmth: high vs. low) by 2 (Competence: high vs. low) matrix. People
feel specific emotions according to the ascribed dimensions (i.e. high warmth/ high
competence invokes admiration, high warmth/ low competence invokes pity, low
warmth/ high competence invokes envy, and low warmth/ low competence invokes
contempt) (Fiske, 2012; Fiske et al., 2002).
One problem involving the stereotype content model is that, in initial tests of the
concept, gay men were viewed as neutral (i.e. participants did not view gay men as
cold/warm or competent/incompetent) (Fiske et al., 2002). Given the well-documented
stigma held towards gay men and other members of sexual minorities, this finding is
extremely suspect (Brown & Henriquez, 2008; Eagly, Diekman, Johannesen-Schmidt, &
Koenig, 2004; Herek, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2007; Herek & Gonzalez-Rivera, 2006).
Clausell and Fiske (2005) attempted to remedy this problem by focusing on potential
subgroups within the gay, male population. The researchers had undergraduate
participants create gay, male subgroups according to how “most Americans” view gay
men. Forty undergraduate students then rated the ten gay, male subgroups along the
competence and warmth dimensions. The researchers found that the ten subgroups
divided into three clusters representing high warmth/ low competence (HW/LC, i.e.
flamboyant and feminine subgroups), low warmth/ high competence (LW/HC, i.e.
artistic, body-conscious, in the closet, straight-acting, activists, and hyper-masculine
subgroups), and low warmth/ low competence (LW/LC, i.e. cross-dressed and
leather/biker subgroups). As hypothesized, the stereotypes assigned to the HW/LC and
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the LW/HC groups tended to match gender stereotypes of femininity and masculinity,
respectively. Similarly, studies on perceptions of lesbians indicate the likely presence of
subgroups that account for different stereotypes (Brambilla et al., 2011; Geiger,
Harwood, & Hummert, 2006).
According to stereotype content model, a group’s status should predict
competency beliefs regarding that group and a group’s intention to compete or cooperate
should predict subjective warmth, e.g., those who have a high status appear as competent
and those who intend to compete could take valuable resources, thereby leading to
feelings of envy (Fiske et al., 2002). These social structural variables are the reasons that
individuals stereotype members of outgroups (Clausell & Fiske, 2005). Although
Clausell and Fiske (2005) studied beliefs about gay men and found that competence and
status were related, they also found that cooperation was not related to warmth, indicating
that the status of gay men but not their warmth level determined the cultural stereotype.
Brambilla and colleagues (2011) found that status related to competence and cooperation
related to warmth for the lesbian subgroups that participants rated high in these
dimensions (i.e. feminine, outed, and butch lesbians for competence and feminine and
outed lesbians for warmth), but competition did not relate to warmth. This finding
indicates that perceived group competition, a key social structural variable within the
stereotype content model, does not affect stereotypes held towards lesbians.
These findings call into question whether the stereotype content model accounts
for all of the aspects of sexual minority stigma. As Herek (2004, 2007) noted, sexual
majorities stigmatize sexual minorities as immoral, immature, criminal, and sick, and the
concept of sexual minority itself is less than heterosexual, less than optimal and negative
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in valence (see also Herek et al., 2009). Immaturity, sickness, and being less than others
could, potentially, be aspects of status such that the majority culture sees some subgroups
of sexual minorities as being incapable of achieving their goals. Thus, unable to achieve
their goals, sexual minorities could be incompetent. Immorality, criminality, and
negative valence could be aspects of a lack of cooperation (though, not necessarily
competition), thereby resulting in neutral or cool feelings. How then to account for the
finding that only two subsets of gay men (cross-dressed and leather/biker) inhabited the
low-neutral warmth/ low competence quadrant within the stereotype content model
(Clausell & Fiske, 2005)? Furthermore, participants attributed to two subgroups of gay
men (i.e., the flamboyant and feminine) great warmth (though, low-neutral competence)
and to six subgroups (artistic, in the closet, activist, straight-acting, body-conscious, and
hyper-masculine) great competence (with lower warmth than the flamboyant and
feminine groups). According to stereotype content model, heterosexual individuals
should envy those within the six subgroups who are competent and pity those within the
two subgroups towards whom they feel warmth. In addition, Brambilla and colleagues
(2011) found that heterosexual participants viewed feminine and outed lesbians with high
warmth/ high competence (which should arouse admiration), butch lesbians with low
warmth/ high competence (which should arouse envy), and closeted lesbians with low
warmth/ low competence (which should arouse contempt). Although anger, fear, and
disgust have been linked to perceptions of sexual minorities, little empirical research
shows that heterosexual individuals express envy, pity, contempt, or admiration towards
sexual minorities (Balzer & Jacobs, 2011; Cunningham et al., 2013; Embrick et al., 2007;
Inbar et al., 2009; Lyons, 2006; Zeichner & Reidy, 2009). In short, applying stereotype
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content model to the stereotypes that people hold about lesbians and gay men falls short
of explaining the sexual stigma that appears to motivate the opponents to same-sex
marriage or fair housing for LGB individuals. Thus, although stereotype content model,
like dehumanization and social dominance theory, may contribute to the understanding of
sexual minority stigma, the theory does not account for other aspects of sexual minority
stigma within the context of marriage and housing equality.
Threatening the Status Quo and System Justification Theory
On the other hand, viewing efforts of the sexual majority (and perhaps the sexual
minorities themselves) to defend the status quo against threat through system justification
theory offers a promising approach to explain discrimination against sexual minorities.
Threatening the status quo creates a motivation to defend the current system (Brescoll et
al., 2013; Hafer, 2000; Jost, Blount, Pfeffer, & Hunyady, 2003; Jost & Hunyady, 2005;
Jost et al., 2005; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009; Kay et al., 2005; Lau, Kay, & Spencer, 2008).
Defense of the current system involves endorsing rationalizations (i.e. stereotypes) that
justify the need for the system. For example, Brescoll, Uhlmann, and Newman (2013)
had Americans read a news story that stated that their fellow citizens either believed the
US was at a new low point (system threat condition) or was stable (system affirmation
condition) according to political, social, and economic indicators. Participants then rated
the extent to which they agreed with gender-related items, some of which were systemjustifying (e.g., biological essentialism) and some of which were not system-justifying
(e.g., average physical differences between men and women). Biological essentialism
explains the current gender dominance (i.e. of men holding a higher status than women)
by insisting that there are differences between the genders (men and women) that emerge
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from innate and immutable biological causes. Biological essentialism maintains the
current status quo of gender dominance by providing a rationale for women occupying
lower social and economic positions because men and women are better suited to the
dominant or submissive role, respectively. Thus, men succeed more within business not
because of social systems that maintain their dominance, but because men are naturally
better at the tasks involved within the business world.
Within the context of system justification theory, biological essentialist beliefs
represent stereotypes that rationalize the current power structure. Beliefs in biological
essentialism and immutability (i.e. that gender differences will not change) were greater
in the system threat condition compared to the other groups (Brescoll et al., 2013).
Importantly, there were no differences between conditions in beliefs in basic, nonsystem-justifying gender attributes. Further, inducements of uncertainty (in general) did
not lead to greater endorsement of system-justifying stereotypes. These results indicate
that system threat activates only those beliefs that maintain the status quo and that they
are activated within the specific domain of system justification to which the threat
pertains (i.e. uncertainty, in general, is not enough to activate these beliefs).
Furthermore, giving individuals an explicit opportunity to express their disagreement
with the author who threatened the system decreased participants’ need to justify the
status quo, leading to biological essentialist beliefs that were the same as in the system
affirmation condition.
In a second study, Brescoll and colleagues (2013) used the same system threat
manipulation (i.e. the authors threatened the current system by having participants read a
news story discussing how their country was currently in a low state in terms of social,
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political, and economic factors) as in their previous study, but gave participants the
opportunity to disagree with the author by rating the extent that they believed the author
was ignorant, biased, unfair, and inaccurate. The authors hypothesized that giving
participants ways to defend the system would lessen their need to endorse biological
essentialist beliefs for gender differences. As expected, participants in the system threat
condition were more likely to endorse a biological essentialist justification for gender
differences than participants in either the system affirmation or explicit disagreement
condition, who did not differ in their endorsement of essentialist beliefs. Thus, it appears
that discrediting the threat to the system reduced the motivation to justify the current
system.
Brescoll and colleagues’ research matches Henry and Reyna’s (2007) earlier
work, which found that only those individuals who believed that gay people violate
traditionalism (as opposed to individualism) were significantly less likely to support gay
marriage. Henry and Reyna asked undergraduate, psychology students and community
members the extent to which they would vote for legalizing same-sex marriage to give
same-sex couples the same benefits as heterosexual couples and the extent to which they
would vote for California (their state) to recognize same-sex marriages from other states
and countries. Participants also completed abstract measures of the importance of
individualism and traditionalism, as well as specific, judgmental expressions of
individualism and traditionalism within the context of gay people. The items that tapped
into gay individualism measured the extent to which participants believed that gay people
support putting forth effort to get ahead, being self-reliant, and the importance of working
hard in life. On the other hand, the items representing gay traditionalism measured the
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extent to which participants believed that gay people support the importance of family,
the value of raising children appropriately, and maintaining “traditional” relationships.
First, participants saw gay people as violating traditionalism more than individualism.
Moreover, while beliefs that gay people violate traditionalism did predict gay marriage
opposition, beliefs in traditionalism (in general) did not significantly predict opposition to
gay marriage. Both the Henry and Reyna (2007) study and the Brescoll and colleagues
(2013) study suggest that threats toward the status quo motivate individuals to attempt to
maintain specific, relevant systems. This tendency will be explored in the current study
by asking participants whether they support a ballot initiative in the specific contexts of
housing and marriage equality. For marriage equality, the current study presents a unique
opportunity to observe the effect of threat when the status quo becomes uncertain.
The system justification response to system threat leads to complementary
stereotyping of high and low status groups and to both victim derogation and
enhancement (Jost, Kivetz, Rubini, Guermandi, and Mosso, 2005; Kay, Gaucher et al.,
2009; Kay et al., 2005; Lau et al., 2008). Jost et al., (2005) investigated whether issuing a
system threat to Israeli citizens would trigger complementary stereotypes regarding the
high-status Ashkenazim and low-status Sephardim for traits of agency and communality.
This hypothesis draws from previous research that demonstrates a tendency to endow
high-status groups with agency, achievement-motivation, competence, and selfprofitability dimensions and low-status groups with communality, socioemotionalmotivation, warmth, likeability, morality, and other-profitability dimensions (Conway,
Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996; Eagley & Steffen, 1984; Glick & Fiske, 2001b; Hoffman &
Hurst, 1990; Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001; Jost & Kay, 2005; Locke, 2003; Peeters &
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Czapinski, 1990; Poppe & Linssen, 1999; Ridgeway, 2001; Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972).
In addition, system justification theory suggests that threat should result in endowing
high-status groups with characteristics allowing them to achieve power while at the same
time endowing low-status groups with characteristics unrelated to achieving power, yet
still positive in valence. This process serves to maintain the status quo of high-status
group dominance. When the system is threatened, if people endowed low-status groups
with agency, those groups would be more likely to question the current status quo
(because it places their group in a state of disadvantage) and, potentially, topple the
current regime. Therefore, the stereotypes of low-status groups compensate their
members by endowing them with positive characteristics that are unrelated to power. To
the extent that threatening the status quo creates anxiety within the individual, they
should be more likely to endorse these complementary beliefs.
Consistent with system justification theory, Jost and colleagues (2005) found that
both the Ashkenazim and the Sephardim were more likely to believe that Ashkenazi Jews
have greater achievement-related traits and agency and that Sephardic Jews have greater
socioemotional traits and communality when they read about a threat to the system in
Israel. An important aspect of this study is that the low-status group was endowed with
positive traits in a domain that was irrelevant to the system that was threatened (i.e. when
Israel was thought to be struggling politically and economically, the Sephardim were
rated as communal in nature). According to Kay, Jost, and Young (2005), when the
system is under threat, individuals enhance high-status groups in ways that are related to
the system, but derogate them on unrelated traits (e.g., the rich are competent, but cold)
and derogate low-status groups in ways that are related to the system, but enhance them
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on unrelated traits (e.g., the poor are incompetent, but warm) (2005; see also Jost &
Burgess, 2000). Thus, Kay et al. (2005) found that, in conditions of high system threat,
powerful people were thought to be independent and intelligent (but not happy) and
overweight people were thought to be lazy (but more sociable). In the current study,
participants who experience system threat may endorse “positive” sexual minority
stereotypes in ways unrelated to system threat, at the same time, maintaining the current
system of hierarchical status by voting against marriage and housing equality measures.
Because the stereotypes endorsed by individuals during times of system threat
tend to increase support for those in high-status positions, system threat leads to greater
maintenance of the current system (e.g., the powerful are intelligent and independent;
therefore, they should be trusted to lead). This trusting in the status quo extends beyond
what is (i.e. the current status quo) to what should be (i.e. the future status quo)
(Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009). Kay, Gaucher, and
colleagues (2009) have termed this belief injunctification (i.e. that which is, constitutes
what should be because it is the best version of the world. Kay, Gaucher, and colleagues
utilized a 2 (condition: threat vs. no threat) by 2 (status quo: high inequality vs. low
inequality) between-subjects design to investigate whether women would injunctify the
current status quo. Half of the participants read that Canada (their country) was
experiencing an economic and social downturn, whereas the other half did not. For the
status quo manipulation, one of two data sets were given to that described the gender
composition of CEOs in Canada’s top Fortune 500 companies. Although men were
shown as more common in both conditions, the relative gender disparity varied (i.e. there
was either high or low inequality between the genders). The authors then asked
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participants whether the number of men and women in upper management positions
should be equal or unequal. The researchers found that participants in the high threat
condition were more likely to say that there should or should not be more women in
business according to what the status quo was for their condition (i.e. women who were
told there were not many female CEOs in business were less likely to believe that there
should be more women in business than women who were told that there were many
female CEOs in business) (Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009). In contrast, when no threat was
present, the women in the two status conditions were not significantly different in their
belief of whether women should be in business. Extrapolating to the context of same-sex
marriage, injunctification may explain part of the “traditional” and definitional
rationalizations for heterosexual-only marriage in that this form of marriage may be seen
as what should be because it encompasses the current status quo under conditions of
threat.
Likelihood of Becoming the Status Quo: The Tipping Point
Maintaining the status quo takes on a dynamic aspect in that, when change to the
status quo seems likely, thereby establishing a new status quo, individuals are likely to
desire the new status quo (Eidelman et al., 2009; Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002). Once
individuals have accepted that a new state of affairs will be the status quo, they will
engage in rationalizations that defend it. The shift in rationalization occurs when
individuals are motivationally involved in the outcome, i.e. the outcome is important to
them. Kay, Jimenez, and Jost (2002) found that undergraduate students would rationalize
only those outcomes that were highly important to them (2002). However, likelihood of
the outcome occurring moderated this effect such that the less likely a positive event (i.e.
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a tuition decrease) was to occur, the less participants desired the event, and the more
likely a negative event (i.e. a tuition increase) was to occur, the more participants desired
it.
Kay and colleagues also found this “sour grapes” and “sweet lemons” aspect of
likelihood in motivated contexts in the days prior to the Bush-Gore 2000 presidential
election (2002). As the polls predicted the vote totals for the candidates to be very close,
the election provided an ideal setting to test the effect of likelihood on rationalization of
the status quo. The authors manipulated the likelihood that each candidate would win
(using the conclusions of “experts”), then asked each community participant how
desirable it would be for each candidate to win and their own political affiliation. For
both Republicans and Democrats, as the probability of their preferred candidate winning
became less likely, participants found that candidate to be less desirable (i.e. “sour
grapes” rationalization). Similarly, for both Republicans and Democrats, as the
probability of their non-preferred candidate winning became more likely, participants
found that candidate to be more desirable (i.e. “sweet lemon” rationalization). In
contrast, the nonpartisans, Independents, and undecided did not engage in any form of
rationalization (i.e. their desirability of each candidate did not depend upon likelihood of
election). Although Kay, Jimenez, and Jost (2002) found motivation to be very important
to the activation of rationalizations for the new status quo, Eidelman, Crandall, and
Pattershall (2009) found that the mere existence of a phenomenon (or, status quo) is
enough to make individuals desire it. Future research will need to investigate further
when the likelihood of a new status quo is enough to trigger rationalizations and when
participants require additional motivation regarding the status quo.
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As marriage remains important to most individuals within the US, individuals
should be motivated to defend it when they believe it is threatened (Campbell & Wright,
2010; Cherlin, 2004; Lewis, 2006, Poritz, C.J., concurring and dissenting; Thornton &
Young-DeMarco, 2001). However, as the inclusion of same-sex couples within the
construct of marriage becomes more likely to be the status quo, individuals should
become more likely to support marriage equality and should develop rationalizations to
justify the new status quo. Therefore, the current study provides a unique opportunity to
study the effect that the emergence of a new status quo has on beliefs.
System Justification Theory within the Sexual Minority Context
System justification theory, as defined above, involves the active maintenance of
current status quos through the use of rationalizations (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al.,
2004). When applied within the context of sexual orientation, people use stereotypes of
sexual minorities to maintain the power and dominance of the sexual majority (i.e.
heterosexual or “straight” individuals) and to keep the current system of heterosexual
dominance in place (Herek, 2004). According to Herek and Garnets (2007), both
homosexual and heterosexual behaviors have existed within human cultures for centuries,
but the terms “homosexuality” and “heterosexuality” did not appear in academic or
popular discourse until the mid to late 1800s (Herek & Garnets, 2007; see also Dynes,
1990; Katz, 1995). The concept of sexual orientation as defined by the sex to which one
is attracted did not gain traction within psychiatry until Freud defined homosexuality in
his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (Freud, 1953/ 1905; Herek & Garnets, 2007).
Mental health professionals initially classified Homosexuality as a sociopathic
personality disturbance in the Mental Disorders: Diagnostic and Statistical Handbook
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(i.e. the Diagnostic and Statistical Handbook of Mental Disorders (DSM)) in 1952.
Homosexuality remained on this list of disorders until 1973 (American Psychiatric
Association, 1952; Herek, 2007, 2008; Herek & Garnets, 2007). The change in diagnosis
categories came after researchers challenged the notion that the prevalence of
psychological disorders within a population (i.e. sexual minorities) supported the
existence of symptoms of the underlying pathology of same-sex attraction and behavior
(Herek & Garnets, 2007; see also Gonsiorek, 1991; Riess, 1980). Studies that did seem
to show same-sex attraction as a pathology had methodological problems, such as
sampling biases (Herek & Garnets, 2007; see also Gonsiorek, 1991; Hooker, 1957;
Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948; Kinsey, Pomeroy, Martin, & Gebhard, 1953; Riess,
1980). However, although most psychiatrists and clinical psychologists have renounced
the view that homosexuality is a pathology, the belief that sexual minority individuals
have a pathology still permeates popular discourse (Herek, 2002, 2004; Herek & Garnets,
2007; Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 2009).
The belief that sexual minorities have a pathology is one aspect of the larger
concept of sexual stigma, which involves the knowledge that society considers
homosexuality as a whole, to be morally wrong, negative, immature, criminal,
pathological, and less than heterosexuality or less than optimal (Geiger, 2014; Herek,
2004, 2007, 2008; Herek et al., 2009). According to Herek (2004), stigma involves an
“enduring condition or attribute…[that] is not inherently meaningful”, but, through social
interaction with the larger society, gains a negative meaning (p. 14; Herek, 2008; see also
Goffman, 1963; Jones, Farina, Hastorf, Markus, Miller, & Scott, 1984; Link & Phelan,
2001). The negative valuation of the attribute involves shared knowledge throughout
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society (Herek, 2008). Finally, the stigma completely represents the individual who has
it, such that, in the eyes of others, this one characteristic subsumes the person’s entire
identity. In other words, the person is no longer an individual with a disliked or
disapproved aspect of their identity, but rather, the stigmatized person only exists in
terms of the stigmatizing identity. For example, in terms of sexual stigma, the sexual
orientation of a sexual minority person engulfs the individual’s identity, such that others
may see the individual only as a gay person, rather than as a complete human being for
whom sexual orientation is merely one aspect of identity. The stigmatization of a group
results in a power differential whereby the non-stigmatized group has a higher status and
dominates the lower status, subordinate, stigmatized group (Herek, 2000, 2004, 2007,
2008; Herek et al., 2009). Sexual stigma represents the antipathy that society holds
toward the non-heterosexual (Herek, 2004, 2008; Herek et al., 2009). Heterosexism, i.e.
“beliefs about gender, morality, and danger by which homosexuality and sexual
minorities are defined as deviant, sinful, and threatening”, sustains sexual stigma by
providing rationales that support the system of heterosexual dominance (Herek, 2004, p.
15; Herek, 2008). According to Herek, heterosexism and sexual stigma become part of
the individual when they hold a negative, lasting attitude towards sexual minorities (i.e.
sexual prejudice) (2004; 2008). This attitude, then, has the potential to influence that
individual’s future behaviors and actions. In the language of system justification theory,
heterosexual dominance within society represents the status quo.
Although sexual minority treatment fits well within the system justification
framework, researchers have conducted little research applying system justification
theory to explain sexual minority stigma. Pacilli, Taurino, Jost, and van der Toorn (2011)
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investigated whether internalized homophobia and system justification affected the views
of same-sex and heterosexual parenting in Italian gay men and lesbians. As expected, the
more participants justified the current system, the less competent they believed same-sex
parents to be. Interestingly, this finding was qualified by an interaction in which system
justification beliefs did not affect the beliefs of lesbians (who thought that same-sex
parents were more competent than heterosexual parents, overall), but was a significant
factor for gay men. Specifically, gay men who had greater system justification beliefs
were more likely than gay men who had lesser system justification beliefs to think that
same-sex parents were less competent parents.
Similarly, Jost, Banaji, and Nosek (2004) explored whether gay and lesbian
respondents were less likely to show in-group favoritism than heterosexual respondents
using both implicit (Implicit Association Test (IAT), Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz,
1998) and explicit (feeling thermometer) measures. The feeling thermometer measures
how warmly or coolly a respondent feels towards a group of people by having the
respondent give that group a temperature between 0 and 100 degrees and a number of
defining characteristics. The IAT asks participants to categorize words that flash onto a
computer screen by pressing one of two keys on a keyboard when the word falls within
the overall category (e.g., gay v. straight). Categories (or groups) are then paired with
positive and negative words (e.g., participants must press one key if either a “good” word
or a “straight” word/ image appears on the screen and must a different key if either a
“bad” word or a “gay” word/ image appears on the screen). Participants have implicit
biases if they can more quickly pair certain categories and valenced words (i.e. faster
categorization of straight/ good words and gay/ bad words than straight/ bad words and
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gay/ good words). Jost and colleagues (2004) found that, although straight respondents
showed in-group favoritism on both the implicit and explicit measures, lesbians and gay
men only showed comparable in-group favoritism on the explicit measure. Although the
sexual minority respondents did show slight in-group favoritism on the implicit measure,
over a third (37.5%) showed outgroup (straight) favoritism.
Although Pacilli et al.’s study (2011) and Jost et al.’s study (2004) showed the
negative effects that being a member of a sexual minority can have on one’s attitudes
about the self (both consciously and unconsciously), both studies focused upon the harm
caused by being members of a subordinate group. Neither study examined how the
majority group stigmatizes the minority group to retain the status quo, a key aspect of
system justification theory. In fact, only Pacilli and colleagues’ study (2011) shows
actual system justification (through rationalizations against same-sex parents that
maintain the current heterosexual-only dominant parenting scheme). Although Jost et al.
(2004) showed a relationship between both implicit and explicit measures and
conservatism, such that sexual minority individuals who were conservative tended to
show a pro-straight/ anti-gay outgroup bias, the authors did not measure the extent that
these individuals endorsed system justifying rationales to support the current system.
Although their findings show a relationship between conservatism and anti-gay bias, the
research failed to examine support for the status quo, which would explain the reason that
the subordinated outgroup that prefers the dominating in-group would also be
conservative. Although conservatism may represent the system justifying rationale, there
is no overall evidence that these individuals were more likely to support the status quo
than their more liberal, less conservative sexual minority counterparts.
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Furthermore, neither study focuses on how the majority group creates
rationalizations that justify the current system of dominance. As the group in power, why
would the dominant, heterosexual majority group feel the need to stigmatize the
subordinate, sexual minority group? How and when does the majority group feel
threatened by the minority group? How would researchers know whether system
justification actually explains the disparate treatment experienced by gays and lesbians?
The current research will address these gaps in the system justification literature by
systematically varying the threat posed by sexual minority individuals in two different
contexts (marriage and housing equality) and measure the extent that majority members
feel the need to support the status quo, and the extent that they endorse rationales that
support the status quo.
Marriage equality: Understanding the impact of system justification.
Whereas heterosexual individuals can marry the persons of their choice, sexual
minorities, prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell (2015), in many jurisdictions,
could not do the same (HRC, 2015). Research suggests that some members of the
dominant sexual orientation group (i.e. heterosexual individuals), may be more inclined
to deny marriage opportunity to lesbians and gay men to maintain the status quo
(Brumbaugh, Sanchez, Nock, and Wright, 2008). To investigate marriage attitudes,
Brumbaugh, Sanchez, Nock, and Wright (2008) conducted telephone surveys with 976
adults from Arizona, Louisiana, and Minnesota between 1998 and 2000, asking them
about their attitudes about same-sex marriage, covenant marriage, divorce, religion,
politics, and society. Interestingly, the researchers found that heterosexual individuals
who are against same-sex marriage are significantly more likely to hold conservative

82
views regarding divorce and believe that covenant marriages (i.e. marriages that require
marriage counseling prior to entry and only allow fault-based divorce) reinforce
heterosexual marriage. Furthermore, married, heterosexual individuals who have
children and who have never cohabitated are more likely to be against same-sex marriage
than unmarried, heterosexual individuals, those who do not have children, and those who
have cohabitated (Brumbaugh et al., 2008). Thus, in 2000 those who had a stake in the
“traditional” (i.e. heterosexual, two-parent) marriage were likely to fight against allowing
sexual minorities to marry (see also Henry & Reyna, 2007).
Supporting this system justification account, as marriage equality (i.e. same-sex
marriage) has threatened the heterosexual monopoly on marriage, some heterosexual
individuals have responded by passing measures intended to strengthen the current status
quo (e.g., anti-same-sex marriage statutes and amendments) (Bishop, district court, 2014;
Geiger, 2014; Henry & Reyna, 2007; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Wardle, 2005). For
example, Oklahoma passed its anti-marriage equality amendment as a direct reaction to
the Massachusetts Supreme Court marriage equality decisions, Goodridge and In re
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate (2004) (Bishop, district court, 2014). Twelve states
in 2004 passed anti-same-sex marriage amendments, likely as a reaction to Goodridge
(Freedom to Marry, 2015). Similarly, after Multnomah County, Oregon, issued 3,000
marriage licenses to same-sex couples in 2004, Oregon’s voting populace amended its
state constitution to only allow marriage for heterosexual couples (Geiger, 2014).
Those who oppose marriage equality rely upon negative stereotypes of sexual
minorities and on a narrow meaning of marriage and family to justify the maintenance of
the current system (Bishop, district court, 2014; Bruning, 2006; DeBoer, sixth circuit,
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2014; Geiger, 2014; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Lewis, 2006; Varnum, 2009). Judges
consider these rationales when deciding whether heterosexual couple only marriage
legislation violates state equal protection and the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection clause and substantive due process (Baker, 1971; Bruning, 2006; DeBoer,
sixth circuit, 2014; Goodridge, 2003; Hernandez, 2006; Jackson, 2012; Lewis, 2006;
Sevcik, 2012). For example, the court in Jackson focused on the state interests in
promoting “traditional” (i.e. heterosexual) marriage, heterosexual procreation within
marriage, heterosexual parenting as the “ideal” parenting, and being wary of social
experimentation when they held that the state of Hawaii could rationally withhold
marriage from same-sex couples (2012). Similarly, the US District Court for the District
of Nevada also found that state interests promoting “traditional” marriage and
heterosexual procreation within marriage were legitimate interests under rational basis
scrutiny (Sevcik, 2012).
As discussed earlier, arguments for heterosexual couple only marriage that focus
on traditional values and morality raise stereotypes as justifications that sexual minorities
are morally wrong or of lesser value than heterosexual individuals (Hernandez, 2006,
Kaye, C.J., dissenting; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Lawrence, 2003; Lewis, 2006, Poritz,
C.J., concurring and dissenting). For example, proponents of Oklahoma’s and Utah’s
anti-marriage equality amendments stated that the people of Utah needed the
amendments to insure morality (Bishop, district court, 2014; Kitchen, district court,
2013). Similarly, being wary of social experimentation is code for the argument that
same-sex marriage is wrong morally (DeBoer, district court, 2014; Kerrigan, 2008).
Several courts held that these arguments were actually religious beliefs and, as such,
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could not constitute legitimate state interests or could not constitute the state’s only
interests behind legislative enactment (Geiger, 2014; Griego, 2013; Kerrigan, 2008;
Lawrence, 2003, O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment; Perry, 2010; Romer, 1996;
Varnum, 2009). These judges opined that promoting “traditional” marriage merely relies
upon the history of discrimination (i.e. not allowing same-sex marriage because the state
has never allowed same-sex marriage) as a rationale to justify continuing the
discrimination (Geiger, 2014; Hernandez, 2006, Kaye, C.J., dissenting; Kerrigan, 2008;
Kitchen, district court, 2013; Lawrence, 2003; Lewis, 2006, Poritz, C.J., concurring and
dissenting; Romer, 1996).
Other state officials, not on the bench, defended heterosexual couple only
marriages as a way of promoting the morality of the community and optimal relationships
between couples and within families, using these justifications to define marriage as a
heterosexual couple only institution (Baehr, 1993; Bishop, district court, 2014; Bruning,
2006; DeBoer, district court, 2014; Goodridge, 2003; Lewis, 2006, Poritz, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting; Varnum, 2009). For example, in Lewis (2006), amici curiae
defended an anti-marriage equality law by stating that heterosexual couple only
marriages created the ideal environment to raise children (Poritz, C.J., concurring and
dissenting). These reasons constitute rationalizations rather than factual assertions
because numerous studies have found little to no difference in child raising outcomes
between families headed by heterosexual or same-sex couples (Bostic, fourth circuit,
2014; Chiu, 2007; DeBoer, district court, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Gibson-Davis & GassmanPines, 2010; Griffin et al., 2000; Harris et al., 1999; Lonczak et al., 2007; Perry, 2010;
Roy & Raver, 2014; Turner et al., 2007; United States v. Windsor, Brief of the American
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Psychological Association et al., as Amici Curia, 2013, p. 2695–2696). Promoting
heterosexual-couple parenting as the “ideal” embraces the unfounded stereotype that
sexual minorities are less than heterosexual individuals in terms of parenting abilities
(DeBoer, district court, 2014; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Lewis, 2006. Poritz, C. J.,
concurring and dissenting). In classic system justification parlance, these rationalizations
act as justifications to maintain the status quo of heterosexual dominance. Furthermore,
these laws convey to sexual minorities and society the view that same-sex relationships
and families have less worth than heterosexual couple relationships and families (Bishop,
district court, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Lewis, 2006, Poritz, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting; Obergefell, 2015; Windsor, 2013).
When defining the meaning of marriage, proponents of anti-marriage equality
initiatives rely upon the false rationalization that the purpose of marriage is to produce
offspring through a “natural” process that the state sanctions (Baehr, 1993, Heen, J.,
dissenting; Baker, 1971; Bruning, 2006; DeBoer, sixth circuit, 2014). The courts in
DeBoer (district court, 2014) and Goodridge (2003) described how state officials and
lower court judges, respectively, focused on “natural” procreation as an argument against
the inclusion of same-sex couples within marriage. This definition of marriage ignores
the US Supreme Court decisions that have held that the choice to procreate within
marriage falls within a realm of privacy into which the state cannot intrude (Griswold,
1965). If the choice of whether or not to procreate within marriage is private, then it
cannot be a necessary aspect of marriage, nor can it be the sole purpose of marriage
(Bishop, district court, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Goodridge, 2003). If funneling procreation
were the only purpose of marriage, then the state would need to deny other couples who
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cannot procreate “naturally” the ability to marry (Bishop, district court, 2014; Geiger,
2014; Goodridge, 2003; Varnum, 2009). In fact, as Senior District Judge Friedman
noted, none of the states have ever made procreative capacity or desire a requirement for
marriage (DeBoer, district court, 2014). Importantly, the US Supreme Court held that
prison inmates, who lack the ability to procreate due to their confinement, still possessed
a fundamental right to marry that the state could not infringe upon without a narrowly
structured scheme intended to promote compelling state interests (Turner, 1987). The
equivalent logic applied to marriage equality would create a fundamental right for gays
and lesbians that would require a strict scrutiny test to overcome.
Promoting heterosexual procreation within marriage highlights the potential
“unnaturalness” of same-sex parenting, as it cannot occur without reproductive assistance
or adoption (Sevcik, 2012). In addition, as stated in Goodridge (2003), it marks same-sex
relationships as “inherently unstable and inferior to opposite-sex relationships and [as]
not worthy of respect”. As states do not and, according to Griswold, cannot forbid
individuals from marrying on the basis of ability or desire to procreate, the concept of
marriage as only a vehicle for insuring “natural” procreation appears to be an unjustified
rationalization that people endorse as a justification to maintain the current system
(Goodridge, 2003). If states do not have a legitimate state interest in procreation within
marriage, yet rely on this purported interest to withhold marriage from same-sex couples,
then states appear to be rationalizing disparate treatment of a minority group to maintain
the current social system (i.e. heterosexual-only marriage). Indeed, some courts have
ruled anti-marriage equality statutes and amendments to be constitutional by using antimarriage equality proponents “natural” procreation rationales to justify their rulings
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(Bruning, 2006; Jackson, 2012; Obergefell, 2015, Roberts, C.J., dissenting; Sevcik,
2012).
Other courts that have upheld anti-marriage equality statutes and amendments
have stated that the sexual minorities or couples do not constitute a suspect or quasisuspect class because their traits are not necessarily immutable (Sevcik, 2012). The lack
of immutability argument draws upon stereotypes of immorality, immaturity, and
pathology endorsing the view that, if the sexual minority individual only chose to be
heterosexual, then they could enjoy the rights held by the majority. This view hints that
the sexual minority person deserves the stigma associated with their sexual orientation
because they either choose to be immoral or choose to not seek help for overcoming their
illness (Dean v. District of Columbia, 1995, Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part; Kerrigan, 2008). By defining sexual minorities as individuals who choose to
behave in certain deviant ways, courts justify not treating sexual minorities as a suspect
or quasi-suspect class, thereby excluding sexual minorities from marriage through the
limited analysis that rational basis scrutiny affords (Equality Foundation, 1995; High
Tech Gays, 1990).
Housing equality: Application of system justification.
Unlike marriage, there exists no fundamental right to housing (Jaimes v. Toledo
Metropolitan Housing Authority, 1985; Lindsey v. Normet, 1972). However, the Fair
Housing Act of 1968 (FHA) offers some protection to certain classes of individuals,
which legislatures could ultimately extend to sexual minorities. While states have not
passed anti-sexual minority housing measures akin to same-sex marriage bans, most have
also not passed housing protection laws for sexual minority individuals (HRC, 2015).
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Thus, landlords and rental agencies may discriminate against sexual minority individuals
within the private housing sector in these states. However, after HUD ruled that sexual
orientation is a protected class, HUD-funded housing companies may not discriminate
against renters based upon sexual orientation (2012). Additionally, if private
discrimination rests upon state action or the federal government fails to remedy HUDfunded housing companies’ discriminatory actions, then sexual minorities may have a
claim for Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation (Ex parte Virginia, 1880;
Shelley v. Kraemer, 1948; Strauder v. West Virginia, 1880; Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 1977; Virginia v. Rives, 1880).
Finally, individual states may provide housing protection for sexual minorities under their
own versions of the equal protection clause (HRC, 2015).
HUD protection, the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, and state
equal protection policies suggest that sexual minority individuals could have viable
claims of housing discrimination, although no courts have ruled in favor of plaintiffs in
anti-discrimination cases under these theories. Most importantly, if Congress extended
the FHA list of protected classes to include sexual orientation, sexual minorities would
enjoy protection from housing discrimination at the federal level. State and federal
interests in not providing protection for sexual minorities are difficult to isolate given the
lack of sexual orientation housing discrimination cases. However, the characterization of
sexual minority civil rights (i.e. housing, employment, and public accommodations nondiscrimination, as well as relationship equality rights) as “special rights” provides insight
as to potential interests that housing equality opponents might invoke (Alexander, 2001;
Blain, 2005; Conant, 2010; Hargis, 2000; Price, Nir, & Cappella, 2005; Rahman, 2004;
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Sen & Morwitz, 1996). Specifically, some will likely characterize these civil rights as
“special rights” and denounce them as undemocratic and as privileging sexual minority
individuals above seemingly similarly situated heterosexual individuals (who are thought
not to have access to the same rights) (Alexander, 2001; Blain, 2005; Hargis, 2000; Price
et al., 2005; Rahman, 2004). For example, Blain (2005) analyzed the discourse used in
the “no special rights” legislative initiative in Idaho in 1994, which if passed, would have
prevented sexual minority rights protection. Initiative proponents described civil rights
protective measures as “special rights” because the term implies that sexual minorities
seek rights above those available to the “ordinary” citizen (Blain, 2005). Furthermore,
beyond simply denouncing proponents of “special rights” as undemocratic and
privileged, opponents of sexual minority civil rights often described civil rights
campaigns as attacks on majority values, such as “traditional” (i.e. heterosexual) marriage
and parenting (Alexander, 2001; Conant, 2010; Hargis, 2000; Rahman, 2004). GoldbergHiller and Milner (2003), pointed out that by labeling civil rights as “special rights” in
pursuit of a “homosexual agenda”, opponents to civil rights legislation falsely
delegitimize the true victims as individuals who place their own selfish needs above those
of the majority (see also Alexander, 2001; Blain, 2005; Hargis, 2000).
By objecting to the cultural and moral norms of the majority, these transgressors
serve as moral pollutants whom the majority must reject in order to preserve the
community (Alexander, 2001; Blain, 2005; Goldberg-Hiller & Milner, 2003; Hargis,
2000). For example, in its campaign for passage of Amendment 2 (an amendment that
denied sexual minority individuals basic civil rights protections in Colorado), Colorado
for Family Values (CFV) described Amendment 2 as ensuring that “gays” continue to
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have the same rights that all Coloradans already enjoy and that they would prevent them
from procuring “special rights” (Alexander, 2001). In flyers it distributed to Coloradans,
the CFV described “gays” as enjoying a more privileged status than “average”
Americans, able to exert their influence on the political system. By focusing on the
purported advantages sexual minorities already had (such as greater amounts of
disposable income and ability to travel), CFV cast sexual minorities as a selfish and
immature minority group dedicated to securing extra rights and privileges for themselves
at the expense of others (Alexander, 2001). In fact, when asked for the reasons why they
had voted for Amendment 2, 74% of individuals polled in Colorado stated that it was not
because they disliked homosexuals, but because the voters disagreed with special rights.
The other, equally important reason that allowed the passage of Amendment 2
involved the rejection of homosexuality within the private sphere (especially private
housing). Many voters feared gay and lesbian individuals would force their lifestyles
upon the heterosexual majority in private areas such as rental housing, work
environments, and public accommodations (Alexander, 2001). Thus, by rejecting sexual
minorities as transgressors, Coloradans viewed themselves as protecting their right to
their own moral code. In system justification terms, advocates of “special rights”
threaten the heteronormative system by pursuing rights of equal footing to the
heterosexual majority, i.e. the dominant group (Alexander, 2001; Blain, 2005; Hargis,
2000). Claims that sexual minorities are privileged and seek rights through an
undemocratic process constitute system justifications. Similarly, denigrations of sexual
minorities as selfish, immature, immoral, sick, and unnatural (i.e. the elements present in
sexual stigma) also act as rationalizations for not granting sexual minorities equal rights
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(Alexander, 2001; Blain, 2005; Conant, 2010; Goldberg-Hiller & Milner, 2003; Hargis,
2000). The current study explored these rationalizations, as well as the rationalizations
used in the marriage equality context as potential system justifications.
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CHAPTER 3
CURRENT RESEARCH: OVERVIEW
The current project investigated whether system justification theory explains the
initial backlash against same-sex marriage and the change in marriage equality cases after
the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Windsor (2013) and
whether system justification theory could explain sexual minority housing discrimination.
System justification theory posits that individuals are motivated to maintain the status
quo, even if it is harmful, because maintaining and defending external systems decreases
the personal anxiety and fear individuals have over the unpredictability of life (Jost &
Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Landau et al., 2006; Landau et al., 2004). When
same-sex couples who wish to marry threaten that system, some heterosexual individuals
may justify heterosexual-only marriage (i.e. the status quo) by creating or championing
stereotypes regarding marriage and sexual minority individuals to rationalize their actions
(i.e. justifying anti-marriage equality actions) (Bishop, tenth circuit, 2014; Bruning, 2006;
DeBoer, sixth circuit, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Lewis, 2006).
Although individuals feel the need to defend the current status quo, when it appears likely
that the status quo will change, they cease to defend the old status quo and seek to justify
and maintain the emerging one (Kay et al., 2002). After the Supreme Court upheld state
created same-sex marriage in Windsor, at least thirty lower level federal and state courts
struck down anti-marriage equality laws (HRC, 2015). Thus, Windsor represents a
tipping point for same-sex marriage. Within the context of housing discrimination,
sexual minorities seeking housing protections threaten the belief that the current system is
fair, a core aspect of several system maintenance ideologies (e.g. just world theory)
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(Lipkus, 1991; Rubin & Peplau, 1975). When sexual minorities threaten the system,
some heterosexual individuals defend the exclusion of sexual minority protection by
designating the protection as “special rights” that a privileged minority demands through
undemocratic and unfair means (Alexander, 2001; Blain, 2005; Conant, 2010; Hargis,
2000; Price et al., 2005; Rahman, 2004; Sen & Morwitz, 1996). Finally, opponents of
equality denigrate sexual minority members in ways that that are consistent with
endorsement of sexual stigma (Alexander, 2001; Blain, 2005; Conant, 2010; GoldbergHiller & Milner, 2003; Hargis, 2000).
The current research analyzed the potential causal mechanism (system
justification) behind the same-sex marriage backlash and tipping point and applied it in
both the marriage equality and housing equality context. The research included two
experiments, one examining marriage equality and one, housing equality. Using a 2
(Socioeconomic threat condition: threat v. affirmation) x 4 (Likelihood of new status quo:
10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) between subjects design, the research tested the effect that
threatening versus affirming the current socioeconomic system had on whether
participants voted for a new status quo (i.e. either same-sex marriage inclusion or sexual
minority housing protection). While several studies have shown that threatening the
status quo motivates individuals to defend the system, none of the previous studies
manipulated threat within sexual minority marriage or housing equality contexts
(Brescoll et al., 2013; Jost et al., 2005; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009; Kay et al., 2005).
Following the procedure of previous system threat manipulations, participants read an
ostensive news article that reported that the United States had reached an economic,
social, and political low (system threat) or was doing well (system affirmation) (Brescoll
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et al., 2013). Participants completed a measure of their emotions regarding the article
they read and then completed system justification/rationalization questionnaires specific
to both contexts (same-sex marriage and housing equality). Next, participants read a
proposed ballot initiative that extended the definition of marriage to include same-sex
couples (Study 1) or extended protection against discrimination to include sexual
orientation as a protected class (Study 2). Participants determined whether or not they
would favor such an initiative and how likely they would be to vote for the initiative if
they saw it in a voter referendum. Participants then read a purported scientific report in
which an experts stated that, by the year 2016, it is likely that all fifty states will have
equality (either marriage or housing, depending upon the study). Kay, Jimenez, and Jost
(2002) observed that manipulating the likelihood of a new status quo leads to
rationalizations that support the new status quo as it becomes more likely (i.e.
participants will provide far greater support to a status quo that is 90% likely to occur
than a status quo that is 30% likely to occur). The current study extends these findings
into the contexts of marriage equality and housing equality by varying the degree of
likelihood for the new status quo. Specifically, participants were told that experts believe
there is 10% (or 30% or 60% or 90%) likelihood that the country will have a new status
quo of complete (i.e. all fifty states) marriage or housing equality. Participants then
completed a second set of emotion measures regarding the political report they read and
completed the system justification/rationalization questionnaires specific to both contexts
(same-sex marriage and housing equality) a second time. Thus, participants’ emotions
and specific justifications were measured twice. Participants then, again, indicated
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whether they would support complete marriage or housing equality and the extent to
which they would support it.
Participants completed a final set of questionnaires that measured how different
psychological aspects impacted their decisions. Specifically, participants completed trait
system justification measures, integrated threat measures, current equality knowledge
questions, and demographic questions. It was estimated that a sample of approximately
280 participants would be sufficient to find moderate effects in the eight cells required for
the completely crossed experimental design in each study. Having a minimum of 35
participants in each condition created a power level equal to at least 90% with a moderate
effect size. This power analysis increased the likelihood that there would be a sufficient
sample size to detect actual differences between groups, but not too large for results to be
simply due to chance (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). As the current research
involved two experiments, it was estimated that a sample of approximately 560
participants would be sufficient.
Specific Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Threat manipulation (Main effect).
Vote (Initial ballot).
Threatening participants’ status quo should cause participants to vote against the
ballot initiative (in the first vote) as it represents a change in the current laws in their state
(Brescoll et al., 2013; Jost et al., 2005; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009; Kay et al., 2005).
Affirming participants’ status quo should lead participants to vote according to their own
beliefs, i.e. the vote will be affected by the individual differences variables (see
Hypothesis 4, below).
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Emotion (Initial measurement).
Participants in the threatened condition should feel greater amounts of fear and
anxiety than those in the affirmation condition (Laurin et al., 2008; Smith & Ellsworth,
1985). It is unknown whether either group will feel greater amounts of anger, disgust,
compassion, happiness, hope, or pity; therefore, the experiment explored the extent to
which each group felt these emotions.
Justification (Initial measurement).
Participants in the threatened condition should feel a greater need to justify the
current status quo, i.e. a heterosexist society; therefore, they should be less likely than
participants in the affirmation condition to state that sexual minorities belong to a suspect
or quasi-suspect class (i.e. less likely to state that lesbians and gay men have a history of
experiencing discrimination, more likely to believe that sexual orientation can be
changed, more likely to state that sexual orientation is related to an individual’s ability to
contribute to society, and more likely to say that lesbians and gay men are politically
powerful enough to achieve their goals through the ordinary political process) (Jost et al.,
2004; Jost, Blount, et al., 2003; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003). These participants should also
be more likely to endorse justifications specific to the change in the system’s status quo,
e.g., that the state should preserve the “traditional” form of marriage and that lesbians and
gay men want “special rights” that other groups do not have. Participants in the
affirmation condition should endorse heterosexist system justifications according to
individual differences variables (see Hypothesis 4, below). Additionally, threatened
participants should be more likely to endorse the status quo in general, which the
Situational System Justification scale (SSJ) (Kay & Jost, 2003) will measure.
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Mediation.
Emotion and system justifications will mediate the main effect of threat on the
initial ballot vote. Participants in the threatened condition, feeling greater amounts of
fear and anxiety, should be less likely to vote for the initial ballot that would create
change within their state than participants in the affirmation condition (Laurin et al.,
2008). Additionally, these participants should also feel a greater need to justify the status
quo, which should then predict their vote (Wakslak et al., 2007). Individual difference
variables (see Hypothesis 4, below) will moderate the votes of those in the system
affirmation condition.
Hypothesis 2: Likelihood manipulation (Main effect). For aid of discussion, I
will refer to the 10% likelihood of change condition as the “lowest”, the 30% as low
condition, the 60% as the moderate condition, and the 90% as the highest.
Vote (Second ballot).
Participants in the lower likelihood of change conditions (10% and 30%) should
be less likely to vote for the ballot initiative than participants in the highest likelihood of
change condition (90%) as it represents an unlikely change to the status quo (Kay et al.,
2002). Participants in the highest likelihood of change condition (90%) should be more
likely to vote for the ballot initiative than participants in the other three conditions (Kay
et al., 2002). Participants in the moderate likelihood of change condition (60%) should
be influenced by individual differences variables in their ballot decisions (see Hypothesis
4, below).
Emotion (Second measurement).
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Participants in the lowest and highest likelihood of change conditions will feel
greater amounts of happiness and joy than participants in the other two conditions
because the participants in the lowest and highest likelihood of change conditions will
have greater confidence in their votes (Kay et al., 2002). Participants in the low (30%)
and moderate (60%) likelihood of change conditions should feel greater amounts of fear,
anxiety, and hope than other participants as they have less certainty in their state’s future
status quo (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).
Justification (Second measurement).
Participants in the lowest (10%) and highest (90%) likelihood conditions will not
feel the need to justify their vote; therefore, these participants will not endorse system
justifications as greatly as participants in the low and moderate likelihood conditions
(Kay et al., 2002).
Mediation.
The effect of status likelihood upon participants’ second ballot vote should be
mediated by both emotion and system justifications. For participants in the lowest and
highest likelihood conditions, the happiness they feel regarding the certainty of the future
status quo should predict their vote decision (Kay et al., 2002; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).
Additionally, the certainty that comes from either very high or low likelihood of equality
as the new status quo should affect the justifications participants offer for their vote so
that the justifications match their voting outcome (regardless of individual differences
variables). Thus, participants in the lowest likelihood condition should endorse system
justifications as they vote against the equality initiatives. Participants in the highest
likelihood condition should not endorse system justifications as they vote for the equality
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initiatives. Participants in the low and moderate likelihood conditions (30% and 60%)
should feel greater anxiety, fear, and hope, given the uncertainty of the future status quo,
which should then affect their ultimate ballot decision (Laurin et al., 2008; Ortony et al.,
1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). These feelings of uncertainty should make room for
individual differences variables to impact participants’ votes (see Hypothesis 4, below).
Participants in the low and moderate likelihood conditions should also feel a greater need
to justify the status quo, which will impact their votes (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost, et
al., 2007; Kay et al., 2002). Again, individual differences variables should impact these
decisions (see Hypothesis 4, below).
Hypothesis 3: Threat by Likelihood (Interaction effect).
Vote (Initial and second ballots).
Threatened conditions.
Participants in the threatened, lowest, low, and moderate likelihood conditions
should vote against the ballot initiative (second vote). Participants in the threatened,
highest likelihood condition should vote for the second ballot initiative as a way to
decrease uncertainty. Thus, a change in vote should occur only for the participants in the
threatened, highest likelihood condition (Kay et al., 2002). However, Brescoll and
colleagues (2013) found that allowing participants to explicitly disagree with a system
threat decreased their motivation to subsequently defend the status quo, indicating that
participants who initially defended the current system in their ballot vote may no longer
feel the need to defend it in the support vote (i.e. the dependent variable after the
likelihood manipulation). Thus, those participants in the threat condition who vote
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against the ballot initiative in their initial vote may not feel the need to subsequently vote
against the second ballot initiative.
However, it is also possible that participants who defend the status quo by voting
against the equality initiative may feel further vindicated in their choice if they read that
experts believe it is unlikely (10% and 30%) that the country will have marriage or
housing equality. These participants may feel the need to further defend their initial vote
by not supporting complete equality. This hypothesis follows the research of Kay and
colleagues (2002), who found that participants who were highly involved in the outcome
of a decision differed in their ratings of desirability for the new status quo according to
whether the new status quo was likely to occur. Participants in the unlikely condition
found the new status quo to be undesirable as compared to participants in the likely
condition. The current study tested these competing hypotheses for either potential
result.
Affirmation conditions.
Participants in the affirmation conditions should not feel a need (from the threat
manipulation) to reduce uncertainty about the status quo. Therefore, their votes on the
second ballot initiative should depend upon their likelihood condition (see Hypothesis 2,
above). Thus, participants in the moderate likelihood condition should be most likely to
vote according to individual differences variables, whereas the participants in the other
three conditions may change their votes if their individual differences tendencies do not
match their likelihood condition (e.g., if participants tend to support the current,
heterosexist system, but were in the highest likelihood condition, they may vote against
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the ballot initially, then vote for it after learning of the likelihood of a new status quo)
(Kay et al., 2002).
Emotion (Initial and second measurements).
Threatened conditions.
Participants in the threatened conditions likely felt a greater amount of anxiety
and fear than participants in the affirmation conditions (Laurin et al., 2008) initially and
they may still experience these emotions. However, they may have alleviated their
distress by voting against the initial ballot (Brescoll et al., 2013; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003;
Jost et al., 2007; Wakslak et al., 2007). Thus, participants may be affected by both
system threat and status likelihood or just status likelihood. Participants in the lowest and
highest likelihood of change conditions should feel greater amounts of happiness and joy
than participants in the other two conditions because those in the lowest and highest
likelihood of change conditions will have greater confidence in their votes (Kay et al.,
2002). Participants in the moderate likelihood of change conditions should feel greater
amounts of fear, anxiety, and hope than other participants as they will have less certainty
in their state’s future status quo (Ortony et al., 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).
Affirmation conditions.
Participants in the affirmation condition should have, initially, felt happiness upon
reading that the current system is prospering (Kay et al., 2002). These participants
should only be affected by the likelihood manipulation (see Hypothesis 2, above). Thus,
although participants in the lowest and highest likelihood of change conditions should
still feel happy, participants in the low and moderate likelihood of change conditions
should no longer experience happiness and should feel greater amounts of fear, anxiety,
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and hope than other participants as they have less certainty in their state’s future status
quo (Kay et al., 2002; Ortony et al., 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). This trend should
be greater for participants in the moderate likelihood condition. Thus, only participants
in the lowest and highest likelihood of change condition should remain unchanged in
their emotional state.
Justification (Initial and second measurements).
Threatened conditions.
In accordance with Hypothesis 3, participants in the threatened, lowest likelihood
condition should vote against the ballot initiative (second vote). These participants
should justify their vote by endorsing the system justifications (Brescoll et al., 2013; Jost,
Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2007). Participants in the threatened, highest likelihood
condition should vote for the second ballot initiative as a way to decrease uncertainty
(Kay et al., 2002). Thus, these participants will not endorse system justifications (i.e.
their endorsements should be pro-equality). Participants in the threatened, low and
threatened, moderate conditions should vote against the ballot initiative as a way to
decrease uncertainty (Jost et al., 2007). Therefore, as they may experience even greater
uncertainty than participants in the other two likelihood conditions, these participants
should endorse system justifications to a greater extent.
Affirmation conditions.
Participants in the system affirmation conditions should not feel uncertainty from
the threat manipulation (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost, et al., 2007; Kay et al., 2002).
These participants should only be affected by the likelihood conditions (see Hypothesis 2,
above).
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Mediation.
Emotion should mediate the effect of system threat and likelihood of a new status
quo upon participants’ second ballot, such that threat and greater levels of likelihood
uncertainty should lead to greater anxiety, fear, and hope (Laurin et al., 2008; Ortony et
al., 1988). Experiencing these emotions should then influence participants’ votes such
that they would be less likely to vote for equality initiatives as voting against the equality
initiatives allows participants to reduce uncertainty through maintaining the status quo
(Laurin et al., 2008; Ortony et al., 1988). Similarly, system justification should mediate
system threat and the likelihood manipulation effects upon the second ballot decision,
such that threat and greater levels of likelihood uncertainty should lead to greater
endorsement of heterosexist system justifications, thereby resulting in votes against the
second ballot initiative (Brescoll et al., 2013; Wakslak et al., 2007). Although emotion
and system justifications are expected to mediate this relationship in the affirmation
condition, participants in the affirmation condition should be more affected by their
likelihood condition and individual differences variables than participants in the threat
condition.
Hypothesis 4: Individual differences (Situational system justification, global
belief in a just world, and attitudes toward lesbians and gay men).
Vote (Initial and second ballots).
Participants individual differences, measured by the Situational System
Justification scale (SSJ), the Global Belief in a Just World scale (GBJW), and the
Attitudes toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale (ATLG), should predict their votes on both
ballot measures. Participants with greater endorsement of the current system (SSJ), belief
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in a just world (GBJW), and negative attitudes toward sexual minorities (ATLG) should
be more likely to vote against the ballot initiatives than other participants as the ballot
initiatives change the current system, question the fairness of the world, and lead to
greater equality for sexual minorities (Brescoll et al., 2013; Herek, 2004; Jost et al., 2004;
Jost, Blount, et al., 2003; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003).
Emotion (Initial and second measurements).
Participants with greater endorsement of the status quo, belief that the world is
just, and negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men should have greater fear, anger,
disgust, and anxiety after reading the political science report (as it discusses sexual
minority issues), but only in the greater likelihood conditions as these conditions tend to
threaten participants’ beliefs and attitudes (Balzer & Jacobs, 2011; Cunningham et al.,
2013; Embrick et al., 2007; Herek, 2004; Inbar et al., 2009; Zeichner & Reidy, 2009).
Thus, the content of the political science report should trigger some negative emotions in
these individuals. Similarly, participants with lesser endorsement of the status quo, belief
that the world is just, and more positive attitudes towards sexual minorities should feel
more fear, anger, disgust, anxiety, compassion, and pity in the low likelihood conditions
as these conditions intimate that greater sexual minority equality is unlikely to occur.
These participants should feel more happiness and hope in the moderate and highest
likelihood conditions (Zeichner & Reidy, 2009).
Justification (Initial and second measurements).
Participants with greater endorsement of the status quo, belief in a just world, and
negative attitudes toward sexual minorities should be more likely than other participants
to endorse marriage and housing equality-specific justifications against sexual minority
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equality (Brescoll et al., 2013; Herek, 2004; Jost et al., 2004; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003).
However, the threat and likelihood manipulations may override these dispositional
influences.
Method
Participants
Participants were 671 community members recruited through Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online site that allows researchers to “access an ondemand, scalable workforce” (www.mturk.com/mturk). The studies were conducted
concurrently between April 20 and June 11, 2015. Thus, participants completed the
research prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell on June 26, 2015. Participants
were at least 19 years old, registered to vote, self-identified as “straight” for sexual
orientation, and resided in states that did not have statewide marriage and housing
equality (i.e. Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas) (HRC, 2015).
Participants received $.10 for completing an initial demographic form to determine
eligibility, then $1 for their participation if they were eligible for the main study (6,111
community members completed the initial demographic form). Once participants
selected the study, the website redirected them to Qualtrics, an online data collection site
that allows researchers to create studies involving random assignment to conditions
(qualtrics.com). They completed all the study materials online.
Of the 900 individuals who participated in this study, 65 were dropped due to
technological error (i.e. the computer software allowed them to participate, but they did
not fit the requirements for the study). Five more participants were dropped due to a
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different technological error (i.e. the software allowed these individuals to participate in
the study after they had previously participated). Of the 830 remaining participants, one
was dropped because the participant did not understand the concepts within the study
(this individual wrote to me explaining their conception of the study, which did not match
the actual meaning of the research). Finally, 158 participants were dropped because they
did not complete the study. Participants who completed the study answered most items
throughout the study (i.e. there were no long intervals of item non-completion and more
than 90% of items were completed). Completion of the manipulation checks
immediately prior to the demographics questions was used as a cutoff point for full
participation in the research. Thus, overall, 229 individuals who took part in the research
were dropped from the final sample (25.44%). Approximately half of the 671
participants (337) completed Study 1 (Marriage Equality) and half of the participants
(334) completed Study 2 (Housing Equality).
In the Marriage Equality study, 50.4% of participants were men and 46% were
women. The average age was 34.56 years old and the sample was 76.9% White (nonLatino), 7.1% African American (Black), 4.7% Asian American, 3.6% Latino/a, 2.1%
Native American, and 2.4% identified as “Other”. Participant religious affiliation varied,
with the largest group identifying as having no religious affiliation (32.9%), followed by
Protestant (31.2%), Catholic (16.3%), “Other” (14.8%), Muslim (.9%), and Jewish (.6%).
For political affiliation, 38.3% of participants were Democrats, 22% were Independents,
15.7% were Republicans, 12.8% had “No Affiliation”, 6.5% were Libertarians, .9% were
“Other” affiliation, and .6% were Green Party members. Many participants were married
or in a marriage-like relationship (43.3%), believed marriage was important (77.4%), and

107
considered themselves to be middle class (43.9%). Slightly more than half owned their
home (51.9%), most had rented housing at some point in their lives (85.5%), and most
thought that owning one’s home was important (77.7%). Participants were fairly welleducated with 32.3% having some college or were in college when they participated,
42.4% having a college degree (Associate’s or Bachelor’s), and 14.2% having an
advanced degree. Most participants were employed, with 51.3% employed full time,
17.5% employed part-time, 14.5% unemployed, and 13.4% identifying as Students. All
participants identified as “straight” and resided within a state that did not have either
marriage equality or state-wide housing equality.
In the Housing Equality study, 46.7% of participants were men and 47.9% were
women. The average age was 35.77 years old and the sample was 75.4% White (nonLatino), 7.8% African American (Black), 4.2% Asian American, 5.1% Latino/a, 1.5%
Native American, and .6% identified as “Other”. Participant religious affiliation varied,
with the largest group identifying as having no religious affiliation (35.9%), followed by
Protestant (29%), “Other” (15.6%), Catholic (12.9%), Muslim (.6%), and Jewish (.6%).
For political affiliation, 35% of participants were Democrats, 18.9% were Independents,
18.9% were Republicans, 10.2% were Libertarians, 9.3% had “No Affiliation”, 1.5%
were Green Party members, and .9% were “Other” affiliation. Many participants were
married or in a marriage-like relationship (44.9%), believed marriage was important
(75.1%), and considered themselves to be middle class (43.1%). Slightly more than half
owned their home (50.3%), most had rented housing at some point in their lives (87.1%),
and most thought that owning one’s home was important (79.9%). Participants were
fairly well-educated with 30.2% having some college or were in college when they
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participated, 44% having a college degree (Associate’s or Bachelor’s), and 14.7% having
an advanced degree. Most participants were employed, with 48.2% employed full time,
19.2% employed part-time, 16.5% unemployed, and 10.8% identifying as Students. All
participants identified as “straight” and resided within a state that did not have either
marriage equality or state-wide housing equality. In this research, the samples from the
two studies were very similar.
Procedure
Participants first completed an Informed Consent document that described the
initial demographic questionnaire, its purpose, the possibility of taking part in the larger
study, and their consent to participate in both parts of the study (Appendix A). After
completing the informed consent, participants completed a short demographic form that
asked them to provide their age, driver’s license, gender, sexual orientation, whether they
are registered to vote (and, if so, in what state they are registered to vote), state in which
they reside, and other, filler items (Appendix B). All participants who completed the
informed consent form and initial demographics form received $.10 for their
participation. The Qualtrics program directed participants who qualified to the main
study website where they read a brief instruction form that stated that the current project
actually encompasses several studies to be administered in one sitting (Appendix C).
Each of these “studies” had different font and individualized instructions to convey that
they were separate studies brought together for convenience. For the “News Article
Reactions Study” (study A), participants then read part of a purported news article (the
system threat manipulation). Half of participants read that most Americans believe the
country has hit a low point in terms of economic, political, and social factors (system
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threat) (Appendix D). The other half of participants read that most Americans believe the
country is relatively stable, but prosperous compared to other countries in terms of
economic, political, and social factors (system affirmation) (Appendix D).
Participants rated, on 5-point scales, the degree to which they felt anger, fear,
disgust, hope, happiness, compassion, and anxiety regarding the news article they read
(See Appendix E for the exact language in this survey) and then completed manipulation
check measures (i.e., questions asking what the article was about). The emotion
measures included synonyms for specific emotions that the studies may trigger within
participants. By using multiple forms of the emotions, I was able to calculate reliability
coefficients for each emotion (except anxiety, which was a single item) (see Table 1).
The emotion measures for happiness, anger, fear, and disgust were modifications of the
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – Expanded Form (PANAS-X) (Watson & Clark,
1994) that other researchers have frequently used. Anxiety is treated as an aspect of fear
within the PANAS-X; as such, it was analyzed separately and with fear. The emotion
measures for hope used synonyms from the thesaurus (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015) and
are based upon Ortony, Clore, and Collins’ (1988) description of prospect-based
emotions. The emotion measures for compassion (Batson, Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer,
2005) also used synonyms from the thesaurus (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015) and are based
upon Batson’s (1987) self-reported empathy measure and Ortony et al.’s (1988)
description of “sorry for” emotions. The emotion measures were thought to capture the
feelings experienced by participants when the status quo was threatened, thereby
providing greater explication regarding the system justification process.
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Table 1
Emotion Reliabilities (Cronbach’s α) after Current Status Quo and Status Quo
Likelihood Manipulations According to Marriage Equality and Housing Equality Studies

Emotion

Marriage Equality
After Current
After Status
Status Quo
Quo Likelihood

Housing Equality
After Current
After Status
Status Quo
Quo Likelihood

Fearful

.91

.91

.92

.91

Happiness

.95

.96

.95

.96

Anger

.81

.88

.86

.85

Disgust

.80

.85

.78

.84

Hope

.77

.84

.77

.84

Compassion

.82

.77

.77

.79

After completing the emotion measures, participants completed system
justification items that measure the extent to which participants believed sexual
orientation to be a suspect class (created using the four criteria cited by courts) (Sevcik,
2012) and housing and marriage system justification items (i.e. purported state interests)
(Alexander, 2001; Bruning, 2008; Jackson, 2012; Price et al., 2005; Rahman, 2004;
Sevcik, 2012). The items served as potential justifications that participants may use to
support the then-current (anti-marriage and housing equality) status. The equal
protection suspect class items asked participants their beliefs regarding lesbians and gay
men’s history of discrimination experience, ability to contribute to society, immutability,
and political powerlessness. The marriage and housing system justification items asked
participants the extent to which they agreed with the purported state interests listed in the
anti-marriage and “special rights” cases (e.g., “traditional marriage, i.e. heterosexual-
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couple marriage should be protected”). The extent that participants agreed with both the
equal protection suspect class items and the marriage and housing system justification
items were thought to depend upon participants’ experimental condition (see Hypotheses
1(c), 2(c), and 3(c), above), thereby providing mediation for participants’ votes on the
ballot initiative (see Hypotheses 1(d), 2(d), and 3(d), above).
For the “Ballot Initiative Study” (study B), all participants read a proposed ballot
initiative for their state and determined whether they would vote for this as an
amendment to their state constitution and how likely they would be to vote for the
amendment on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being “Very Unlikely to Vote for this
Amendment” and 5 being “Very Likely to Vote for this Amendment”) (Appendix F). For
Study 1, the ballot initiative concerned redefining marriage within the participants’ state
to include same-sex couples. For Study 2, the ballot initiative concerned extension of
civil rights law within the participants’ state to include sexual orientation as a protected
class. These ballot initiatives measured participants’ beliefs in the current status quo, i.e.
the system itself.
Participants then read that they would complete a third study (“Study C: Political
Science Report Study”) developed by a different political science researcher (Appendix
G). Again, the intention of this instruction was to encourage participants to distinguish
between the different parts of the study. Participants read a “Political Science Report”
that stated that law and political science experts believed that the United States would
have country-wide marriage (Study 1) or housing (Study 2) equality by 2016. This
statement qualified the likelihood of a new equality status using different percentages
according to four conditions. In the first condition (lowest likelihood), participants read
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that experts believe the likelihood for countrywide equality to be 10%. In the second
condition (low likelihood), the likelihood was 30%. In the third condition (moderate
likelihood), the likelihood was 60%. In the fourth condition (highest likelihood), the
likelihood was 90%. The likelihood manipulation tested whether participants felt the
need to support a new status quo when there was a greater likelihood of it occurring.
Again, participants completed the same set of emotion measures, a set of manipulation
checks regarding the report they read, and a second set of system justification measures
based on suspect class and marriage and housing equality (Appendix H). All participants
then read the same proposed ballot initiative for their state that they read previously and
determined whether they would vote for this as an amendment to their state constitution if
it were on the ballot and how likely they would be to vote for the amendment on a scale
of 1 to 5 (with 1 being “Very Unlikely to Vote for this Amendment” and 5 being “Very
Likely to Vote for this Amendment”).
Participants then read that they would complete a fourth and final study (“Study
D: General Political Attitudes Study”) assessing a broad array of attitudes (Appendix I).
The questionnaires for this study assessed the extent that participants rationalize/ justify
the current system and included items assessing individual differences variables. For
justifications thought to represent individual differences variables that affect support for
the current system, the current study measured participants’ endorsement of items from
Kay and Jost’s Situational System Justification scale (2003), Herek’s Attitudes Towards
Lesbians and Gay men scale (ATLG) (1988), and Lipkus’ Global Belief in a Just World
scale (1991).
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As originally theorized, Kay and Jost (2003) created the Situational System
Justification scale as a measure of participants’ needs to justify the status quo in specific,
experimental situations. Thus, this variable was conceptualized as depending upon
context. In the current research, it was hypothesized to act as an individual differences
variable (see Hypothesis 4) (Cronbach’s α = .84 for the Marriage Equality study and
Cronbach’s α = .86 for the Housing Equality study).
Herek’s ATLG scale includes stereotypical statements regarding lesbians and gay
men and remains the standard for measuring negative attitudes held toward lesbians and
gay men (see Hypothesis 4) (Cronbach’s α = .96 for the Marriage Equality study and
Cronbach’s α = .96 for the Housing Equality study; Herek, 1988; 1994; 2000; Hudepohl,
Parrott, & Zeichner, 2010; Parrott & Gallagher, 2008). After the ATLG, participants
completed the Global Belief in a Just World scale (Lipkus, 1991), which measures the
extent that they believe the world is just, an individual differences, trait-like variable
(Cronbach’s α = .93 for the Marriage Equality study and Cronbach’s α = .92 for the
Housing Equality study). System justification researchers link this latent-trait variable to
overall tendencies to support the status quo, making it essential to include it in the current
research (Jost et al., 2004; Jost, Glaser et al., 2003; Jost & Hunyady, 2005).
Prior research suggests that conflict between groups arises when the out-group’s
culture poses a threat to the in-group’s culture (Stephan, Diaz-Loving, & Duran, 2000;
Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). This threat takes the form of realistic threats (i.e.
subjectively perceived threats to the in-group’s existence, economic and political power,
and physical well-being) and symbolic threats (i.e. the out-group’s perceived different
worldview that threatens the in-group’s worldview). Symbolic threat takes the form of
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the two groups holding seemingly different norms, beliefs, attitudes, etc. (Stephan et al.,
2000). When the in-group feels threatened by the out-group, they may experience
intergroup anxiety, i.e. anxiety about intergroup interactions due to fear of suffering
negative outcomes. Intergroup anxiety, in turn, leads in-group members to hold negative
feelings and attitudes (prejudice) toward the out-group. These attitudes and feelings are
then reinforced by negative stereotypes (beliefs) regarding the out-group because the
stereotypes justify feelings of threat and anxiety by providing reasons for the in-group
member’s experience. Although much of the research regarding integrated threat theory
involves conflict between groups according to race or ethnicity, integrated threat theory
may also explain the way the heterosexual majority treats sexual minorities.
Participants completed shortened (four out of seven items measuring Realistic
Threat and four out of eight items measuring Symbolic Threat) versions of the Realistic
and Symbolic Threat scale (Stephan et al., 1999). The original scales (Stephan et al.,
1999) focused upon perceived threats posed by out-groups within the context of
immigration. Thus, because I was unable to modify certain items to fit the sexual
minority context (e.g., “Immigration from Asia is undermining American culture”), I did
not include these items. Modified versions of the remaining eight items referred to the
in-group as either “most Americans” (matching the original scale language) or
“heterosexual” and the out-group was “lesbians and gay men”. As separate factors, the
scales lacked reliability, but an overall scale for threat (Cronbach’s α = .87 for the
Marriage Equality study and Cronbach’s α = .88 for the Housing Equality study) did
show more than adequate reliability. In addition, Stephan and colleagues (1999) 12 item
Intergroup Anxiety scale was used to measure the anxiety participants felt toward
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lesbians and gay men (Cronbach’s α = .94 for the Marriage Equality study and
Cronbach’s α = .95 for the Housing Equality study).
Next, participants completed manipulation checks (Appendix J). Finally,
participants completed a demographic questionnaire answering questions about their
political party affiliation; how liberal/conservative they are on economic, social, and
political issues; and several religious items intended to gauge whether they belong to
conservative or religious affiliations, each of which could impact the likelihood of
individuals to support the status quo (Jost et al., 2004; Jost et al., 2014; Kay, Whitson et
al., 2009) (Appendix K). To complete the study, participants were debriefed and
received payment for their participation (Appendix L).
Statistical Analyses
The statistical analyses for this project for each hypothesis depended upon
whether the goal was to test differences between means or to predict a vote/ support
decision, whether mediators were involved, and whether moderators were involved. In
general, I conducted Analyses of Variances (ANOVAs) and Multivariate Analyses of
variances (MANOVAs) to compare means between groups on continuous variables and
logistic regression for dichotomous variables i.e., votes in favor or opposed to assuring
equality. Therefore, I used these models for most of the variables including either scales
or individual items on the Herek’s ATLG scale, the suspect class items, the trait-like
system justification items (Situational System Justification scale and Global Belief in a
Just World scale), and the system justification questions for marriage and housing
equality. Thus, I analyzed the effects of system threat and likelihood conditions with a
factorial design: 2 (System condition: Threat vs. Affirmation) x 4 (Likelihood condition:
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10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%). Because the likelihood of voting for the ballot initiative,
the emotion measures, and the system justification measures are asked after both the
system threat and likelihood manipulations, I analyzed these measures using a repeated
measures ANOVA to see whether participant’s emotions, justifications, and ballot votes
change after the likelihood manipulation (see Hypothesis 3). When using the emotional
reactions items, Herek’s ATLG scale, the suspect class items, the system justification
items, and the system justification questions for marriage and housing equality to predict
the likelihood that participants would vote for the ballot initiative and the extent that they
support the new status quo, I used a multiple regression analysis.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Marriage Equality
Hypothesis 1: Current status quo manipulation (Main Effect).
Current status quo manipulation’s effects on Ballot 1 decisions.
Current status quo manipulation’s effect on voting for Ballot 1.
A between subjects One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) testing whether
participants differed in their initial ballot according to current status quo condition
(threating participants current status quo) failed to yield a significant result, F(1, 331) =
.79, MSE = .21, p > .05, ηρ² = .00. Of those who voted on Ballot 1 (four participants did
not vote), 69.7% voted for marriage equality.
Individual differences variables’ effects on voting for Ballot 1.
Correlation analyses revealed that the individual differences variables (Attitudes
Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale (ATLG), Situational System Justification scale
(SSJ), Global Belief in a Just World scale (GBJW), Realistic and Symbolic Threat, and
Intergroup Anxiety) were significantly correlated with Ballot 1 such that participants
were less likely to vote for marriage equality with more negative attitudes toward
lesbians and gay men (ATLG), , r = -.77, p < .01, stronger views that lesbians and gay
men constituted realistic and symbolic threats, r = -.67, p < .01, greater anxiety felt
toward lesbians and gay men (Intergroup Anxiety), r = -.46, p < .01, stronger belief that
American society is fair, legitimate, and justifiable (SSJ) r = -.20, p < .01, and stronger
global belief in a just world (GBJW), r = -.23, p < .01.

(Note: r values are point, bi-
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serial correlations for the Ballot 1 dichotomous outcome – voting against marriage
equality = 0 and voting in favor of marriage quality = 1).
Main effects and interactions for current status quo emerged when individual
difference covariates were added to the binary logistic regressions, separately, one at a
time. Table 2 displays the results. The main effects for the covariates were similar to the
correlation analyses described above (except for SSJ and GBJW, which were not
significant predictors for the marriage equality vote). However, as shown in Table 2,
there was a significant regression model with the SSJ covariate, Nagelkerke R2 = .07,
X2(3) = 17.44, p < .01, revealing a main effect for current status quo but qualified by a
quo by SSJ interaction. For those in the affirmation condition, SSJ was a significant
predictor such that the more that participants believed American society to be fair,
legitimate, and justifiable, the less likely they were to vote for marriage equality, Β = .47, p < .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .13, X2(1) = 15.88, p < .01. For those in the threat
condition, SSJ was not a significant predictor, Nagelkerke R2 = .01, X2(1) = 1.04, p > .05.
Similarly, the GBJW covariate produced a significant model, Nagelkerke R2 =
.11, X2(3) = 25.92, p < .01, with a main effect for current status quo but again qualified
by a significant current status quo by GBJW interaction. For participants in the
affirmation condition, GBJW was a significant predictor, Β = -.90, p < .01, Nagelkerke R2
= .20, X2(1) = 24.32, p < .01. For participants in the threat condition, GBJW was not a
significant predictor, Nagelkerke R2 = .01, X2(1) = 1.07, p > .05. Thus, threat appears to
disrupt the relationship between GBJW and the marriage equality vote.
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Table 2
Binary Logistic Regressions with Current Status Quo and Individual Differences
Covariates Predicting Initial Ballot Decision (Marriage Equality)
Β

Wald

p

Exp(B)

ATLG

-2.20 (.33)

44.58

.00

.11

SSJ

SSJ

-.12 (.12)

1.02

.31

.89

SSJ

CSQ

1.83 (.86)

4.58

.03

6.23

SSJ

CSQ x SSJ Interaction

-.36 (.17)

4.18

.04

.70

SSJ
(Affirmation)

CSQ x SSJ Interaction

-.47 (.13)

13.80

.00

.62

GBJW

GBJW

-.17 (.16)

1.06

.30

.85

GBJW

CSQ

2.49 (.89)

7.87

.00

12.08

GBJW

CSQ x GBJW
Interaction
CSQ x GBJW
Interaction

-.73 (.26)

8.00

.01

.48

-.90 (.20)

19.72

.00

.41

Realistic &
Symbolic
Threat

Realistic & Symbolic
Threat

-1.77 (.28)

41.17

.00

.17

Intergroup
Anxiety

Intergroup Anxiety

-.59 (.11)

28.20

.00

.55

Covariate
Predictor
Model

Current Status Quo
(CSQ) and Individual
Differences Covariates
(Predictors)

ATLG

GBJW
(Affirmation)

Notes. ATLG, SSJ, GBJW, and CSQ stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale,
Situational System Justification scale, Global Belief in a Just World scale, and Current Status
Quo. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dfs = 1.

Current status quo manipulation’s effect on likelihood to vote for Ballot 1.
A between subjects One-way ANOVA testing whether participants differed in
their initial ballot likelihood according to current status quo condition failed to yield a
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significant result, F(1, 330) = 2.05, MSE = 5.77, p > .05, ηρ² = .01. Of those that rated
their likelihood to vote for Ballot 1 (five participants did not complete this item), 67.2%
of participants were at least somewhat likely to vote for marriage equality (with 41.9%
very likely) and 28.9% were at least somewhat unlikely to vote for marriage equality
(with 21.4% very unlikely).
Individual differences variables’ effects on likelihood to vote for Ballot 1.
Correlation analyses revealed that the individual differences variables were
significantly correlated with Ballot 1 likelihood such that participants were less likely to
vote for marriage equality with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men
(ATLG), r = -.79, p < .01, stronger views that lesbians and gay men constituted realistic
and symbolic threats, r = -.71, p < .01, greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay men
(Intergroup Anxiety), r = -.50, p < .01, stronger belief that American society is fair,
legitimate, and justifiable (SSJ), r = -.24, p < .01, and stronger global belief in a just
world (GBJW), r = -.25, p < .01.
Main effects and interactions for current status quo emerged when individual
difference covariates were added to the basic ANOVA one at a time, thereby creating a
series of Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) designs. Table 3 displays the results. The
main effects for the covariates were similar to the correlation analyses described above.
However, as shown in Table 3, a marginally significant main effect emerged for current
status quo in the SSJ ANCOVA such that participants in the affirmation condition were
more likely to vote for Ballot 1 (M = 5.07) than were participants in the threat condition
(M = 4.76).
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Similarly, for the GBJW ANCOVA, a significant main effect emerged for current
status quo, but was qualified by a significant current status quo by GBJW interaction.
For participants in the affirmation condition, GBJW was a significant predictor, β = -.40,
p < .01, R2 = .16, F(1, 162) = 30.87, MSE = 4.78. For participants in the threat condition,
GBJW was not a significant predictor, β = -.10, p > .05, R2 = .01, F(1, 161) = 1.56, MSE
= 5.72. Thus, threat appears to disrupt the relationship between GBJW and the likelihood
to vote for marriage equality.
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Table 3
ANCOVA Models with Current Status Quo and Individual Differences Covariates
Predicting Initial Ballot Decision (Marriage Equality)
Df

F

MSE

p

β

ηρ²

ATLG

1, 323

541.96

2.14

.000

-.84

.63

SSJ

SSJ

1, 323

18.35

5.36

.000

-.32

.05

SSJ

CSQ

1, 323

3.67

5.36

.056

-.32

.01

GBJW

GBJW

1, 323

21.70

5.25

.000

-.40

.06

GBJW

CSQ

1, 323

8.66

5.25

.003

-.48

.03

GBJW

CSQ x GBJW
Interaction

1, 323

7.89

5.25

.005

-.50

.02

GBJW
(Affirmation)

CSQ x GBJW
Interaction

1, 162

30.87

4.78

.000

-.40

.16

Realistic &
Symbolic
Threat

Realistic &
Symbolic Threat

1, 323

328.01

2.84

.000

-.70

.50

Intergroup
Anxiety

Intergroup Anxiety

1, 323

109.06

4.28

.000

-.55

.25

Covariate
Predictor
Model

Current Status Quo
(CSQ) and
Individual
Differences
Covariates
(Predictors)

ATLG

Notes. ATLG, SSJ, GBJW, and CSQ stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale,
Situational System Justification scale, Global Belief in a Just World scale, and Current Status
Quo.

When the individual differences covariates were added to the linear regression
model, the linear regression was significant, R2 = .64, F(6, 320) = 93.02, p < .01.
Participants with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and those who
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believed that gay men and lesbians represent a realistic and symbolic threat were
significantly less likely to vote for marriage equality (See Table 4).
Table 4
Linear Regressions with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Initial Ballot
Likelihood Decision (Marriage Equality)
Β

S.E.

Β

t

p

ATLG

-1.52

.15

-.68

-10.05

.00

Realistic &
Symbolic
Threat

-.29

.12

-.16

-2.46

.01

Covariate
Predictor
Model

Note. ATLG stands for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale.

Current status quo manipulation’s effect on emotion.
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 7 (Emotion: Fear v. Anxiety v.
Anger v. Disgust v. Compassion v. Happiness v. Hope) Multivariate Analysis of
Variance (MANOVA) testing the extent that participants felt different emotions when
threatened revealed a significant multivariate main effect for current status quo, MultF(7,
329) = 11.03, p < .01, ηρ² = .19 (See Table 5 for the means). Follow-up univariates
showed that threat condition participants were more fearful, F(1, 335) = 26.36, MSE =
.44, p < .01, ηρ² = .07; anxious, F(1, 335) = 23.09, MSE = .71, p < .01, ηρ² = .06; angry,
F(1, 335) = 20.04, MSE = .65, p < .001, ηρ² = .06; disgusted, F(1, 335) = 18.22, MSE =
.54, p < .001, ηρ² = .05; and compassionate, F(1, 335) = 9.60, MSE = .68, p < .01, ηρ² =
.03. Affirmation condition participants were happier and more hopeful, F(1, 335) =
34.58, MSE = 1.10, p < .01, ηρ² = .09 and F(1, 335) = 19.38, MSE = .91, p < .001, ηρ² =
.06, respectively. No other effects were significant.
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Table 5
Differences across Emotions According to Current Status Quo after Current Status Quo
Manipulation (Marriage Equality)
Affirmation
Emotion

Threat

M

SE

M

SE

Fear

1.26

.05

1.64

.05

Anxiety

1.31

.07

1.75

.06

Anger

1.50

.06

1.90

.06

Disgust

1.38

.06

1.72

.06

Compassion

1.68

.06

1.96

.06

Happiness

2.32

.08

1.64

.08

Hope

2.50

.07

2.05

.07

Notes. All means are significantly different for each emotion according to current status quo at p
< .01. NAffirmation = 165 and NThreat = 172.

Current status quo manipulation’s effect on sexual minority system
justification.
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 17 (Sexual Minority System
Justifications (SMSJ): 17 individual items) MANOVA testing whether participants
differed according to current status quo condition for seventeen system justification items
did not attain significance, MultF(17, 309) = .78, p > .05, ηρ² = .04 (See Table 6). Threat
condition participants were marginally significantly more likely than affirmation
condition participants to believe that lesbians and gay men are selfish (in general), F(1,
325) = 3.81, MSE = 1.29, p =.05, ηρ² = .01; significantly more likely to believe that
lesbians and gay men are selfish because they put themselves before others, F(1, 325) =
4.02, MSE = 1.28, p < .05, ηρ² = .01 and significantly less likely to believe that lesbians
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and gay men have a history of experiencing discrimination in the United States, F(1, 325)
= 4.10, MSE = 1.20, p < .05, ηρ² = .01.
Table 6
Differences across System Justifications According to Current Status Quo after Current
Status Quo Manipulation (Marriage Equality)
Sexual Minority
System
Justification

Affirmation

Threat

M

SE

M

SE

LG Selfish –
General

1.59*

.09

1.83*

.09

LG Selfish – put
themselves
before others

1.58

.09

1.83

.09

LG History of
Discrimination

4.42

.09

4.17

.08

Note. LG stands for Lesbians and Gay men. Means are significantly different at p < .05 level,
unless denoted with a *. Means with a * are marginally significantly different at p = .05.
NAffirmation = 160 and NThreat = 167.

To examine the social justifications groupings, I performed an exploratory factor
analysis of the 17 SMSJ items, which produced two significant internally reliable factors.
The first factor, entitled LGSelfish, included eight items representing participants’ views
of lesbians and gay men as selfish, immature, immoral, privileged, desirous of “special
rights”, and willing to use undemocratic means to gain these rights (Eigenvalue = 8.59;
explained variance 50.52%; cut off loading score = .40). LGSelfish was internally
consistent at both time 1 (after the current status quo manipulation) and at time 2 (after
the status quo likelihood manipulation), Cronbach’s α = .91 and α = .93, respectively.
The second factor included six items representing participants’ views that homosexuality
is unnatural; sexual orientation can be changed; “traditional”, heterosexual marriage
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should be protected; heterosexual, married couples provide the ideal parenting
environment for raising children; states should move slowly when deciding whether to
include same-sex couples within the definition of marriage; and restricting marriage to
heterosexual couples encourages natural procreation (Eigenvalue = 1.18; explained
variance 6.95%; cut off loading score = .40). Entitled NaturalHeterosexualMarriage, this
factor was internally consistent at both time 1 and at time 2, Cronbach’s α = .89 and α =
.90, respectively. The three remaining items (i.e. that lesbians and gay men have a
history of discrimination in the United States (Discrimination History), that lesbians and
gay men have enough political power to achieve their goals through the ordinary political
process (Political Power), and that sexual orientation is related to an individual’s ability
to contribute to society (Societal Contribution)) did not load on either of the two factors
and lowered the two factors’ internal reliabilities; thus, these items were left as individual
items.
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 5 (SMSJ – Reduced number of
items at Time 1) MANOVA testing whether participants differed according to current
status quo condition for the two factors and the three standalone items approached
multivariate significance, MultF(5, 329) = 1.98, p = .08, ηρ² = .03. Threat condition
participants were marginally more likely than affirmation condition participants to
believe that lesbians and gay men are selfish (LGSelfish factor), F(1, 333) = 3.61, MSE =
1.02, p = .058, ηρ² = .01 and marginally less likely to believe that lesbians and gay men
have a history of experiencing discrimination in the United States, F(1, 333) = 3.62, MSE
= 1.22, p = .058, ηρ² = .01 (See Table 7).
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Table 7
Differences across Sexual Minority System Justifications (Reduced Model) according to
Current Status Quo after Current Status Quo Manipulation (Marriage Equality)
Sexual Minority
System
Justification

Affirmation

Threat

M

SE

M

SE

LGSelfish

1.85

.08

2.06

.08

LG History of
Discrimination

4.40

.09

4.17

.08

Note. LG stands for Lesbians and Gay Men. Means are marginally significantly different at p =
.058. NAffirmation = 165 and NThreat = 170.

Mediation of the relationship between current status quo and marriage equality
ballot decisions by emotion and sexual minority system justification.
Participants did not differ in their Ballot 1 decisions according to current status
quo. In a series of binary logistic regressions that controlled for the effect of the
individual differences variables on marriage equality Ballot 1, the main effect of current
status quo did not attain statistical significance, ps > .05. Although current status quo
was a marginally significant predictor within the SSJ ANCOVA model for likelihood to
vote for Ballot 1 (See Above), when the interaction between SSJ and current status quo
was removed from the model, current status quo was no longer marginally significant, p
> .10. Similarly, although there was a main effect for current status quo and an
interaction effect between current status quo and GBJW within the GBJW ANCOVA
model, when the interaction was removed from the model, current status quo was no
longer significant, p > .05. I performed no mediation analyses because there were no
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significant differences for status quo to test for emotion or system justification
mediations.
Hypothesis 2: Status quo likelihood manipulation (Main effect).
Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effects on Ballot 2 decisions.
Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effect on voting for Ballot 2.
A between subjects One-way ANOVA testing whether participants differed in
their second ballot according to status quo likelihood condition (10% v. 30% v. 60% v.
90%) failed to yield a significant result, F(3, 326) = .06, MSE = .21, p > .05, ηρ² = .00.
Of those that voted (seven participants did not vote), 70.6% voted for marriage equality.
Individual differences variables’ effects on voting for Ballot 2.
Correlation analyses revealed that the individual differences variables were
significantly correlated with Ballot 2 such that participants were less likely to vote for
marriage equality with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (ATLG), r =
-.78, p < .01; stronger views that lesbians and gay men constituted realistic and symbolic
threats, r = -.68, p < .01; greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay men (Intergroup
Anxiety), r = -.49, p < .01; stronger belief that American society is fair, legitimate, and
justifiable (SSJ) r = -.21, p < .01; and stronger global belief in a just world (GBJW), r = .24, p < .01. Main effects and interactions for status quo likelihood emerged when
individual difference covariates were added to the binary logistic regressions for Ballot 2,
separately, one at a time. Although each individual differences variable resulted in
significant models, status quo likelihood was not a significant predictor in any of the
models. Table 8 displays the results. The main effects for the covariates were similar to
the correlation analyses described above.
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Table 8
Binary Logistic Regressions with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Second
Ballot Decision (Marriage Equality)
Β

Wald

p

Exp(B)

-3.19 (.70)

20.66

.00

.04

SSJ

-.66 (.20)

10.51

.00

.52

GBJW

GBJW

-.64 (.28)

5.22

.02

.53

Realistic &
Symbolic
Threat

Realistic & Symbolic
Threat

-2.67 (.61)

19.11

.00

.07

Intergroup
Anxiety

Intergroup Anxiety

-.61 (.15)

17.27

.00

.54

Covariate
Predictor
Model

Individual Differences
Covariates
(Predictors)

ATLG

ATLG

SSJ

Notes. ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale,
Situational System Justification scale, and Global Belief in a Just World scale. Standard errors
are in parentheses. Dfs = 1.

Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effect on likelihood to vote for Ballot 2.
A between subjects One-way ANOVA testing whether participants differed in
their second ballot likelihood according to status quo likelihood condition failed to yield
a significant result, F(3, 325) = .20, MSE = 5.71, p > .05, ηρ² = .00. Of those that
completed this item (eight participants did not), 68.4% were at least somewhat likely to
vote for marriage equality (40.1% were very likely) whereas 27% were at least somewhat
unlikely to vote for marriage equality (21.6% were very unlikely).
Individual differences variables’ effects on likelihood to vote for Ballot 2.
Correlation analyses revealed that the individual differences variables were
significantly correlated with Ballot 2 likelihood. Participants were less likely to vote for
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marriage equality with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (ATLG), r =
-.81, p < .01, stronger views that lesbians and gay men constituted realistic and symbolic
threats, r = -.72, p < .01, greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay men (Intergroup
Anxiety), r = -.51, p < .01, stronger beliefs that American society is fair, legitimate, and
justifiable (SSJ), r = -.25, p < .01, and stronger global belief in a just world (GBJW), r = .26, p < .01. Main effects emerged when individual difference covariates were added to
the basic ANOVA one at a time, thereby creating a series of ANCOVA designs for
likelihood to vote for Ballot 21. Table 9 displays the results. The main effects for the
covariates were similar to the correlation analyses.
Table 9
ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Second Ballot
Decision (Marriage Equality)
Df

F

MSE

p

β

ηρ²

ATLG

1, 320

605.60

1.96

.000

-.84

.65

SSJ

SSJ

1, 320

22.32

5.35

.000

-.37

.06

GBJW

GBJW

1, 320

22.58

5.35

.000

-.27

.07

Realistic &
Symbolic
Threat

Realistic &
Symbolic
Threat

1, 320

349.60

2.73

.000

-.81

.52

Intergroup
Anxiety

Intergroup
Anxiety

1, 320

109.52

4.19

.000

-.53

.26

Covariate
Predictor
Model

Individual
Differences
Covariates
(Predictors)

ATLG

Note. ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale,
Situational System Justification scale, and Global Belief in a Just World scale.

1

I created three vectors for status quo likelihood to compare the four groups (10%, 30%, 60%, and 90%)
when conducting the regression model. Unless otherwise noted, the standard reference group was the 90%
condition.
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A significant model was attained when individual differences covariates were
added to the linear regression to see whether participants’ likelihood to vote for the
second ballot differed according to status quo likelihood, R2 = .66, F(6, 321) = 104.94, p
< .01. (See Table 10). Participants with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay
men and greater beliefs that lesbians and gay men represent threats were less likely to
vote for marriage equality.
Table 10
Linear Regressions with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Second Ballot
Likelihood Decisions (Marriage Equality)
Β

S.E.

β

t

p

ATLG

-1.58

.14

-.71

-10.93

.00

Realistic &
Symbolic
Threat

-.25

.11

-.14

-2.23

.03

Covariate
Predictor
Model

Note. ATLG stands for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale.

Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effect on emotion.
A 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) MANOVA testing the
extent that participants felt different emotions (Fear v. Anxiety v. Anger v. Disgust v.
Compassion v. Happiness v. Hope) under each status quo likelihood condition revealed a
significant model, MultF(21, 919.422) = 1.77, p < .05, ηρ² = .04. However, further
inspection showed that only happiness differed marginally significantly across
conditions, F(3, 326) = 2.63, MSE = 1.52, p = .05, ηρ² = .02 (See Table 11). Participants

All omnibus multivariate tests in this experiment used the Wilks’ Lambda adjustment for correlated error
terms, which result in adjusted degrees of freedom that may not always be whole numbers.
2
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in the 90% condition felt significantly happier than participants in either the 10% or 30%
conditions, ps < .05.
Table 11
Differences for Happiness According to Status Quo Likelihood after Status Quo
Likelihood Manipulation (Marriage Equality)

Emotion
Happiness

10%
M (SE)

30%
M (SE)

60%
M (SE)

90%
M (SE)

2.08a (.14)

2.03b (.14)

2.36 (.14)

2.48a, b (.13)

Notes. Means with shared subscripts indicate significant differences at p < .05 level. N10% = 83,
N30% = 81, N60% = 80 and N90% = 86.

Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effect on sexual minority system
justification.
A 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) MANOVA model
testing the extent that participants used justifications (SMSJ: 17 items) under each status
quo likelihood condition failed to attain significance, MultF(51, 885.02) = 1.18, p > .05,
ηρ² = .06. Individual justifications also failed to attain significance, ps > .05. Similarly,
the 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) MANOVA model for the 5
justifications (SMSJ – Reduced number of items at Time 2 following the earlier factor
analysis) failed to attain significance, MultF(15, 881.02) = .92, p > .05, ηρ² = .01. Again,
the individual justifications failed to attain significance, ps > .05.
Mediation of the relationship between status quo likelihood and marriage
equality ballot decisions by emotion and sexual minority system justification.
Participants did not differ in their Ballot 2 decisions according to status quo
likelihood. In a series of binary logistic regressions that controlled for the effect of the
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individual differences variables on marriage equality Ballot 2, the main effect of status
quo likelihood did not attain statistical significance, ps > .05. In the series of ANCOVA
models involving likelihood to vote for Ballot 2 (See Above), none of the models
included a significant main effect or interaction for status quo likelihood. I performed no
mediation analyses because there were no significant differences for status quo to test for
emotion or system justification mediations
Hypothesis 3: Current status quo by status quo likelihood (Interaction
effect).
Current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations’ effects on Ballot 2
decisions.
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10%
v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Initial v. Second ballot) repeated measures MANOVA
testing the different hypotheses for Ballot change failed to attain significance, p > .05.
Crosstabs revealed that only 2% of participants changed their vote (seven participants)
between the initial and subsequent ballot. However, a marginally significant current
status quo by time interaction emerged, F(1, 321) = 3.37, MSE = .01, p = .067, ηρ² = .01.
Follow up analyses did not reveal significant differences according to current status quo
across time, i.e. participants in the threat and affirmation conditions did not change their
votes across time, F(1, 163) = 1.00, MSE = .00, p > .05, ηρ² = .01 and F(1, 164) = 2.69,
MSE = .02, p > .05, ηρ² = .02, respectively. Similarly, participants did not differ at time 1
or time 2 according to current status quo condition, t(331) = .89, p > .05 and t(328) = .29,
p > .05, respectively, for Ballot 1 and Ballot 2 across current status quo condition. A 2 x
4 x 2 MANOVA for likelihood to vote also failed to attain significance, p > .05, because
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only 7.9% of participants changed their likelihood to vote (26 of 328 participants)
between the initial and subsequent ballot.
Current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations’ interaction effect on
Ballot 2 decisions with individual differences variables included.
Correlational analyses revealed that individual differences variables were
significantly correlated with the four ballot decisions (i.e. the initial ballot, the initial
ballot likelihood, the subsequent ballot, and the subsequent ballot likelihood) (See Table
12). Participants were less likely to vote for marriage equality with more negative
attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (ATLG), stronger views that lesbians and gay men
constituted realistic and symbolic threats, greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay
men, stronger beliefs that American society is fair, legitimate, and justifiable (SSJ), and
stronger global belief in a just world (GBJW)3.

3

Covariate analyses of these variables can be found in the Hypothesis 2 and 3 Results sections.
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Table 12
Correlations between Ballot Decisions and Individual Differences variables

Individual
Difference
variable

Ballot 1

Ballot Decision
Ballot 2
Ballot 1
Likelihood

Ballot 2
Likelihood

ATLG

-.77

-.78

-.79

-.81

SSJ

-.20

-.21

-.24

-.25

GBJW

-.23

-.24

-.25

-.26

Realistic &
Symbolic Threat

-.67

-.68

-.71

-.72

Intergroup
Anxiety

-.46

-.49

-.50

-.51

Notes. ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale,
Situational System Justification scale, and Global Belief in a Just World scale. All correlations
are significant at p < .01 level. NBallot 1 = 328, NBallot 2 = 329, NBallot 1 Likelihood = 327, NBallot 2 Likelihood
= 328.

Individual differences variables’ effects on the relationship between manipulated
variables (Current status quo and status quo likelihood) and voting for marriage
equality.
Binary logistic regression involving current status quo and status quo likelihood
as predictors for Ballot 2 failed to attain significance, Nagelkerke R2 = .01, X2(7) = 1.55,
p > .05. As shown in the results for Hypothesis 2, individual differences variables
significantly predicted participants’ votes for Ballot 2. Therefore, in a series of models, I
added individual differences variables one at a time as covariates to the original binary
logistic regression models used to predict Ballot 2. Table 13 displays the results. The
main effects for the covariates were similar to the correlation analyses described above.
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However, as shown in Table 12 (Below), there was a significant regression model with
the ATLG covariate, Nagelkerke R2 = .74, X2(8) = 240.75, p < .01, revealing a main
effect for status quo likelihood such that participants in the 10%, Β = 1.80, 30%, Β = 2.28,
and 90%, Β = 1.95, conditions were significantly more likely to vote for marriage
equality than participants in the 60% condition, ps < .05.
Similarly, when the binary logistic regression model included all main effects and
interactions for current status quo (Affirmation v. Threat), status quo likelihood (90% v.
10%, 30%, and 60%), and GBJW with 90% and affirmation as the reference groups, a
significant model emerged, Nagelkerke R2 = .17, X2(15) = 40.76, p < .01, with a main
effect for current status quo, but qualified by a significant current status quo by GBJW
interaction. After splitting the file for status quo conditions, binary logistic regression
revealed that, for participants in the affirmation condition, GBJW was a significant
predictor, Β = -.54, p < .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .28, X2(7) = 35.37. For participants in the
threat condition, GBJW was not a significant predictor, Nagelkerke R2 = .04, X2(7) =
5.35, p > .05. Thus, threat again appears to disrupt the relationship between GBJW and
the marriage equality vote.
Within the original, built model, a marginally significant interaction between
current status quo and status quo likelihood emerged, p = .06; however, a marginally
significant three-way interaction among current status quo, status quo likelihood, and
GBJW, p = .06, qualified the two-way interaction. Splitting the file according to current
status quo and status quo likelihood allowed a finer look at the effects of GBJW under
each of the status quo conditions. A significant model emerged for the affirmation, 30%
cell, Β = -1.23, p < .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .39, X2(1) = 12.74; affirmation, 60% cell, B = -
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.65, p = .05, Nagelkerke R2 = .12, X2(1) = 3.81; and affirmation, 90% cell, B = -2.54, p <
.01, Nagelkerke R2 = .49, X2(1) = 17.49, p < .01, such that participants within these
conditions who held global belief in a just world were less likely to vote for Ballot 2.
Table 13
Binary Logistic Regressions with Current Status Quo, Status Quo Likelihood, and
Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Second Ballot Decisions (Marriage
Equality)
Covariate
Predictor
Model

Current Status Quo
(CSQ), Status Quo
Likelihood (SQL), and
Individual Differences
Covariates
(Predictors)

ATLG

ATLG

ATLG

SQL (60% as
reference group)

Β

Wald

d.f.

p

Exp(B)

-2.92
(.33)

77.24

1

.00

.05

8.88

3

.03

SQL (10% v. 60%)

1.80
(.84)

4.55

1

.03

6.04

SQL (30% v. 60%)

2.28
(.91)

6.30

1

.01

9.83

SQL (90% v. 60%)

1.95
(.82)

5.66

1

.02

7.02

SSJ

SSJ

14.71

1

.00

.72

GBJW

GBJW

-.33
(.09)
-.54
(.13)

18.34

1

.00

.58

GBJW (Built
Model)

CSQ (Affirmation as
reference group)

8.54
(3.27)

6.84

1

.01

5140.40

GBJW x CSQ
Interaction
(Affirmation as
reference group)

-2.51
(.93)

7.32

1

.01

.08

7.37

3

.06

CSQ x SQL
Interaction
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(Affirmation and 90%
as reference groups)
GBJW x CSQ x SQL
Interaction
(Affirmation and 90%
as reference groups)

7.30

3

.06

GBJW (Built
Model – Split
by CSQ)

GBJW (Affirmation
condition)

-2.54
(.87)

8.48

1

.00

.08

GBJW (Built
Model – Split
by CSQ and
SQL)

GBJW (Affirmation
and 30% condition)

-1.23
(.41)

8.80

1

.00

.29

GBJW (Affirmation
and 60% condition)

-.65
(.35)

3.42

1

.06

.52

GBJW (Affirmation
and 90% condition)

-2.54
(.87)

8.48

1

.00

.08

Realistic &
Symbolic
Threat

Realistic & Symbolic
Threat

-1.94
(.22)

78.38

1

.00

.14

Intergroup
Anxiety

Intergroup Anxiety

-.66
(.08)

59.48

1

.00

.52

Notes. ATLG, SSJ, GBJW, CSQ, and SQL stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men
scale, Situational System Justification scale, Global Belief in a Just World scale, Current Status
Quo, and Status Quo Likelihood. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Individual differences variables’ effects on the relationship between manipulated
variables (Current status quo and status quo likelihood) and likelihood to vote for
marriage equality.
A series of mixed model ANCOVAs included individual differences variables as
covariates in the 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo
Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Ballot 1 Likelihood v. Ballot 2
Likelihood) with repeated measures on the last factor tested the main effects and
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interactions the continuous factor, likelihood to vote for marriage equality. However,
when the individual differences variables were added, one at a time, to the model, time of
the ballot was not significant as a main effect or interaction, ps > .05. Thus, the
dependent variables were collapsed across time to create an overall likelihood to vote for
marriage equality.
A series of 2 (Current status quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status quo
likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) ANCOVAs with the individual differences
variables as covariates produced results similar to the correlation analyses performed
above4 (see Tables 12 and 14). In the GBJW ANCOVA model, significant main effects
for current status quo and GBJW emerged, but were qualified by a significant interaction
between current status quo and GBJW5 (See Table 14). Splitting the file according to
current status quo revealed that the significant effect of GBJW was in the affirmation
condition, β = -.53, p < .01, F(1, 156) = 29.21, MSE = 4.78, ηρ² = .16. As the effect of
GBJW was not significant in the threat condition, this indicates that threat may disrupt
the effect of GBJW on marriage equality decisions, β = -.09, p > .05, F(1, 156) = 2.48.
Significant three-way interactions emerged among current status quo, status quo
likelihood, and individual differences for ATLG and realistic and symbolic threat (See
Table 14). After splitting the file according to current status quo and status quo
likelihood (separately), I conducted ANCOVAs and correlations for the individual
difference factors. Correlations between ATLG and likelihood to vote for marriage

4

The reference groups for regression analyses were the affirmation condition and the 90% condition, unless
otherwise noted.
5
The significant beta weights were found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the
reference group. Therefore, the 30% condition was the reference group throughout the GBJW analyses.
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equality were significant in all eight cells, ps < .01 (See Table 15). Correlations were
significantly different between the affirmation, 10% (r = -.906) and affirmation, 60% (r =
-.708), z = -2.73, p < .01, and affirmation, 90% (r = -.780), z = -2.00, p < .05, cells
(Fisher r-to-z transformation, Richard Lowry, 2001-2015, vassarstats.net/rdiff.html).
Similarly, correlations were significantly different between the affirmation, 30% (r = .883) and affirmation, 60% (r = -.708), z = -2.20, p < .05, cells. Correlations were
significantly different between the threat, 10% (r = -.909) and threat, 30% (r = -.714), z =
-2.78, p < .01, cells and marginally significantly different between the threat, 10% (r = .909) and threat, 60% (r = -.791), z = -1.93, p = .054, cells. Finally, for the 30%
condition, correlations were significantly different between affirmation (r = -.883) and
threat (r = -.714), z = -2.14, p < .05.
Correlations between realistic and symbolic likelihood and likelihood to vote for
marriage equality were significant in all cells such that the more participants believed
lesbians and gay men to represent realistic and symbolic threats, the less likely they were
to vote for marriage equality (See Table 16). None of the correlations were significantly
different from each other within either the threat or affirmation conditions, ps > .05
(Lowry, 2001-2015).
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Table 14
ANCOVA Models with Current Status Quo, Status Quo Likelihood, and Individual
Differences Covariates Predicting Second Ballot Decision (Marriage Equality)
Df

F

MSE

p

β

ηρ²

ATLG

1, 312

627.36

1.86

.000

-.78

.67

CSQ x SQL x
ATLG Interaction

3, 312

3.96

1.86

.009

.392

.04

ATLG (Split
by CSQ)

SQL x ATLG
(Threat condition)

3, 156

4.22

1.88

.007

.35

.08

ATLG (Split
by SQL)

CSQ x ATLG (30%
condition)

1, 77

10.34

1.89

.002

.53

.12

SSJ

SSJ

1, 312

20.85

5.22

.000

-.47

.06

GBJW

GBJW

1, 312

23.38

5.13

.000

-.54

.07

CSQ

1, 312

6.94

5.13

.009

-.63

.02

CSQ x GBJW
Interaction

1, 312

6.40

5.13

.012

.74

.02

GBJW (Split
by CSQ)

GBJW (Affirmation
condition)

1, 156

29.21

4.78

.000

-.53

.16

Realistic &
Symbolic
(R&S) Threat

R&S Threat

1, 312

365.56

2.58

.000

-.67

.54

CSQ x SQL x R&S
Threat Interaction

3, 312

3.59

2.58

.014

.56

.03

SQL x R&S Threat
Interaction (Threat
condition)

3, 156

4.38

2.19

.005

.56

.08

Covariate
Predictor
Model

Current Status Quo
(CSQ), Status Quo
Likelihood (SQL),
and Individual
Differences
Covariates
(Predictors)

ATLG

R&S Threat
(Split by
CSQ)

142
R&S Threat
(Split by
SQL)

Intergroup
Anxiety

CSQ x R&S Threat
Interaction (30%
condition)

1, 77

4.88

2.43

.030

.43

.06

CSQ x R&S Threat
Interaction (90%
condition)

1, 79

5.02

2.52

.028

-.41

.06

Intergroup Anxiety

1, 312

109.98

4.12

.000

-.54

.26

Notes. ATLG, SSJ, GBJW, CSQ, and SQL stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men
scale, Situational System Justification scale, Global Belief in a Just World scale, Current Status
Quo, and Status Quo Likelihood.

Table 15
Correlations between ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale) and
Likelihood to Vote for Ballot 2 at Different Levels of Current Status Quo and Status Quo
Likelihood (Marriage Equality)

Current Status
Quo

10%

Status Quo Likelihood Conditions
30%
60%

90%

Affirmation

-.906a, b (40)

-.883c, e (39)

-.708a, c (43)

-.780b (42)

Threat

-.909d* (43)

-.714d, e (42)

-.791* (38)

-.815 (41)

Notes. Correlations are significant at p < .01. Correlations with shared subscripts indicate
significant differences at p < .05 or less level. Shared * indicate marginally significantly different
at p = .05 level. Ns are in parentheses.
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Table 16
Correlations between Realistic and Symbolic Threat scale and Likelihood to Vote for
Ballot 2 at Different Levels of Current Status Quo and Status Quo Likelihood (Marriage
Equality)

Current Status
Quo

10%

Status Quo Likelihood Conditions
30%
60%

90%

Affirmation

-.640 (40)

-.774 (39)

-.634 (43)

-.719 (42)

Threat

-.805 (43)

-.729 (42)

-.762 (38)

-.811 (41)

Notes. Correlations are significant at p < .001. Ns are in parentheses.

Current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations’ effects on emotion.
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10%
v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 7 (Emotions: Fear v. Anxiety v. Anger v. Disgust v.
Compassion v. Happiness v. Hope) x 2 (Time: After current status quo manipulation v.
After status quo likelihood manipulation) mixed model ANOVA with repeated measures
on the last two factors revealed significant main effects and interactions for reported
emotion. A significant main effect for emotion emerged, F(2.34, 753.166) = 108.29, MSE
= 2.03, p < .01, ηρ² = .25, that was qualified by an emotion by current status quo
interaction, F(2.34, 753.16) = 11.24, MSE = 2.03, p < .01, ηρ² = .03. A significant time
by emotion interaction emerged, F(2.21, 711.82) = 8.55, MSE = 1.48, p < .01, ηρ² = .03,
that was qualified by two significant three-way interactions: one being time by emotion
by current status quo, F(2.21, 711.82) = 16.21, MSE = 1.48, p < .01, ηρ² = .05, and the

6

All repeated measures tests in this experiment used the Huynh-Felt adjustment for correlated error terms,
which result in adjusted degrees of freedom that may not always be whole numbers.
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other being time by emotion by status quo likelihood, F(6.63, 711.82) = 2.56, MSE =
1.48, p < .05, ηρ² = .02.
A series of 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo
Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: After current status quo
manipulation (Time 1) v. After status quo likelihood manipulation (Time 2)) repeated
measures ANOVAs were performed on each emotion. Significant time main effects
appeared for most emotions (except for anxiety and disgust): fear, F(1, 323) = 5.16, MSE
= .34, p < .05, ηρ² = .02; anger, F(1, 323) = 6.55, MSE = .60, p < .05, ηρ² = .02;
compassion, F(1, 323) = 27.32, MSE = .38, p < .01, ηρ² = .08; happiness, F(1, 323) =
11.13, MSE = .97, p < .01, ηρ² = .03; and hope, F(1, 323) = 4.77, MSE = .81, p < .05, ηρ²
= .02. Similarly, a main effect for current status quo emerged for each emotion: fear,
F(1, 323) = 12.22, MSE = .60, p < .01, ηρ² = .04; anxiety, F(1, 322) = 10.83, MSE = .93,
p < .01, ηρ² = .03; anger, F(1, 323) = 7.84, MSE = .95, p < .01, ηρ² = .02; disgust, F(1,
323) = 9.00, MSE = .86, p < .01, ηρ² = .03; compassion, F(1, 323) = 5.37, MSE = 1.07, p
< .05, ηρ² = .02; happiness, F(1, 323) = 8.25, MSE = 1.66, p < .01, ηρ² = .02; and hope,
F(1, 323) = 5.87, MSE = 1.37, p < .05, ηρ² = .02. However, all of these main effects were
qualified by significant time by current status quo interactions: fear, F(1, 323) = 13.11,
MSE = .34, p < .01, ηρ² = .04; anxiety, F(1, 322) = 9.43, MSE = .63, p < .01, ηρ² = .03;
anger, F(1, 323) = 8.84, MSE = .60, p < .01, ηρ² = .03; disgust, F(1, 323) = 4.71, MSE =
.53, p < .05, ηρ² = .01; compassion, F(1, 323) = 5.56, MSE = .38, p < .05, ηρ² = .02;
happiness, F(1, 322) = 24.19, MSE = .97, p < .01, ηρ² = .07; and hope, F(1, 323) = 10.88,
MSE = .81, p < .01, ηρ² = .03.
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After splitting the file according to current status quo, repeated measure ANOVAs
and One-way ANOVAs for each time were conducted to explore these relationships (See
Table 17). Table 17 shows that for all the negative emotions participants experienced
stronger negative emotions at Time 1 under the threat condition than under the
affirmation condition and that this effect dissipated over time so that there were no
differences in negative emotions at Time 2 for the status quo manipulation. Further,
participants felt stronger negative emotions under threat at Time 1 than at Time 2. Table
17 shows the opposite pattern for the positive emotions of happiness and hope where
participants felt stronger positive emotions at Time 1 in the affirmation condition than
threat condition but this effect dissipated at Time 2 where participants felt equivalent
happiness and hope in the affirmation and threat conditions. Compassion did not follow
this trend such that threat condition participants felt greater compassion than affirmation
condition participants at time 1, but this effect dissipated at Time 2.
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Table 17
Differences across Emotions and Time According to Current Status Quo (Marriage
Equality)
Time 1

Time 2

Emotion

Affirmation

Threat

Affirmation

Threat

Fear

1.26a (.05)

1.64a, b (.05)

1.33 (.06)

1.37b (.06)

Anxiety

1.31c (.07)

1.75c, d (.07)

1.45 (.07)

1.50d (.07)

Anger

1.50e (.06)

1.89e, f (.06)

1.53 (.07)

1.56f (.07)

Disgust

1.38g (.06)

1.72g, h (.06)

1.46 (.07)

1.56h (.07)

Compassion

1.67i, j (.06)

1.97i, k (.06)

2.04j (.07)

2.11k (.07)

Happiness

2.32l (.08)

1.65l, m (.08)

2.19 (.10)

2.28m (.10)

Hope

2.50n (.08)

2.05n, o (.07)

2.42 (.09)

2.44o (.09)

Notes. Means with shared subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 or less level for the same
emotion. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Significant and marginally significant time by status quo likelihood interactions
also emerged: anger, F(3, 323) = 2.53, MSE = .60, p < .06, ηρ² = .02; compassion, F(3,
323) = 2.43, MSE = .38, p = .06, ηρ² = .02; happiness, F(3, 323) = 3.00, MSE = .97, p <
.05, ηρ² = .03; and hope, F(3, 323) = 2.57, MSE = .81, p < .06, ηρ² = .02. After splitting
the file according to status quo likelihood, repeated measured ANOVAs were conducted
to explore these relationships (See Table 18). Time main effects emerged in the 60%,
F(1, 79) = 8.48, MSE = .52, p < .01, ηρ² = .10; and 90%, F(1, 84) = 7.31, MSE = .48, p <
.01, ηρ² = .08, conditions such that participants were angrier at time 1 than at time 2.
Participants in the 10%, F(1, 81) = 11.81, MSE = .45, p < 01, ηρ² = .13; 60%, F(1, 79) =
10.61, MSE = .32, p < 01, ηρ² = .12; and 90%, F(1, 84) = 10.48, MSE = .42, p < .01, ηρ² =
.11 conditions felt less compassion at time 1 than at time 2. Participants in the 60%, F(1,
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79) = 3.82, MSE = 1.04, p = .05, ηρ² = .05, and 90%, F(1, 84) = 11.36, MSE = 1.38, p <
.01, ηρ² = .12 conditions were happier at time 2 than at time 1. Participants in the 90%
likelihood condition, F(1, 84) = 8.02, MSE = 1.12, p < .01, ηρ² = .09, were more hopeful
at time 2 than at time 1.
Table 18
Differences across Emotions and Time According to Status Quo Likelihood (Marriage
Equality)

Emotion
Anger

10%
1.56
(.07)

Time 1
30%
60%
1.76
(.10)

90%

10%

Time 2
30%
60%

1.69a
(.09)

1.79b
(.09)

1.64
(.10)

1.68
(.13)

1.36a
(.08)

1.51b
(.10)

90%

Compassion

1.84c
(.08)

2.01
(.10)

1.83d
(.09)

1.62e
(.08)

2.19c
(.10)

2.04
(.10)

2.12d
(.09)

1.94e
(.10)

Happiness

2.04
(.12)

1.95
(.11)

2.06*
(.13)

1.88f
(.10)

2.07
(.13)

2.03
(.13)

2.37*
(.12)

2.48f
(.15)

Hope

2.38
(.11)

2.26
(.10)

2.29
(.11)

2.17g
(.10)

2.31
(.12)

2.35
(.13)

2.43
(.11)

2.63g
(.14)

Notes. Means with shared subscripts indicate significant differences at p < .01 for the same
emotion. Shared * indicate marginally significant differences at p = .05 level for the same
emotion. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations’ effects on sexual
minority system justification.
A 17 (SMSJ: 17 items) x 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4
(Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Time 1 v. Time 2)
repeated measures MANOVA tested the change hypotheses. Only a main effect for
SMSJ emerged, indicating that participants differed in their endorsement of different
system justifications, F(5.62, 1685.73) = 170.83, MSE = 5.82, p < .01, ηρ² = .36.
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In addition, a 5 (SMSJ – Reduced number of items based upon the earlier factor
analysis) x 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood:
10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) repeated measures MANOVA
tested these hypotheses. A main effect for SMSJ emerged, F(2.65, 841.13) = 413.47,
MSE = 2.77, p < .01, ηρ² = .57, qualified with an interaction between SMSJ and current
status quo, F(2.65, 841.13) = 3.13, MSE = 2.77, p < .05, ηρ² = .01.
A series of 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo
Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) repeated measures
MANOVAs were performed on each justification. A significant main effect for current
status quo emerged for Discrimination History, such that affirmation condition
participants (M = 4.42) were more likely than threat condition participants (M = 4.14) to
believe that lesbians and gay men have a history of discrimination in the United States,
F(1, 321) = 6.14, MSE = 2.05, p < .05, ηρ² = .02.
Mediation of the relationship between current status quo, status quo likelihood,
and marriage equality ballot decisions by emotion and sexual minority system
justification.
Participants did not differ in their Ballot 2 decisions according to status quo
likelihood. In addition, participants did not differ in their Ballot 2 decisions according to
current status quo, Nagelkerke R2 = .00, X2(1) = .08, p > .05, or according to both current
status quo and status quo likelihood, Nagelkerke R2 = .001, X2(2) = .24, p > .05. In a
series of binary logistic regressions that controlled for the effect of the individual
differences variables on marriage equality Ballot 2, the main effects of current status quo
and status quo likelihood did not attain statistical significance, ps > .05. I performed no
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mediation analyses because there were no significant differences for status quo to test for
emotion or system justification mediations
Hypothesis 4: Individual differences variables (Attitudes Toward Lesbians
and Gay Men (ATLG), Situational System Justification (SSJ), and Global Belief in a
Just World (GBJW) scales)
Individual differences variables’ effects on Ballot decisions.
Individual differences variables strongly affected participants’ ballot decisions
(See Results for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3).
Individual differences variables’ effects on emotion.
ATLG as individual differences covariate.
A 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 8 (Emotion: Fear v.
Anxiety v. Anger v. Disgust v. Compassion v. Pity v. Happiness v. Hope) x 2 (Time:
Time 1 v. Time 2) repeated measures MANCOVA with ATLG covariate resulted in a
significant four-way interaction between time, emotion, status quo likelihood, and ATLG,
F(10.003, 1060.34) = 4.25, MSE = .91, p < .01, ηρ² = .04. Thus, a series of 4 (Status Quo
Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) repeated measures
ANCOVAs with ATLG covariate were conducted for each emotion (ATLG repeated
measures ANCOVA). Significant time main effects appeared for each emotion, with the
differences across time mostly matching the time by current status quo effect (See Tables
17 and 19), with greater means for negative emotions at time 1 than time 2. However,
whereas happiness and pity had greater means at time 1 than time 2, hope and
compassion had greater means at time 2 than at time 1. Similarly, an ATLG main effect
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emerged for most emotions, except compassion (See Table 20). However, all of these
main effects were qualified by significant time by ATLG interactions (See Table 21).
Table 19
Repeated Measures ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting
Emotions: Time Main Effect (Marriage Equality)
Df

F

MSE

p

ηρ²

Fear

1, 321

46.20

.31

.000

.13

Anxiety

1, 320

25.40

.60

.000

.07

Anger

1, 321

75.28

.50

.000

.19

Disgust

1, 321

67.22

.41

.000

.17

Compassion

1, 321

77.96

.34

.000

.20

Pity

1, 319

19.42

.57

.000

.06

Happiness

1, 321

122.13

.75

.000

.28

Hope

1, 321

126.40

.58

.000

.28

Fear

1, 321

18.75

.33

.000

.06

Anxiety

1, 320

7.37

.64

.007

.02

Anger

1, 321

24.37

.56

.000

.07

Disgust

1, 321

15.44

.50

.000

.05

Compassion

1, 321

12.33

.38

.001

.04

Pity

1, 319

6.42

.59

.012

.02

Happiness

1, 321

22.88

.98

.000

.07

Hope

1, 321

29.18

.77

.000

.08

Individual
Differences
Covariate
Model

Predicted Emotion

ATLG

SSJ

Notes. ATLG and SSJ stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale and Situational
System Justification scale.
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Table 20
Repeated Measures ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting
Emotions: Covariate Main Effect (Marriage Equality)
Df

F

MSE

p

β

ηρ²

Fear

1, 321

71.58

.51

.000

.48

.18

Anxiety

1, 320

35.36

.86

.000

.25

.10

Anger

1, 321

107.82

.70

.000

.60

.25

Disgust

1, 321

127.90

.61

.000

.74

.28

Pity

1, 319

37.67

.79

.000

.52

.11

Happiness

1, 321

9.85

1.60

.002

-.45

.03

Hope

1, 321

12.58

1.32

.000

-.41

.04

Compassion

1, 321

4.96

1.07

.027

-.127

.02

Individual
Differences
Covariate
Model

Predicted
Emotion

ATLG

SSJ

Notes. ATLG and SSJ stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale and Situational
System Justification scale.

7

The beta weights were not significant using the different status quo likelihood comparison groups.
Therefore, status quo likelihood vectors were removed from the regression model in order to find the
significant relationship (beta weight) between SSJ and Compassion.
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Table 21
Repeated Measures ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting
Emotions: Time by Covariate Interaction (Marriage Equality)
Df

F

MSE

p

ηρ²

Fear

1, 321

41.21

.31

.000

.11

Anxiety

1, 320

27.74

.60

.000

.08

Anger

1, 321

67.29

.50

.000

.17

Disgust

1, 321

76.30

.41

.000

.19

Compassion

1, 321

50.49

.34

.000

.14

Pity

1, 319

20.28

.57

.000

.06

Happiness

1, 321

109.70

.75

.000

.26

Hope

1, 321

128.04

.58

.000

.28

Fear

1, 321

14.87

.33

.000

.04

Anxiety

1, 320

6.91

.64

.009

.02

Anger

1, 321

18.98

.56

.000

.06

Disgust

1, 321

15.72

.50

.000

.05

Compassion

1, 321

3.88

.38

.050

.01

Pity

1, 319

5.80

.59

.017

.02

Happiness

1, 321

15.79

.98

.000

.05

Hope

1, 321

24.76

.77

.000

.07

Individual
Differences
Covariate
Model

Predicted Emotion

ATLG

SSJ

Notes. ATLG and SSJ stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale and Situational
System Justification scale.

153
One-way ANCOVA follow ups were conducted to explore these relationships
(See Table 22). For fear, the effect of ATLG was significant at both time 1, β = .25, p <
.01, and at time 2, β = .52, p < .01. For anxiety, the relationship was only significant at
time 2, β = .27, p < .01, such that participants with negative attitudes toward lesbians and
gay men were anxious at time 2. For anger, the relationship was significant at both time
1, β = .22, p < .05, and at time 2, β = .69, p < .01. For compassion, the relationship was
significant at time 1, β = .148, p < .01, and at time 2, β = -.23, p < .01, but in opposite
directions, with participants having more compassion at time 1. For pity, the relationship
was significant at time 2, β = .64, p < .01, such that participants with negative attitudes
toward lesbians and gay men felt pity.

8

A significant beta weight could not be found between ATLG and Compassion at time 1 using the different
status quo likelihood references groups. Therefore, for both times, the status quo likelihood vectors were
removed from the regression model in order to find the significant relationship (beta weight) between
ATLG and Compassion.
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Table 22
One-way ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Emotions:
Time 1 v. Time 2 (Marriage Equality)
F

MSE

p

β

ηρ²

Fear (Time 1)

1, 321

6.50

.47

.011

.25

.02

Fear (Time 2)

1, 321

132.15

.35

.000

.52

.29

Anxiety (Time 2)

1, 320

66.75

.69

.000

.27

.17

Anger (Time 1)

1, 321

6.30

.68

.013

.22

.02

Anger (Time 2)

1, 321

200.71

.52

.000

.69

.38

Disgust (Time 1)

1, 321

9.39

.55

.002

.30

.03

Disgust (Time 2)

1, 321

222.06

.47

.000

.82

.41

Compassion (Time 1)

1, 321

7.02

.67

.008

.149

.02

Compassion (Time 2)

1, 321

17.79

.76

.000

-.23

.05

Pity (Time 2)

1, 320

60.52

.65

.000

.64

.16

Happiness (Time 1)

1, 321

11.17

1.17

.001

.5010

.03

Happiness (Time 2)

1, 321

71.75

1.19

.000

-.42

.18

Hope (Time 1)

1, 321

11.20

.94

.001

.3711

.03

Hope (Time 2)

1, 321

83.57

.97

.000

-.48

.21

Fear (Time 1)

1, 321

7.05

.47

.008

-.1512

.02

Predicted Emotion

ATLG

SSJ
9

Df

Individual
Differences
Covariate
Model

Significant beta weights could not be found between ATLG and Compassion using the same status quo
likelihood reference groups for both time 1 and time 2. Therefore, for both times, the status quo likelihood
vectors were removed from the model in order to find the significant relationship (beta weight) between
ATLG and Compassion.
10
The significant beta weights were found within the model using the 60% status quo likelihood as the
reference group for both Time 1 and Time 2.
11
The significant beta weights were found within the model using the 60% status quo likelihood as the
reference group for both Time 1 and Time 2.
12
Significant beta weights could not be found between SSJ and Fear using the same status quo likelihood
reference groups for both time 1 and time 2. Therefore, for both times, the status quo likelihood vectors
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Fear (Time 2)

1, 321

3.63

.49

.058

.11

.01

Anxiety (Time 1)

1, 321

6.14

.75

.014

-.2313

.02

Disgust (Time 1)

1, 321

11.11

.56

.001

-.2414

.03

Compassion (Time 2)

1, 321

7.98

.78

.005

-.1515

.02

Hope (Time 1)

1, 321

6.75

.92

.010

.1516

.02

Hope (Time 2)

1, 321

11.11

1.21

.001

-.18

.03

Notes. ATLG and SSJ stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale and Situational
System Justification scale.

For anger, a significant interaction emerged for time by status quo likelihood (See
Table 23). After splitting the file by status quo likelihood, the ATLG repeated measures
ANCOVA revealed a significant main effect for time for participants in the 30%, 60%,
and 90% conditions, such that participants were angrier at time 1 than at time 2 (See
Table 24).

were removed from the model in order to find the significant relationship (beta weight) between SSJ and
Fear.
13
The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the
reference group.
14
The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 60% status quo likelihood as the
reference group.
15
A significant beta weight could not be found between SSJ and Compassion at time 2 using the different
status quo likelihood references groups. Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed from
the model in order to find the significant relationship (beta weight) between SSJ and Compassion.
16
Significant beta weights could not be found between SSJ and Hope using the same status quo likelihood
reference groups for both time 1 and time 2. Therefore, for both times, the status quo likelihood vectors
were removed from the model in order to find the significant relationships (beta weights) between SSJ and
Hope.
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Table 23
Repeated Measures ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting
Emotions: Status Quo Likelihood Effects (Marriage Equality)
Individual
Differences
Covariate
Model

Predicted Emotion
(SQL Effects)

ATLG

β

ηρ²

Df

F

MSE

p

Anger (Time x
SQL Interaction)

3, 321

3.61

.50

.014

.03

Anger (Time x
SQL Interaction:
30% condition)

1, 79

26.84

.53

.000

.25

Anger (Time x
SQL Interaction:
60% condition)

1, 79

32.86

.42

.000

.29

Anger (Time x
SQL Interaction:
90% condition)

1, 82

34.29

.38

.000

.30

Disgust (Time x
SQL Interaction)

3, 321

4.76

.41

.003

.04

Disgust (SQL x
ATLG Interaction)

3, 321

2.96

.61

.033

Disgust (Time x
SQL x ATLG
Interaction)

3, 321

4.84

.41

.003

.04

Disgust (Time x
SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 30%
condition)

1, 79

44.25

.44

.000

.36

Disgust (Time x
SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 60%
condition)

1, 79

22.38

.32

.000

.22

Disgust (Time x
SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 90%
condition)

1, 82

37.39

.32

.000

.31

-.35

.03
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Happiness (SQL)

3, 321

3.25

1.60

.022

.03

Happiness (Time x
SQL Interaction)

3, 321

11.14

.75

.000

.09

Happiness (SQL x
ATLG Interaction)

3, 321

3.08

1.60

.027

Happiness (Time x
SQL x ATLG
Interaction)

3, 321

8.74

.75

.000

.08

Happiness (Time x
SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 30%
condition)

1, 79

24.86

.60

.000

.24

Happiness (Time x
SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 60%
condition)

1, 79

50.65

.69

.000

.39

Happiness (Time x
SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 90%
condition)

1, 82

53.09

.87

.000

.39

Hope (Time x SQL
Interaction)

3, 321

7.29

.58

.000

.06

Hope (Time x SQL
x ATLG
Interaction)

3, 321

5.22

.58

.002

.05

Hope (Time x SQL
x ATLG
Interaction: 10%
condition)

1, 81

14.36

.55

.000

.15

Hope (Time x SQL
x ATLG
Interaction: 30%
condition)

1, 79

21.63

.49

.000

.22

Hope (Time x SQL
x ATLG
Interaction: 60%
condition)

1, 79

41.27

.60

.000

.34

.40

.03
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SSJ

Hope (Time x SQL
x ATLG
Interaction: 90%
condition)

1, 82

54.46

.70

.000

.40

Anger (Time x
SQL Interaction)

3, 321

4.44

.56

.005

.04

Anger (Time x
SQL x SSJ
Interaction)

3, 321

3.08

.56

.028

.03

Anger (Time x
SQL x SSJ
Interaction: 30%
condition)

1, 79

4.44

.70

.038

.05

Anger (Time x
SQL x SSJ
Interaction: 60%
condition)

1, 79

16.98

.45

.000

.18

Anger (Time x
SQL x SSJ
Interaction: 90%
condition)

1, 82

13.39

.42

.000

.14

Disgust (Time x
SQL Interaction)

3, 321

2.66

.50

.048

.02

Disgust (Time x
SQL Interaction:
60% condition)

1, 79

20.61

.35

.000

.21

Disgust (Time x
SQL Interaction:
90% condition)

1, 82

11.12

.40

.001

.12

Pity (Time x SQL
Interaction)

3, 319

3.46

.59

.017

.03

Pity (Time x SQL x
SSJ Interaction)

3, 319

2.95

.59

.033

.03

Pity (Time x SQL x
SSJ Interaction:
60% condition)

1, 79

13.78

.50

.000

.15

Happiness (Time x
SQL Interaction)

3, 321

3.23

.98

.023

.03
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Happiness (Time x
SQL x SSJ
Interaction)

3, 321

2.55

.98

.056

.02

Happiness (Time x
SQL x SSJ
Interaction: 30%
condition)

1, 79

11.48

.69

.001

.13

Happiness (Time x
SQL x SSJ
Interaction: 60%
condition)

1, 79

8.79

1.02

.004

.10

Happiness (Time x
SQL x SSJ
Interaction: 90%
condition)

1, 82

5.30

1.34

.024

.06

Notes. ATLG, SSJ, and SQL stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale, Situational
System Justification scale, and Status Quo Likelihood.

Table 24
Differences for Anger According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Marriage
Equality)

Time

10%

Status Quo Likelihood Conditions
30%
60%

90%

Time 1

1.57 (.08)

1.76a (.10)

1.68b (.09)

1.81c (.10)

Time 2

1.64 (.10)

1.68a (.09)

1.36b (.06)

1.49c (.07)

Notes. Means with shared subscripts indicate significantly different correlations at p < .05 level.
Standard errors are in parentheses.

For disgust, significant effects emerged for time by status quo likelihood and
status quo likelihood by ATLG (See Table 23). For happiness, significant effects
emerged for status quo likelihood, time by status quo likelihood, and status quo
likelihood by ATLG. For hope, a significant effect emerged for time by status quo
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likelihood. However, these effects were explained by significant three-way interactions
among status quo likelihood, ATLG, and time.
After splitting the file according to status quo likelihood, the ATLG repeated
measures ANCOVA and correlations were conducted for each emotion. For disgust,
significant interactions emerged between ATLG and time for the 30%, 60%, and 90%
conditions. At time 2, participants in these conditions had significantly stronger
relationships between their negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and their
feelings of disgust than participants in the 10% condition, z = -2.93, p < .01; z = -2.35, p
< .05; and z = -3.74, p < .01, respectively (See Table 25). Participants in the 90%
condition had significantly stronger relationships at time 2 than at time 1, z = -4.73, p <
.01.
Table 25
Correlations between Disgust and ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men
scale) According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Marriage Equality)

Time

10%

Status Quo Likelihood Conditions
30%
60%

90%

Time 1

.314 (83)

.09ns (81)

-.026ns (81)

.282d (84)

Time 2

.416a, b, c (83)

.721a (81)

.673b (81)

.775c, d (84)

Notes. Correlations with shared subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 or less. NS
subscripts indicate the correlation was not significant at p < .05 level. Ns are in parentheses.

For happiness, significant interactions emerged between ATLG and time for the
30%, 60%, and 90% conditions (See Table 23). At time 2, participants in the 90%
condition had a stronger relationship between their negative attitudes toward lesbians and
gay men and their feelings of unhappiness than those in the 30% and 60% conditions, z =
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2.49, p < .05 and z = 2.31, p < .05, respectively (Lowry, 2001-2015). Participants in the
60% condition had significantly different correlations between time 1 and 2, indicating
that knowledge of increased likelihood for marriage equality elicited stronger feelings of
unhappiness in people who have negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, z =
5.36, p < .01 (See Table 26).
Table 26
Correlations between Happiness and ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men
scale) According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Marriage Equality)

Time

10%

Status Quo Likelihood Conditions
30%
60%

90%

Time 1

.003ns (83)

.16ns (81)

.401c (81)

.109ns (84)

Time 2

-.183ns (83)

-.384a (81)

-.408b, c (81)

-.664a, b (84)

Notes. Correlations with shared subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 or less. NS
subscripts indicate the correlation was not significant at p < .05 level. Ns are in parentheses.

For hope, significant interactions emerged between ATLG and time for each
condition (See Tables 23). At time 2, participants in the 90% condition had a stronger
r0elationship between their negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and their
feelings of hopelessness than participants in the 10% and 30% conditions, z = 2.86, p <
.01 and z = 2.44, p < .05, respectively (Lowry, 2001-2015). Participants in the 60%
condition had a significantly different correlation between time 1 and at time 2, z = 5.27,
p < .01, such that participants with greater negative attitudes felt less hope with time (See
Table 27).
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Table 27
Correlations between Hope and ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale)
According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Marriage Equality)

Time

10%

Status Quo Likelihood Conditions
30%
60%

90%

Time 1

.127ns (83)

.127ns (81)

.311c (81)

.139ns (84)

Time 2

-.296a (83)

-.353b (81)

-.480c (81)

-.639a, b (84)

Notes. Correlations with shared subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 or less. NS
subscripts indicate the correlation was not significant at p < .05 level. Ns are in parentheses.

SSJ as individual differences covariate.
A 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 8 (Emotion: Fear v.
Anxiety v. Anger v. Disgust v. Compassion v. Pity v. Happiness v. Hope) x 2 (Time:
Time 1 v. Time 2) repeated measures MANCOVA with SSJ covariate resulted in a
significant four-way interaction between time, emotion, status quo likelihood, and SSJ,
F(8.11, 860.01) = 2.07, MSE = 1.38, p < .05, ηρ² = .02. Thus, a series of 4 (Status Quo
Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) repeated measures
ANCOVAs with SSJ covariate were run for each emotion (the SSJ repeated measures
ANCOVA). Significant time main effects emerged for each emotion (See Table 19). A
significant main effect for SSJ emerged for compassion (See Table 20). However, all of
these effects were qualified by significant or marginally significant time by SSJ
interactions (See Table 21).
One-way ANCOVA follow ups between the emotions and SSJ were conducted to
explore these relationships (See Table 22). For fear, the relationship was significant at
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time 1, β = -.1517, p < .01, and marginally significant time 2, β = .11, p = .058, suggesting
that participants who believed that the American system is fair and legitimate were more
fearful at time 2. For anxiety, the relationship was significant only at time 1, β = -.2318, p
< .05, such that participants who believed in American system legitimacy were anxious at
time 1. For disgust, the relationship was significant at time 1, β = -.2419, p < .01, such
that greater beliefs in American system legitimacy engendered less disgust. For
compassion, the relationship was significant at time 2, β = -.1520, p < .01, such that
greater beliefs in American system legitimacy predicted reduced compassion. For hope,
the relationship was significant at both time 1, β = .1521, p < .05, and at time 2, β = -.18, p
< .01, but in opposite directions, suggesting that the more participants believed in the
legitimacy of the American system, the less hopeful they were with time.
For disgust, a significant interaction emerged for time by status quo likelihood
(See Tables 23 and 28). After splitting the file according to status quo likelihood, the SSJ
repeated measures ANCOVA revealed significant main effects for time for participants in
the 60% and 90% conditions, with greater disgust at time 1.

17

Significant beta weights could not be found between SSJ and Fear using the same status quo likelihood
reference groups for both time 1 and time 2. Therefore, for both times, the status quo likelihood vectors
were removed from the model in order to find the significant relationships (beta weights) between SSJ and
Fear.
18
The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the
reference group.
19
The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 60% status quo likelihood as the
reference group.
20
A significant beta weight could not be found between SSJ and Compassion at time 2 using the different
status quo likelihood references groups. Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed from
the model in order to find the significant relationship (beta weight) between SSJ and Compassion.
21
Significant beta weights could not be found between SSJ and Hope using the same status quo likelihood
reference groups for both time 1 and time 2. Therefore, for both times, the status quo likelihood vectors
were removed from the model in order to find the significant relationships (beta weights) between SSJ and
Hope.
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Table 28
Differences for Disgust According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Marriage
Equality)

Time

10%

Status Quo Likelihood Conditions
30%
60%

90%

Time 1

1.48 (.09)

1.51 (.08)

1.58a (.08)

1.61b (.09)

Time 2

1.55 (.10)

1.62 (.12)

1.31a (.06)

1.55b (.10)

Notes. Means with shared subscripts indicate significant differences at p < .05 level. Standard
errors are in parentheses.

For anger, pity, and happiness, significant interactions emerged for time by status
quo likelihood (See Table 23). However, the effects for these emotions were qualified by
significant and marginally significant three-way interactions among status quo likelihood,
SSJ, and time. After splitting the file according to status quo likelihood, the SSJ repeated
measures ANCOVA and correlations were conducted for each emotion. For anger,
significant interactions between SSJ and time emerged for the 30%, 60%, and 90%
conditions. Participants in the 60% condition had a significantly different correlation
between time 1 and 2, such that greater beliefs in the legitimacy of the American system
led to more anger felt at time 2, z = -3.8, p < .001 (Lowry, 2001-2015) (See Table 29).
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Table 29
Correlations between Anger and SSJ (Situational System Justification scale) According
to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Marriage Equality)

Time

10%

Status Quo Likelihood Conditions
30%
60%

90%

Time 1

-.087ns (83)

-.281 (81)

-.276a (81)

-.131ns (84)

Time 2

-.113ns (83)

.019ns (81)

.314a (81)

.278 (84)

Notes. Correlations with shared subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 or less. NS
subscripts indicate the correlation was not significant at p < .05 level. Ns are in parentheses.

For pity, significant interactions between SSJ and time emerged for the 60%
condition at time 2, r = .23, p < .05, such that the more participants believed in the
legitimacy of the American system, the more pity they felt (See Table 23). For
happiness, significant interactions between SSJ and time emerged for the 30%, 60%, and
90% conditions (See Table 23). Only participants in the 30% (r = .41, p < .01) and 60%
(r = .38, p < .01) conditions (at time 1) had significant correlations between SSJ and
feelings of happiness, such that the more that participants believed in the legitimacy of
the American system, the happier they felt. These participants did not differ significantly
from each other in relationship strength, z = .200, p > .05 (Lowry, 2001-2015).
Individual differences variables’ effects on sexual minority system justification.
Separate 5 (SMSJ – Reduced at Time 2) x 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v.
Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) MANCOVA models
with ATLG and SSJ covariates failed to attain significant three-way interactions for the
individual SMSJ items, ps > .05. However, in a series of ANCOVAs with current status
quo and status quo likelihood as predictor variables, ATLG, SSJ, or GBJW as the
covariates, and the individual SMSJs dependent variables, and, ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW
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significantly predicted participants’ endorsement of the SMSJs. The more that
participants held negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (ATLG), believed
American society to be fair, legitimate, and justifiable (SSJ), and believed that the world
is fair and that individuals are punished according to dessert (GBJW) the more likely they
were to believe that sexual minorities are selfish, immature, immoral, and desirous of
“special rights” above others (LGSelfish factor); heterosexual marriage and parenting
represent the natural and ideal form of marriage and child rearing
(NaturalHeterosexualMarriage factor); lesbians and gay men do not have a history of
experiencing discrimination in America; sexual orientation is related to an individual’s
ability to contribute to society (except for SSJ model); and sexual minorities do not have
enough political power, as a group, to achieve their goals through the ordinary political
process (See Table 30).
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Table 30
ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Sexual Minority
System Justifications (Marriage Equality)
Df

F

MSE

p

Β

ηρ²

LGSelfish

1, 313

852.11

.29

.000

.97

.73

Natural
Heterosexual
Marriage

1, 313

949.43

.37

.000

.85

.75

LG History of
Discrimination

1, 313

97.31

1.38

.000

-.83

.24

Sexual Orientation
related to Societal
Contribution

1, 310

119.86

.48

.000

.53

.28

Sexual Minorities
have Political Power

1, 311

87.03

1.38

.000

-.66

.22

LGSelfish

1, 313

16.76

1.06

.000

.33

.05

Natural
Heterosexual
Marriage

1, 313

24.32

1.39

.000

.34

.07

LG History of
Discrimination

1, 313

11.69

1.79

.001

-.45

.04

Sexual Minorities
have Political Power

1, 311

7.41

1.77

.007

-.38

.02

LGSelfish

1, 313

39.52

.98

.000

.51

.11

Natural
Heterosexual
Marriage

1, 313

33.54

1.34

.000

.53

.10

LG History of
Discrimination

1, 313

7.88

1.79

.005

-.61

.02

Individual
Differences
Covariate
Model

Predicted SMSJ

ATLG

SSJ

GBJW
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Sexual Orientation
related to Societal
Contribution

1, 310

119.86

.48

.002

.3522

.28

Sexual Minorities
have Political Power

1, 311

7.10

1.78

.008

-.36

.02

Notes. ATLG, SSJ, GBJW, and LG stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale,
Situational System Justification scale, Global Belief in a Just World scale, and Lesbians and Gay
men.

The 5 (SMSJ – Reduced at Time 2) x 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v.
Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) MANCOVA model
with GBJW covariate had a four-way significant interaction for only one of the SMSJ
items, Discrimination History, F(3, 308) = 2.67, MSE = 1.79, p < .05, ηρ² = .02. When
analyzed with the GBJW ANCOVA model the three-way interaction remained
significant, F(3, 313) = 2.92, MSE = 1.79, p < .05, ηρ² = .03. After splitting the file by
current status quo and status quo likelihood (separately), GBJW ANCOVA models and
correlations were calculated. A significant status quo likelihood by GBJW interaction
emerged in the affirmation condition, F(3, 156) = 3.26, MSE = 1.47, p < .05, ηρ² = .06,
and a significant current status quo by GBJW interaction emerged in the 90% condition,
F(1, 80) = 4.53, MSE = 2.15, p < .05, ηρ² = .05. In the affirmation, 90% cell, greater
global belief in a just world predicted the belief that lesbians and gay men do not have a
history of discrimination, r = -.49, p < .01.

22

The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the
reference group.
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Housing Equality
Hypothesis 1: Current status quo manipulation (Main Effect).
Current status quo manipulation’s effects on Ballot 1 decisions.
Current status quo manipulation’s effect on voting for Ballot 1.
A between subjects One-way ANOVA testing whether participants differed in
their initial ballot according to current status quo condition (threatening participants
current status quo) failed to yield a significant result, F(1, 324) = .71, MSE = .14, p > .05,
ηρ² = .00. Of the participants that voted on Ballot 1 (eight did not vote), 83.1% voted for
housing equality.
Individual differences variables’ effects on voting for Ballot 1.
Correlation analyses revealed that the individual differences variables were
significantly correlated with Ballot 1 such that participants were less likely to vote for
housing equality with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (ATLG), r = .48, p < .01, stronger views that lesbians and gay men constituted realistic and symbolic
threats, r = -.48, p < .01, greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay men (Intergroup
Anxiety), r = -.26, p < .01, stronger beliefs that American society is fair, legitimate, and
justifiable (SSJ), r = -.14, p < .01, and stronger global belief in a just world (GBJW), r = .18, p < .01. Main effects were only significant for the individual difference covariates,
which I added to the binary logistic regressions one at a time. Table 31 displays the
results. The main effects for the covariates were similar to the correlation analyses
described above. There were no significant effects for manipulated factors or interactions
between manipulated factors and covariates.
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Table 31
Binary Logistic Regressions with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Initial
Ballot Decision (Housing Equality)
β

Wald

p

Exp(B)

ATLG

-1.18 (.23)

26.93

.00

.31

SSJ

SSJ

-.34 (.14)

5.50

.02

.71

GBJW

GBJW

-.54 (.20)

6.90

.01

.58

Realistic &
Symbolic
Threat

Realistic & Symbolic
Threat

-1.09 (.21)

25.64

.00

.34

Intergroup
Anxiety

Intergroup Anxiety

-.37 (.12)

10.12

.00

.69

Covariate
Predictor
Model

Individual Differences
Covariates
(Predictors)

ATLG

Notes. ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale,
Situational System Justification scale, and Global Belief in a Just World scale. Standard errors
are in parentheses. Dfs = 1.

Current status quo manipulation’s effect on likelihood to vote for Ballot 1.
A between subjects One-way ANOVA testing whether participants differed in
their initial ballot likelihood according to current status quo condition failed to yield a
significant result, F(1, 324) = .28, MSE = 3.70, p > .05, ηρ² = .00. Of those participants
who completed this item (eight did not), 80.7% were at least somewhat likely to vote for
housing equality (47.5% were very likely) whereas 16.3% were at least somewhat
unlikely to vote for housing equality (8% were very unlikely).
Individual differences variables’ effects on likelihood to vote for Ballot 1.
Correlation analyses revealed that the individual differences variables were
significantly correlated with Ballot 1 likelihood such that participants were less likely to
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vote for housing equality with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men
(ATLG), r = -.54, p < .01, stronger views that lesbians and gay men constituted realistic
and symbolic threats, r = -.58, p < .01, greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay men
(Intergroup Anxiety), r = -.35, p < .01, stronger beliefs that American society is fair,
legitimate, and justifiable (SSJ), r = -.23, p < .01, and stronger global belief in a just
world (GBJW), r = -.19, p < .01. Main effects and interactions for current status quo
emerged when individual difference covariates were added to the basic ANOVA one at a
time, thereby resulting in a series of ANCOVA designs for post-hoc tests. Table 32
displays the results. The main effects for the covariates were similar to the correlation
analyses described above.
Table 32
ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Initial Ballot
Decision (Housing Equality)
Df

F

MSE

p

β

ηρ²

ATLG

1, 315

129.61

2.60

.000

-.54

.29

SSJ

SSJ

1, 315

15.95

3.48

.000

-.19

.05

GBJW

GBJW

1, 314

11.45

3.54

.001

-.18

.04

Realistic &
Symbolic
Threat

Realistic &
Symbolic Threat

1, 315

153.78

2.46

.000

-.57

.33

Intergroup
Anxiety

Intergroup Anxiety

1, 315

43.99

3.22

.000

-.37

.12

Covariate
Predictor
Model

Individual
Differences
Covariates
(Predictors)

ATLG

Note. ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale,
Situational System Justification scale, and Global Belief in a Just World scale.
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When the individual differences covariates were added to the linear regression
model, the linear regression was significant, R2 = .35, F(6, 311) = 27.41, p < .001.
However, current status quo did not predict ballot likelihood (See Table 33). Participants
with more negative attitudes towards lesbians and gay men and those who believed that
gay men and lesbians represent a realistic and symbolic threat were significantly less
likely to vote for housing equality.
Table 33
Linear Regressions with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Initial Ballot
Likelihood Decision (Housing Equality)
Β

S.E.

β

t

p

ATLG

-.36

.16

-.20

-2.22

.03

Realistic &
Symbolic
Threat

-.67

.14

-.46

-4.86

.00

Covariate
Predictor
Model

Note. ATLG stands for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale.

Current status quo manipulation’s effect on emotion.
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) MANOVA tested the effects of
current status quo on the seven emotions (Fear, Anxiety, Anger, Disgust, Compassion,
Happiness, and Hope) revealed a significant multivariate significant main effect,
MultF(7, 326) = 12.39, p < .001, ηρ² = .21 (See Table 34). Threat condition participants
were more fearful, F(1, 332) = 18.75, MSE = .46, p < .001, ηρ² = .05; anxious, F(1, 332)
= 17.79, MSE = .66, p < .001, ηρ² = .05; angry, F(1, 332) = 14.47, MSE = .66, p < .001,
ηρ² = .04; disgusted, F(1, 332) = 14.05, MSE = .49, p < .001, ηρ² = .04; and
compassionate, F(1, 332) = 5.37, MSE = .66, p < .05, ηρ² = .02. Affirmation condition
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participants were happier and more hopeful, F(1, 332) = 44.28, MSE = 1.12, p < .001, ηρ²
= .12 and F(1, 332) = 29.07, MSE = .93, p < .001, ηρ² = .08, respectively.
Table 34
Differences across Emotions According to Current Status Quo after Current Status Quo
Manipulation (Housing Equality)
Affirmation
Emotion

Threat

M

SE

M

SE

Fear

1.31

.05

1.63

.05

Anxiety

1.33

.06

1.71

.06

Anger

1.46

.06

1.80

.06

Disgust

1.37

.06

1.66

.05

Compassion

1.78

.06

1.99

.06

Happiness

2.44

.08

1.67

.08

Hope

2.55

.08

1.98

.07

Note. All means are significantly different at p < .05 or less level for same emotion. NAffirmation =
160 and NThreat = 174.

Current status quo manipulation’s effect on sexual minority system
justification.
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 17 (SMSJ: 17 items)
MANOVA did not reveal a significant effect for current status quo across the seventeen
SMSJ items, MultF(17, 305) = .94, p > .05, ηρ² = .05. None of the SMSJs were
significantly different according to current status quo, ps > .05.
The same factors produced in the Marriage Equality study were used in the
Housing Equality study. LGSelfish was internally consistent at both time 1 (after the
current status quo manipulation) and at time 2 (after the status quo likelihood
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manipulation), Cronbach’s α = .92 and α = .92, respectively.
NaturalHeterosexualMarriage was internally consistent at both time 1 and at time 2,
Cronbach’s α = .87 and α = .88, respectively. The three left remaining items (i.e.
Discrimination History, Political Power, and Societal Contribution) were left as
individual items.
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 5 (SMSJ – Reduced number of
items at Time 1) MANOVA testing whether participants differed according to current
status quo condition for the five system justification items failed to attain significance,
MultF(5, 325) = .21, p > .05, ηρ² = .003. None of the individual factors or items were
significant, ps > .05.
Mediation of the relationship between current status quo and housing equality
ballot decisions by emotion and sexual minority system justification.
Participants did not differ in their Ballot 1 decisions according to current status
quo. In a series of binary logistic regressions that controlled for the effect of the
individual differences variables on housing equality Ballot 1, the main effect of current
status quo did not attain statistical significance, ps > .05. None of the ANCOVA models
included significant main effects or interactions for current status quo. I performed no
mediation analyses because there were no significant differences for status quo to test for
emotion or system justification mediations.
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Hypothesis 2: Status quo likelihood manipulation (Main effect).
Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effects on Ballot 2 decisions.
Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effect on voting for Ballot 2.
A between subjects One-way ANOVA testing whether participants differed in
their second ballot according to status quo likelihood condition (10% v. 30% v. 60% v.
90%) failed to yield a significant result, F(3, 316) = .74, MSE = .14, p > .05, ηρ² = .01.
Of those participants who voted on Ballot 2 (fourteen did not vote), 82.8% voted for
housing equality.
Individual differences variables’ effects on voting for Ballot 2.
Correlation analyses revealed that the individual differences variables were
significantly correlated with Ballot 2 such that participants were less likely to vote for
housing equality with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (ATLG), r = .51, p < .01; stronger views that lesbians and gay men constituted realistic and symbolic
threats, r = -.50, p < .01; greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay men (Intergroup
Anxiety), r = -.30, p < .01; stronger beliefs that American society is fair, legitimate, and
justifiable (SSJ) r = -.14, p < .01; and stronger global belief in a just world (GBJW), r = .17, p < .01. Main effects and interactions for status quo likelihood did not emerge when
individual difference covariates were added to the logistic regressions one at a time.
Although three individual differences variables (ATLG, Realistic and Symbolic threat,
and Intergroup Anxiety) resulted in significant models, status quo likelihood was not a
significant predictor in any of the models. Table 35 displays the results. The main effects
for the covariates were similar to the correlation analyses described above.

176
Table 35
Binary Logistic Regressions with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Second
Ballot Decision (Housing Equality)
Β

Wald

p

Exp(B)

ATLG

-1.13 (.30)

14.72

.00

.32

Realistic &
Symbolic
Threat

Realistic &
Symbolic
Threat

-1.08 (.29)

14.06

.00

.34

Intergroup
Anxiety

Intergroup
Anxiety

-.43 (.16)

7.53

.01

.65

Covariate
Predictor
Model

Individual
Differences
Covariates
(Predictors)

ATLG

Notes. ATLG stands for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Dfs = 1.

Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effect on likelihood to vote for Ballot 2.
A between subjects One-way ANOVA testing whether participants differed in
their second ballot likelihood according to status quo likelihood condition failed to yield
a significant result, F(3, 315) = .37, MSE = 3.63, p > .05, ηρ² = .00. Of those who
completed this item (fifteen did not), 80.2% of participants were at least somewhat likely
to vote for housing equality (46.1% were very likely) whereas 16.6% were at least
somewhat unlikely to vote for housing equality (7.5% were very unlikely).
Individual differences variables’ effects on likelihood to vote for Ballot 2.
Correlation analyses revealed that the individual differences variables were
significantly correlated with Ballot 2 likelihood. Participants were less likely to vote for
housing equality with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (ATLG), r = .60, p < .01, stronger views that lesbians and gay men constituted realistic and symbolic

177
threats, r = -.61, p < .01, greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay men (Intergroup
Anxiety), -.38, p < .01, stronger beliefs that American society is fair, legitimate, and
justifiable (SSJ), r = -.24, p < .01, and stronger global belief in a just world (GBJW), r = .21, p < .01. Main effects emerged when individual difference covariates were added to
the basic ANOVA, one at a time, resulting in a series of ANCOVA designs for likelihood
to vote for Ballot 2 post-hoc tests. Table 36 displays the results. The main effects for the
covariates were similar to the correlation analysis.
However, a significant interaction between ATLG and status quo likelihood also
emerged, F(3, 310) = 3.29, MSE = 2.28, p < .05, ηρ² = .03, with a significant effect for
ATLG in each status quo likelihood condition, 10%: β = -.71, p < .01, F(1, 78) = 77.91,
MSE = 2.17, ηρ² = .50; 30%: β = -.68, p < .01, F(1, 76) = 65.77, MSE = 2.07, ηρ² = .46;
60%: β = -.45, p < .01, F(1, 81) = 20.72, MSE = 2.59, ηρ² = .20; and 90%: β = -.56, p <
.01, F(1, 75) = 33.70, MSE = 2.27, ηρ² = .31. Relationships between ATLG and
likelihood to vote for Ballot 2 were significantly different between the 10% (β = -.71) and
60% (β = -.45) conditions, z = -2.48, p < .05; and the 30% (β = -.68) and 60% (β = -.45)
conditions, z = -2.15, p < .05 (Lowry, 2001-2015). The relationship between negative
attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and likelihood not to vote for housing equality was
stronger when participants thought equality was unlikely.
A significant interaction between realistic and symbolic threat and status quo
likelihood emerged, F(3, 310) = 4.53, MSE = 2.19, p < .01, ηρ² = .04 such that realistic
and symbolic threat was a significant effect for each status quo likelihood condition,
10%: β = -.74, p < .01, F(1, 78) = 91.66, MSE = 2.00, ηρ² = .54; 30%: β = -.70, p < .01,
F(1, 76) = 73.46, MSE = 1.96, ηρ² = .49; 60%: β = -.51, p < .01, F(1, 81) = 28.28, MSE =
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2.41, ηρ² = .26; and 90%: β = -.52, p < .01, F(1, 75) = 28.08, MSE = 2.39, ηρ² = .27.
Relationships between realistic and symbolic threat and likelihood to vote for Ballot 2
were significantly different between the 10% (β = -.74) and 60% (β = -.51) conditions, z
= -2.37, p < .05; and 10% (β = -.74) and 90% (β = -.52) conditions, z = -2.21, p < .05,
(Lowry, 2001-2015). A marginally significant difference arose between the 30% (β = .70) and 60% (β = -.51) conditions, z = -1.92, p = .055. Beliefs in the realistic and
symbolic threat of sexual minorities had a stronger relationship with likelihood to vote
for housing equality when participants believed housing equality was unlikely.
Table 36
ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Second Ballot
Decision (Housing Equality)
Df

F

MSE

p

β

ηρ²

ATLG

1, 310

182.18

2.28

.000

-.48

.37

SSJ

SSJ

1, 310

20.86

3.44

.000

-.25

.06

GBJW

GBJW

1, 309

13.43

3.54

.000

-.2323

.04

Realistic &
Symbolic
Threat

Realistic &
Symbolic Threat

1, 310

203.27

2.19

.000

-.45

.40

Intergroup
Anxiety

Intergroup Anxiety

1, 310

54.96

3.12

.000

-.41

.15

Covariate
Predictor
Model

Individual
Differences
Covariates
(Predictors)

ATLG

Note. ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale,
Situational System Justification scale, and Global Belief in a Just World scale.

23

The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the
reference group.
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Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effect on emotion.
A 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) MANOVA with the 7
emotions (Fear, Anxiety, Anger, Disgust, Compassion, Happiness, and Hope) as
measures that tested the extent that participants felt different emotions under each status
quo likelihood condition revealed a significant model, MultF(21, 884.96) = 1.74, p < .05,
ηρ² = .04. Follow up univariate tests showed that participants differed according to status
quo likelihood in their feelings of fear, F(3, 314) = 3.46, MSE = .25, p < .05, ηρ² = .03;
anxiety, F(3, 314) = 3.80, MSE = .48, p < .05, ηρ² = .04; anger, F(3, 314) = 4.49, MSE =
.48, p < .01, ηρ² = .04; and disgust, F(3, 314) = 4.81, MSE = .46, p < .01, ηρ² = .04.
Participants in the 10% condition showed greater levels of fear, anxiety, and disgust than
participants in the 30%, 60%, and 90% conditions (See Table 37). Participants in the
10% condition showed greater levels of anger than participants in the 60% and 90%
conditions.
Table 37
Differences across Emotions According to Status Quo Likelihood after Status Quo
Likelihood Manipulation (Housing Equality)

Emotion

10%

Status Quo Likelihood Conditions
30%
60%

90%

Fear

1.38a, b, c (.06)

1.19a (.06)

1.15b (.06)

1.21c (.06)

Anxiety

1.59d, e, f (.08)

1.30d (.08)

1.29e (.08)

1.26f (.08)

Anger

1.60g, h (.08)

1.40 (.08)

1.21g (.08)

1.33h (.08)

Disgust

1.57i, j, k (.08)

1.34i (.08)

1.18j (.07)

1.29k (.08)

Notes. Means with shared subscripts denote significant differences (p < .05) between means
within each emotion. Standard errors are in parentheses. N10% = 80, N30% = 79, N60% = 83, N90% =
76.
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Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effect on sexual minority system
justification.
A 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) MANOVA with the 17
SMSJ items as dependent measures that tested the extent to which participants used
justifications under each status quo likelihood condition failed to attain significance,
MultF(51, 864.18) = .91, p > .05, ηρ² = .05. Individual justifications also failed to attain
significance, p > .05. Similarly, the 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v.
90%) MANOVA with the 5 SMSJ – Reduced number of items at Time 2 failed to attain
significance, MultF(15, 856.18) = .41, p > .05, ηρ² = .01. Again, the individual
justifications failed to attain significance, ps > .05.
Mediation of the relationship between status quo likelihood and housing
equality ballot decisions by emotion and sexual minority system justification.
Participants did not differ in their Ballot 2 decisions according to status quo
likelihood. In a series of binary logistic regressions that controlled for the effect of the
individual differences variables on housing equality Ballot 2, the main effect of status
quo likelihood did not attain statistical significance, ps > .05. Although both the ATLG
and the Realistic and Symbolic Threat models contained significant interactions with
status quo likelihood, when the interaction between the covariates and status quo
likelihood were removed from the ANCOVAs, the main effects for status quo likelihood
were not significant, ps > .05. I performed no mediation analyses because there were no
significant differences for status quo to test for emotion or system justification
mediations.
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Hypothesis 3: Current status quo by status quo likelihood (Interaction
effect).
Current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations’ effects on Ballot 2
decisions.
The 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood:
10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Initial v. Second ballot) mixed model ANOVA
with repeated measures on the last factor tested the different hypotheses for Ballot change
and failed to attain significance, p > .05. Crosstabs revealed that only 2.5% of
participants changed their vote (eight participants) between the initial and subsequent
ballot. A 2 x 4 x 2 ANOVA collapsing across time also failed to attain significance for
vote likelihood, p > .05.
Current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations’ interaction effect on
Ballot 2 decisions with individual differences variables included.
Correlational analyses revealed that individual differences variables were
significantly correlated with the four ballot decisions (See Table 38). Participants were
less likely to vote for housing equality with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and
gay men (ATLG), stronger views that lesbians and gay men constituted realistic and
symbolic threats, greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay men, stronger beliefs that
American society is fair, legitimate, and justifiable (SSJ), and stronger global belief in a
just world (GBJW)24.

24

Covariate analyses of these variables can be found in the Hypothesis 2 and 3 Results sections.
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Table 38
Correlations between Ballot Decisions and Individual Differences variables (Housing
Equality)

Individual
Difference
variable

Ballot 1

Ballot Decision
Ballot 2
Ballot 1
Likelihood

Ballot 2
Likelihood

ATLG

-.48
(319)

-.51
(319)

-.54
(319)

-.60
(318)

SSJ

-.14
(319

-.14*
(319)

-.23
(319

-.24
(318)

GBJW

-.18
(318)

-.17
(318)

-.19
(318)

-.21
(317)

Realistic &
Symbolic
Threat

-.48
(319)

-.50
(319)

-.58
(319)

-.61
(318)

Intergroup
Anxiety

-.26
(319)

-.30
(319)

-.35
(319)

-.38
(318)

Notes. ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale,
Situational System Justification scale, and Global Belief in a Just World scale. All correlations
are significant at p < .01 level, except for *. Correlations with * are significant at p < .05 level.
Ns are in parentheses.

Individual differences variables’ effects on the relationship between manipulated
variables (Current status quo and status quo likelihood) and voting for housing equality.
Binary logistic regression involving current status quo and status quo likelihood
as predictors for Ballot 2 failed to attain significance, Nagelkerke R2 = .03, X2(7) = 5.42,
p > .05. As shown in the results for Hypothesis 2, individual differences variables
significantly predicted participants’ votes for Ballot 2. Therefore, in a series of models, I
added individual differences variables one at a time as covariates to the original binary
logistic regression models used to predict Ballot 2. Table 39 displays the results. The
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main effects for the covariates were similar to the correlation analyses described above.
Although SSJ and GBJW were significant predictors, the overall models did not attain
significance, Nagelkerke R2 = .06, X2(8) = 12.01, p > .05 and Nagelkerke R2 = .08, X2(8)
= 14.99, p < .06, respectively.
Table 39
Binary Logistic Regressions with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Second
Ballot Decisions (Housing Equality)
Covariate
Predictor
Model

Individual Differences
Covariates
(Predictors)

Df

Β

Wald

p

Exp(B)

ATLG

ATLG

1

-1.28
(.17)

56.22

.00

.28

SSJ

SSJ

1

-.26
(.10)

6.40

.01

.77

GBJW

GBJW

1

-.46
(.15)

9.14

.00

.63

Realistic &
Symbolic
Threat

Realistic & Symbolic
Threat

1

-1.15
(.16)

51.79

.00

.32

Intergroup
Anxiety

Intergroup Anxiety

1

-.42
(.09)

23.33

.00

.66

Note. ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale,
Situational System Justification scale, and Global Belief in a Just World scale. Standard errors
are in parentheses.

Individual differences variables’ effects on the relationship between manipulated
variables (Current status quo and status quo likelihood) and likelihood to vote for
housing equality.
A series of ANCOVAs that included individual differences variables as covariates
in the 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v.
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30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Ballot 1 Likelihood v. Ballot 2 Likelihood) model
explored further the vote for housing equality. Both ATLG and realistic and symbolic
threat showed significant effects for time and for their specific individual differences
variable (See Table 40). However, both were qualified by significant time by individual
differences interactions: time by ATLG, F(1, 302) = 7.55, MSE = .23, p < .01, ηρ² = .02
and time by realistic and symbolic threat, F(1, 302) = 4.14, MSE = .23, p < .05, ηρ² = .01.
One-way ANCOVAs revealed significant ATLG effects for the likelihood of voting for
Ballot 1, β = -.47, p < .01, and Ballot 2, β = -.55, p < .01. One-way ANCOVAs revealed
significant realistic and symbolic threat effects for the likelihood of voting for Ballot 1, β
= -.42, p < .01, and Ballot 2, β = -.48, p < .01. Both results suggest that the relationships
were stronger at time 2.
For both MANCOVAs, significant status quo likelihood by individual differences
variables interactions emerged: ATLG, F(3, 302) = 3.07, MSE = 4.66, p < .05, ηρ² = .03
and realistic and symbolic threat, F(3, 302) = 4.54, MSE = 4.36, p < .01, ηρ² = .04.
ANCOVAs with likelihood to vote for housing equality collapsed across time (overall
likelihood to vote for housing equality) revealed significant status quo likelihood by
ATLG, F(3, 303) = 3.08, MSE = 2.33, p < .05, ηρ² = .03 and status quo likelihood by
realistic and symbolic threat, F(3, 303) = 4.55, MSE = 2.18, p < .01, ηρ² = .04,
interactions. After the file was split according to status quo likelihood, significant ATLG
effects emerged in each condition: 10%, β = -.67, p < .01; 30%, β = -.74, p < .01; 60%, β
= -.38, p < .01; and 90%, β = -.60, p < .01. Significant realistic and symbolic effects
emerged in each condition as well: 10%, β = -.83, p < .01; 30%, β = -.84, p < .01; 60%, β
= -.43, p < .01; and 90%, β = -.54, p < .01. These results indicate that participants’
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negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and perceptions that sexual minorities
represent realistic and symbolic threats had a greater impact on their likelihood to vote
for housing equality in the 10% and 30% likelihood conditions.
When I added the remaining individual differences variables (SSJ, GBJW, and
Intergroup Anxiety), one at a time, to the ANCOVA model, time was not a significant
main effect in any of the models, ps > .05, so that I collapsed across time. A series of 2
(Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v.
60% v. 90%) ANCOVAs with the individual differences variables as covariates produced
main effects for the covariates that were similar to the correlation analyses performed
above (see Tables 36 and 37). Although both SSJ and GBJW had significant and
marginally significant current status quo by status quo likelihood interactions, these
interactions were qualified by significant and marginally significant three-way
interactions involving the individual differences variables, β = -1.0025, p < .05, F(3, 303)
= 3.36, MSE = 3.32, ηρ² = .03 and β = -.9226, p = .063, F(3, 302) = 2.46, MSE = 3.43, ηρ²
= .02, respectively. After splitting the files according to current status quo and status quo
likelihood (separately), ANCOVA analyses and correlations revealed a significant current
status quo by SSJ interaction in the 90% condition, β = -.99, p < .01, F(1, 73) = 7.74,
MSE = 2.78, ηρ² = .10, such that, for participants in the threat, 90% cell, the more they
believed in the legitimacy of the American system, the less likely they were to vote for

25

In the regression model, SSJ did not have a significant beta weight when using the 90% reference group
(see footnote 16). Therefore, the beta weights for SSJ used 10% as the reference group throughout these
analyses.
26
In the regression model, GBJW did not have a significant beta weight when using the 90% reference
group (see footnote 17). Therefore, the beta weights for GBJW used 10% as the reference group
throughout these analyses.
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housing equality, r = -.42, p < .01. A marginally significant current status quo by GBJW
interaction emerged in the 10% condition, β = .77, p = .05, F(1, 75) = 3.88, MSE = 4.07,
p = .05, ηρ² = .05, such that, for participants in the affirmation, 10% cell, the more they
held global belief in a just world, the less likely they were to vote for housing equality, r
= -.34, p < .05.
Table 40
MANCOVA and ANCOVA Models with Time, Current Status Quo, Status Quo
Likelihood, and Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Second Ballot Decision
(Housing Equality)
Covariate
Predictor
Model

Time, Current
Status Quo (CSQ),
Status Quo
Likelihood (SQL),
and Individual
Differences
Covariates
(Predictors)

ATLG
MANCOVA

β

ηρ²

Df

F

MSE

p

Time

1, 302

7.08

.23

.008

ATLG

1, 302

157.51

4.66

.000

Time x ATLG
Interaction

1, 302

7.55

.23

.006

ATLG (Ballot 1
Likelihood)

1, 303

128.46

2.59

.000

-.47

.30

ATLG (Ballot 2
Likelihood)

1, 302

175.91

2.30

.000

-.55

.37

SQL x ATLG

3, 302

3.07

4.66

.028

ATLG
ANCOVA

SQL x ATLG
Interaction

3, 303

3.08

2.33

.028

-.35

.03

ATLG
ANCOVA
(Split by SQL)

ATLG (10%
condition)

1, 76

70.85

2.24

.000

-.67

.48

ATLG (30%
condition)

1, 75

60.23

2.01

.000

-.74

.44

.02
-.52

.34
.02

.03
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ATLG (60%
condition)

1, 79

16.86

2.73

.000

-.38

.18

ATLG (90%
condition)

1, 73

28.26

2.31

.000

-.60

.28

SSJ

1, 303

17.36

3.32

.000

-.4827

.05

CSQ x SQL
Interaction

3, 303

3.18

3.32

.024

.98

.03

CSQ x SQL x SSJ
Interaction

3, 303

3.36

3.32

.019

-1.00

.03

SSJ ANCOVA
(Split by SQL)

CSQ x SSJ (90%
condition)

1, 73

7.74

2.78

.007

-.99

.10

GBJW
ANCOVA

GBJW

1, 302

12.07

3.43

.001

-.4328

.04

CSQ x SQL
Interaction

3, 302

2.40

3.43

.068

.90

.02

CSQ x SQL x
GBJW Interaction

3, 302

2.46

3.43

.063

-.92

.02

GBJW
ANCOVA
(Split by SQL)

CSQ x GBJW (10%
condition)

1, 75

3.88

4.07

.053

.77

.05

Realistic &
Symbolic
(R&S) Threat
MANCOVA

Time

1, 302

4.02

.23

.046

R&S Threat

1, 302

192.34

4.34

.000

Time x R&S Threat
Interaction

1, 302

4.14

.23

.043

R&S Threat (Ballot
1 Likelihood)

1, 303

163.39

2.40

.000

-.42

.35

R&S Threat (Ballot
2 Likelihood)

1, 302

205.26

2.18

.000

-.48

.40

SSJ ANCOVA

27

.01

-.46

.39
.01

The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 10% status quo likelihood as the
reference group.
28
The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 10% status quo likelihood as the
reference group.
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SQL x R&S Threat
Interaction

3, 302

4.54

4.36

.004

R&S Threat
ANCOVA

SQL x R&S Threat
Interaction

3, 303

4.55

2.18

.004

-.51

.04

R&S Threat
ANCOVA
(Split by SQL)

R&S Threat (10%
condition)

1, 76

87.14

2.01

.000

-.83

.53

R&S Threat (30%
condition)

1, 75

73.28

1.83

.000

-.84

.49

R&S Threat (60%
condition)

1, 79

28.50

2.44

.000

-.43

.26

R&S Threat (90%
condition)

1, 73

23.53

2.42

.000

-.54

.24

Intergroup Anxiety

1, 303

52.41

3.08

.000

-.33

.15

Intergroup
Anxiety
ANCOVA

.04

Notes. ATLG, SSJ, GBJW, R&S Threat, CSQ, and SQL stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and
Gay Men scale, Situational System Justification scale, Global Belief in a Just World scale,
Realistic and Symbolic Threat scale, Current Status Quo, and Status Quo Likelihood.

Current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations’ effects on emotion.
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10%
v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 7 (Emotions: Fear v. Anxiety v. Anger v. Disgust v.
Compassion v. Happiness v. Hope) x 2 (Time: After current status quo manipulation v.
After status quo likelihood manipulation) mixed model ANOVA with repeated measures
on the last two factors revealed a significant main effect for emotion, F(2.22, 688.04) =
148.21, MSE = 1.98, p < .01, ηρ² = .32, qualified by an emotion by current status quo
interaction, F(2.22, 688.04) = 12.31, MSE = 1.98, p < .01, ηρ² = .04. A significant time
by emotion interaction also resulted, F(2.46, 7.36) = 18.38, MSE = .99, p < .01, ηρ² = .06;
however, a significant three-way interaction among time, emotion, and current status quo,
F(2.46, 7.36) = 27.00, MSE = .99, p < .01, ηρ² = .08 subsumed these effects.
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A series of 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo
Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: After current status quo
manipulation (Time 1) v. After status quo likelihood manipulation (Time 2)) mixed
model ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor served as post hoc analyses for
each emotion. Each of the following emotions registered a time by current status quo
interaction: fear, F(1, 313) = 12.06, MSE = .22, p < .01, ηρ² = .04; anxiety, F(1, 310) =
8.68, MSE = .35, p < .01, ηρ² = .03; anger, F(1, 313) = 13.79, MSE = .41, p < .01, ηρ² =
.04; disgust, F(1, 313) = 11.53, MSE = .32, p < .01, ηρ² = .04; compassion, F(1, 313) =
11.30, MSE = .36, p < .01, ηρ² = .04; happiness, F(1, 313) = 27.41, MSE = .81, p < .01,
ηρ² = .10; and hope, F(1, 313) = 24.21, MSE = .75, p < .01, ηρ² = .07.
After splitting the file according to current status quo, repeated measure ANOVAs
and One-way ANOVAs for each time were conducted to explore these relationships (See
Table 41). As depicted in Table 38, feelings of fear, anxiety, anger, and disgust under
threat were stronger at time 1 than at time 2, and participants felt all four of these
negative emotions more strongly under threat than affirmation at time 1. Compassion
feelings were stronger under affirmation at time 2 compared to time 1 but also stronger
under threat at time 1 than affirmation at time 1. Happiness ratings were greater under
affirmation than threat at time 1 but under threat increased at time 2. Finally, hope
followed a similar pattern as happiness.
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Table 41
Differences across Emotions and Time According to Current Status Quo (Housing
Equality)
Time 1

Time 2

Emotion

Affirmation

Threat

Affirmation

Threat

Fear

1.30a, b (.06)

1.64a, c (.05)

1.20b (.04)

1.29c (.04)

Anxiety

1.30d (.06)

1.73d, e (.06)

1.29 (.06)

1.44e (.05)

Anger

1.45f (.07)

1.78f, g (.06)

1.42 (.06)

1.37g (.06)

Disgust

1.37h (.06)

1.65h, i (.05)

1.36 (.06)

1.34i (.05)

Compassion

1.78j, k (.07)

1.99j (.06)

2.14k (.07)

2.03 (.07)

2.46l (09)

1.69l, m (.08)

2.30 (.10)

2.36m (.10)

2.56n* (.08)

2.00n, o (.08)

2.37* (.09)

2.49o (.09)

Happiness
Hope

Notes. Means with shared subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 or less for the same
emotion. Shared * are marginally significantly different at p = .05 for the same emotion.
Standard errors are in parentheses.

Current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations’ effects on sexual
minority system justification.
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10%
v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 17 (SMSJ: 17 items) x 2 (Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) mixed
model ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two factors tested the change
hypotheses. A marginally significant main effect for time emerged such that participants
were more likely to endorse SMSJs at time 1, M = 2.39, than at time 2, M = 2.37, F(1,
294) = 3.78, MSE = .27, p = .05, ηρ² = .01. A main effect for SMSJ emerged, indicating
that participants differed in their endorsement of different system justifications, F(6.26,
1839.68) = 168.81, MSE = 5.08, p < .01, ηρ² = .36. To examine the SMSJ effect further, I
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relied on the factors and items that resulted from the 5 (SMSJ) x 2 (Current Status Quo:
Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2
(Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) mixed model ANOVA with repeated measures on the last
factor examined this hypothesis with a reduced number of SMSJ items based on the
factor analysis reported above. A main effect for time emerged, F(1, 308) = 4.88, MSE =
.18, p < .05, ηρ² = .02 as did a main effect for SMSJ emerged, indicating that participants
differed in their endorsement of different system justifications, F(2.54, 782.05) = 410.68,
MSE = 2.76, p < .01, ηρ² = .57.
A series of 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo
Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) mixed model
ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor served as post-hoc tests for each of
the reduced set of justifications. A significant main effect for time emerged for
Discrimination History, such that participants were less likely to believe that lesbians and
gay men have a history of discrimination at time 1, M = 4.30, than at time 2, M = 4.32,
F(1, 310) = 4.89, MSE = .21, p < .05, ηρ² = .02. No other significant effects resulted
from this analysis.
Mediation of the relationship between current status quo, status quo likelihood,
and housing equality ballot decisions by emotion and sexual minority system
justification.
Participants did not differ in their Ballot 2 decisions according to status quo
likelihood. In addition, participants did not differ in their Ballot 2 decisions according to
current status quo. In a series of binary logistic regressions that controlled for the effect
of the individual differences variables on housing equality Ballot 2, the main effects of
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current status quo and status quo likelihood did not attain statistical significance, ps > .05.
Although there were interactions within the different ANCOVA models (See Above),
when the interactions were removed from the models, current status quo and status quo
likelihood were not significant predictors of likelihood to vote for housing equality, ps >
.05. I performed no mediation analyses because there were no significant differences for
status quo to test for emotion or system justification mediations.
Hypothesis 4: Individual differences variables (Attitudes Toward Lesbians
and Gay Men (ATLG), Situational System Justification (SSJ), and Global Belief in a
Just World (GBJW) scales)
Individual differences variables’ effects on Ballot decisions.
Individual differences variables strongly affected participants’ ballot decisions
(See Results for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3).
Individual differences variables’ effects on emotion.
ATLG as individual differences covariate.
A 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 8 (Emotion: Fear v.
Anxiety v. Anger v. Disgust v. Compassion v. Pity v. Happiness v. Hope) x 2 (Time:
Time 1 v. Time 2) mixed model ANCOVA with ATLG covariate and the last two factors
as repeated measures resulted in a significant four-way interaction between time,
emotion, status quo likelihood, and ATLG, F(9.05, 920.20) = 3.42, MSE = .93, p < .01,
ηρ² = .03. Thus, a series of 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2
(Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) repeated measures ANCOVAs with ATLG covariate were
conducted for each emotion. Significant time main effects appeared for all emotions
except pity (See Tables 42 and 43). Similarly, an ATLG main effect emerged for most
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emotions (except compassion and pity): fear, β = .24, p < .01, anxiety, β = .1229, p < .05,
anger, β = .39, p < .01, disgust, β = .34, p < .01, happiness, β = -.2730, p < .05, and hope,
β = -.2931, p < .01 (See Table 44). In general, higher bias against LGBT people resulted
in stronger negative feelings and weaker positive feelings, especially at time 1.
Table 42
Repeated Measures ANCOVA Models with ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay
Men scale) Predicting Emotions: Time Main Effect (Housing Equality)
Df

F

MSE

p

ηρ²

Fear

1, 311

25.05

.21

.000

.08

Anxiety

1, 308

9.82

.35

.002

.03

Anger

1, 311

10.55

.41

.001

.03

Disgust

1, 311

4.83

.31

.029

.02

Compassion

1, 311

71.57

.31

.000

.19

Happiness

1, 311

87.01

.72

.000

.22

Hope

1, 311

92.78

.60

.000

.23

Predicted Emotion

Note. ATLG stands for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale.

29

None of the status quo likelihood references groups produced significant beta weights within the
regression models. Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed to find the significant
relationship between ATLG and Anxiety.
30
The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the
reference group.
31
The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the
reference group.
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Table 43
Differences for Emotions across Time (Housing Equality)
Time 1
Emotion

Time 2

M

SE

M

SE

Fear

1.48

.04

1.23

.03

Anxiety

1.53

.05

1.35

.04

Anger

1.63

.05

1.38

.04

Disgust

1.52

.04

1.34

.04

Compassion

1.89

.05

2.08

.05

Pity

1.61

.05

1.47

.05

Happiness

2.04

.06

2.34

.06

Hope

2.25

.06

2.44

.06

Note. All means are significantly different between Time 1 and 2 for the same emotion at p < .05
or less, except for Pity, which was not significantly different across time.
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Table 44
Repeated Measures ANCOVA Models with ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay
Men scale) Predicting Emotions: ATLG Main Effect (Housing Equality)
Df

F

MSE

p

β

ηρ²

Fear

1, 311

11.07

.50

.001

.24

.03

Anxiety

1, 308

4.00

.80

.046

.1232

.01

Anger

1, 311

19.70

.72

.000

.39

.06

Disgust

1, 311

19.78

.58

.000

.34

.06

Happiness

1, 311

5.60

1.91

.019

-.2733

.02

Hope

1, 311

9.29

1.46

.003

-.2934

.03

Predicted Emotion

Notes. ATLG stands for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale.

However, some of these main effects were qualified by significant time by ATLG
interactions: fear, compassion, happiness, and hope (See Table 45). For anxiety, only the
main effects emerged, such that participants felt more anxiety at time 1 than at time 2
(See Table 43) and the greater negative attitudes participants held toward lesbians and
gay men the greater anxiety they felt, β = .12, p < .05. Similarly, for disgust, only the
main effects emerged, such that participants were more disgusted at time 1 than at time 2
(See Table 43) and greater negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men were related to
greater disgust felt, β = .34, p < .01. One-way ANCOVA follow ups revealed that the

32

None of the status quo likelihood references groups produced significant beta weights within the
regression models. Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed to find the significant
relationship between ATLG and Anxiety.
33
The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the
reference group.
34
The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the
reference group.

196
relationship between compassion and ATLG was significant at both time 1, β = .1535, p <
.05, F(1, 311) = 6.34, MSE = .66, ηρ² = .02, and at time 2, β = -.22, p < .01, F(1, 311) =
18.01, MSE = .78, ηρ² = .06, but in opposite directions such that those with negative
attitudes towards lesbians and gay men were more compassionate at time 1 than at time 2.
Table 45
Repeated Measures ANCOVA Models with ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay
Men scale) Predicting Emotions: Time by ATLG Interaction (Housing Equality)
Df

F

MSE

p

ηρ²

Fear

1, 311

4.89

.21

.028

.02

Compassion

1, 311

54.15

.31

.000

.15

Happiness

1, 311

67.34

.72

.000

.18

Hope

1, 311

85.63

.60

.000

.22

Predicted Emotion

Notes. ATLG stands for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale.

Significant and marginally significant time by status quo likelihood interactions
emerged for most emotions (except for fear and anxiety) (See Table 46). For disgust and
compassion, I split the file according to status quo likelihood and the ATLG repeated
measures ANCOVA was conducted to explore these interactions. For disgust, a
significant main effect for time emerged for participants in the 90% condition, such that
participants were more disgusted at time 1 (M = 1.59) than at time 2 (M = 1.31). For
compassion, significant effects for time emerged for all of the conditions, such that
participants felt less compassion at time 1 than at time 2 (See Table 47).

35

None of the status quo likelihood references groups produced significant beta weights within the
regression models at the different times. Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed to find
the significant relationship between ATLG and Compassion.
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Table 46
Repeated Measures ANCOVA Models with ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay
Men scale) Predicting Emotions: Status Quo Likelihood Effects (Housing Equality)
Df

F

MSE

p

ηρ²

Time x SQL x ATLG
Interaction

3, 311

2.75

.21

.043

.03

Time x SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 10%
condition

1, 78

6.90

.22

.010

.08

Time x SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 90%
condition

1, 75

5.27

.27

.025

.07

Time x SQL
Interaction

3, 311

3.02

.41

.030

.03

Time x SQL x ATLG
Interaction

3, 311

2.69

.41

.047

.02

Time x SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 90%
condition

1, 75

10.52

.36

.002

.12

Time x SQL
Interaction

3, 311

2.74

.31

.043

.03

Time x SQL
Interaction: 90%
condition

1, 75

14.04

.28

.000

.16

Time x SQL
Interaction

3, 311

3.45

.31

.017

.03

Time x SQL
Interaction: 10%
condition

1, 78

50.09

.30

.000

.39

Time x SQL
Interaction: 30%
condition

1, 77

16.12

.29

.000

.17

Predicted
Emotions

SQL Effects

Fear

Anger

Disgust

Compassion
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Pity

Happiness

Hope

Time x SQL
Interaction: 60%
condition

1, 81

11.34

.30

.001

.12

Time x SQL
Interaction: 90%
condition

1, 75

6.80

.35

.011

.08

Time x SQL
Interaction

3, 308

2.60

.60

.052

.02

Time x SQL x ATLG
Interaction

3, 308

3.97

.60

.009

.04

Time x SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 90%
condition

1, 72

10.45

.49

.002

.13

Time x SQL
Interaction

3, 311

4.49

.72

.004

.04

Time x SQL x ATLG
Interaction

3, 311

3.35

.72

.019

.03

Time x SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 10%
condition

1, 78

7.18

.64

.009

.08

Time x SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 30%
condition

1, 77

11.43

.82

.001

.13

Time x SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 60%
condition

1, 81

13.73

.61

.000

.14

Time x SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 90%
condition

1, 75

45.20

.80

.000

.38

Time x SQL
Interaction

3, 311

6.00

.60

.001

.06

Time x SQL x ATLG
Interaction

3, 311

5.17

.60

.002

.05

Time x SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 10%
condition

1, 78

5.05

.62

.027

.06
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Time x SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 30%
condition

1, 77

17.74

.58

.000

.19

Time x SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 60%
condition

1, 81

18.70

.58

.000

.19

Time x SQL x ATLG
Interaction: 90%
condition

1, 75

63.85

.63

.000

.46

Notes. ATLG and SQL stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale and Status Quo
Likelihood.

Table 47
Differences for Compassion According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times
(Housing Equality)

Time

10%

Status Quo Likelihood Conditions
30%
60%

90%

Time 1

1.85a (.09)

1.76b (.08)

1.91c (.09)

2.04d (.11)

Time 2

2.22a (.10)

1.98b (.09)

1.95c (.10)

2.17d (.11)

Notes. Means with shared subscripts indicate significant differences at p < .05 level. Standard
errors are in parentheses.

Significant three-way interactions among time, status quo likelihood, and ATLG
emerged for most of the emotions (except anxiety, disgust, and compassion) (See Table
46). After splitting the file according to status quo likelihood, the ATLG repeated
measures ANCOVA and correlations served as post hoc tests for each emotion. For fear,
significant interactions between ATLG and time emerged in the 10% and 90%
conditions. However, at time 2, participants did not differ in their relationships between
negative attitudes and feelings of fear, z = -1.07, p > .05 (Lowry, 2001-2015), such that
participants with greater negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men experienced
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greater fear (See Table 48). For anger, a significant interaction emerged in the 90%
condition such that more negative attitudes were associated with greater anger at time 2, r
= .54, p < .01. For pity, a significant interaction emerged in the 90% condition such that
participants with greater negative attitudes felt a great amount of pity at time 2, r = .47, p
< .01.
Table 48
Correlations between Fear and ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale)
According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Housing Equality)

Time

10%

Status Quo Likelihood Conditions
30%
60%

90%

Time 1

-.028ns (80)

.092ns (79)

.206ns (83)

.05ns (77)

Time 2

.278 (80)

.109ns (79)

.280 (83)

.430 (77)

Notes. Correlations are not significantly different from each other. NS subscripts indicate
correlations are not significant at p < .05 level. Ns are in parentheses.

For happiness, significant interactions emerged for all of the conditions (See
Table 46). At time 2, participants in the 90% condition (r = -.51, p < .01) had
significantly stronger relationships between their negative attitudes toward lesbians and
gay men and their feelings of unhappiness than participants in the 60% condition (r = .21, p < .06), z = 2.13, p < .05 (See Table 49) (Lowry, 2001-2015). Participants in the
90% condition had significantly different and stronger relationships at time 2 (r = -.51, p
< .01) than at time 1 (r = .22, p < .06), z = 4.73, p < .01, such that they felt more unhappy
with time. For hope, significant interactions emerged for all of the conditions (See Table
46). At time 2, participants in the 90% condition (r = -.53, p < .01) had significantly
stronger relationships between their negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and
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their feelings of hopelessness than participants in the 10% condition (r = -.22, p = .05), z
= 2.29, p < .05 (See Table 50). Participants in the 90% condition had a significantly
different and stronger relationship at time 2 (r = -.53, p < .01) than at time 1 (r = .32, p <
.01), z = 5.67, p < .01, such that they felt more hopeless with time (Lowry, 2001-2015).
Table 49
Correlations between Happiness and ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men
scale) According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Housing Equality)

Time

10%

Status Quo Likelihood Conditions
30%
60%

90%

Time 1

.143ns (80)

-.015ns (79)

.164ns (83)

.216a (77)

Time 2

-.175ns (80)

-.409 (79)

-.211b (83)

-.506a, b (77)

Notes. Correlations with shared subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 or less level. NS
subscripts indicate correlations are not significant at p < .05 level. Ns are in parentheses.

Table 50
Correlations between Hope and ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale)
According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Housing Equality)

Time

10%

Status Quo Likelihood Conditions
30%
60%

90%

Time 1

.065ns (80)

.013ns (79)

.153ns (83)

.325a (77)

Time 2

-.218b (80)

-.469 (79)

-.310 (83)

-.533a, b (77)

Notes. Correlations with shared subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 or less. NS
subscripts indicate correlations are not significant at p < .05 level. Ns are in parentheses.

Individual differences variables’ effects on sexual minority system justification.
Three separate 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo
Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) MANCOVA models with the five SMSJ
variables as dependent measures and ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW serving as covariates,

202
entered one at a time tested the effects of these covariates on the system justification
judgments. The SSJ MANCOVA model failed to attain significant three-way
interactions for the individual SMSJ items, ps > .05. However, in a series of ANCOVAs
with current status quo and status quo likelihood as predictor variables, the individual
SMSJ dependent variables, and ATLG, SSJ, or GBJW as covariates, ATLG, SSJ, and
GBJW significantly predicted participants’ endorsement of the SMSJs. The more that
participants held negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (ATLG), believed
American society to be fair, legitimate, and justifiable (SSJ), and believed that the world
is fair and that individuals are punished according to dessert (GBJW) the more likely they
were to believe that sexual minorities are selfish, immature, immoral, and desirous of
“special rights” above others (LGSelfish factor). The higher they scored on these factors
the more likely they were to believe that heterosexual marriage and parenting represent
the natural and ideal form of marriage and child rearing (NaturalHeterosexualMarriage
factor) and the less likely they were to believe that lesbians and gay men have a history of
experiencing discrimination in America (except for the GBJW model). Finally, high
scores on these factors also predicted beliefs that sexual orientation is related to an
individual’s ability to contribute to society and that sexual minorities do not have enough
political power, as a group, to achieve their goals through the ordinary political process
(only for the ATLG model) (See Table 51).
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Table 51
ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Sexual Minority
System Justifications (Housing Equality)
Individual
Differences
Covariate
Model

Predicted
SMSJ

Df

F

MSE

p

Β

ηρ²

ATLG

LGSelfish

1, 303

775.83

.29

.000

1.06

.72

Natural
Heterosexual
Marriage

1, 303

1102.69

.29

.000

.86

.78

LG History of
Discrimination

1, 303

61.95

1.58

.000

-.51

.17

Sexual
Orientation
related to
Societal
Contribution

1, 302

26.50

.24

.000

.41

.08

Sexual
Minorities
have Political
Power

1, 303

48.06

1.55

.000

-.41

.14

LGSelfish

1, 303

29.78

.96

.000

.3936

.09

Natural
Heterosexual
Marriage

1, 303

36.11

1.21

.000

.4037

.11

LG History of
Discrimination

1, 303

5.38

1.90

.021

-.1538

.02

SSJ

36

The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 10% status quo likelihood as the
reference group.
37
The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 60% status quo likelihood as the
reference group.
38
None of the status quo likelihood references groups produced significant beta weights within the
regression models. Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed to find the significant
relationship between SSJ and LG History of Discrimination.
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GBJW

Sexual
Orientation
related to
Societal
Contribution

1, 302

6.76

.26

.010

.1339

.02

LGSelfish

1, 302

37.58

.94

.000

.41

.11

Natural
Heterosexual
Marriage

1, 302

22.29

1.26

.000

.2740

.07

Sexual
Orientation
related to
Societal
Contribution

1, 301

5.99

.26

.015

.1641

.02

Notes. ATLG, SSJ, GBJW, and LG stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale,
Situational System Justification scale, Global Belief in a Just World scale, and Lesbians and Gay
men.

The three-way interaction for ATLG, current status quo, and status quo likelihood
in the ATLG MANCOVA model was significant, F(15, 823.05) = 1.82, p < .05, ηρ² =
.03, but for only two SMSJ items, LGSelfish factor, F(3, 302) = 3.37, MSE = .29, p < .05,
ηρ² = .03, and Societal Contribution item, F(3, 302) = 3.32, MSE = .24, p < .05, ηρ² = .03.
When analyzed with the ATLG ANCOVA model, the three-way interactions remained
significant: LGSelfish, F(3, 303) = 3.34, MSE = .29, p < .05, ηρ² = .03 and Societal
Contribution, F(3, 302) = 3.32, MSE = .24, p < .05, ηρ² = .03. After splitting the file by
current status quo and status quo likelihood (separately), I conducted ATLG ANCOVA

39

None of the status quo likelihood references groups produced significant beta weights within the
regression models. Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed to find the significant
relationship between SSJ and Sexual Orientation related to Societal Contribution.
40
None of the status quo likelihood references groups produced significant beta weights within the
regression models. Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed to find the significant
relationship between GBJW and Natural Heterosexual Marriage.
41
None of the status quo likelihood references groups produced significant beta weights within the
regression models. Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed to find the significant
relationship between GBJW and Sexual Orientation related to Societal Contribution.
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models and correlations for each SMSJ. For both SMSJs, a significant status quo
likelihood by ATLG interaction emerged in the affirmation condition: LGSelfish, F(3,
144) = 3.70, MSE = .29, p < .05, ηρ² = .07 and Societal Contribution, F(3, 143) = 4.48,
MSE = .15, p < .01, ηρ² = .09. For LGSelfish and Societal Contribution, significant
current status quo by ATLG interactions emerged in the 90%, F(1, 73) = 8.97, MSE =
.30, p < .01, ηρ² = .11 and 60%, F(1, 78) = 9.07, MSE = .14, p < .01, ηρ² = .10 conditions,
respectively.
For LGSelfish, although all correlations were large (rs > .79) and significant (ps <
.01), only three correlations were significantly different from each other (See Table 52).
In the affirmation condition, 90% condition participants (r = .924) had a significantly
stronger relationship between ATLG and LGSelfish than 30% condition participants (r =
.792), z = -2.16, p < .05, indicating that the relationship between their negative attitudes
toward lesbians and gay men and their beliefs that sexual minorities are selfish grew
stronger with the certainty of housing equality. Similarly, the relationship between
ATLG and LGSelfish in the affirmation condition was significantly stronger in the 90%
(r = .924) than in the 60% (r = .797) condition, z = -2.18, p < .05. Finally, a significant
difference existed between the affirmation and threat conditions within the 90%
condition, z = 2.04, p < .05, such that participants in the affirmation condition had a
stronger correlation (r = .924) than participants in the threat condition (r = .811),
suggesting that threat disrupts this relationship. For Societal Contribution, significant
correlations emerged in the affirmation, 60% (r = .477, p < .01); affirmation, 90% (r =
.614, p < .01); and threat, 10% (r = .325, p < .05) cells such that the more negative
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attitudes these participants held toward lesbians and gay men, the more likely they were
to believe that sexual orientation relates to an individual’s ability to contribute to society.
Table 52
Correlations between LGSelfish and ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men
scale) According to Current Status Quo and Status Quo Likelihood (Housing Equality)

Current Status
Quo

10%

Status Quo Likelihood Conditions
30%
60%

90%

Affirmation

.856 (42)

.792a (35)

.797b (40)

.924a, b, c (35)

Threat

.847 (38)

.854 (44)

.876 (43)

.811c (42)

Notes. Correlations are significant at p < .01. Correlations with shared subscripts are significantly
different at p < .05. Ns are in parentheses. LG stands for Lesbians and Gay men.

The three-way interaction for GBJW, current status quo, and status quo likelihood
in the GBJW MANCOVA model was significant, F(15, 820.29) = 1.76, p < .05, ηρ² =
.03, but only for one SMSJ item, Discrimination History, F(3, 301) = 2.78, MSE = 1.87, p
< .05, ηρ² = .03. When analyzed with the GBJW ANCOVA model, the three-way
interaction remained significant, F(3, 302) = 2.79, MSE = 1.87, p < .05, ηρ² = .03. After
splitting the file by current status quo and status quo likelihood (separately), I conducted
GBJW ANCOVA models and correlations. A significant current status quo by GBJW
interaction emerged in the 90% condition, F(1, 73) = 6.92, MSE = 2.36, p < .05, ηρ² =
.09, such that, at time 2, greater global belief in a just world was significantly related to
the belief that lesbians and gay men do not have a history of discrimination, r = -.367, p <
.05.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
Hypothesis 1. The data did not support the initial hypothesis that threatened
participants would be less likely to vote for marital or housing equality as there were no
significant differences for votes according to current status quo. However, there was
partial support for the first hypothesis in the Marriage Equality study in that affirmation
condition participants were more likely to vote according to their own beliefs in
American system legitimacy and global beliefs in a just world. This finding indicates
that threat may disrupt the relationship between individual differences variables and
voting against marital equality. Furthermore, threat condition participants were
significantly more likely to experience fear and anxiety than affirmation condition
participants (Laurin et al., 2008; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). These participants also
experienced greater anger, disgust, and compassion and less happiness and hope. In
addition, in the Marriage Equality study threat condition participants were less likely to
believe that lesbians and gay men have a history of experiencing discrimination in the
United States and more likely to believe that lesbians and gay men are selfish (Jost et al.,
2004; Jost, Blount, et al., 2003; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003). However, the data did not
support this finding in the Housing Equality study. Finally, mediation of the relationship
between current status quo manipulation and equality votes was not relevant because no
significant main effects emerged for the current status quo factor. However, individual
differences variables moderated likelihood to vote for equality. Thus, although threat
impacts emotions and sexual minority system justifications, it only impacts ballot
equality decisions in conjunction with individual differences variables.
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Hypothesis 2. Unfortunately, the results did not support the second hypothesis,
that participants in the 10% and 30% likelihood conditions would be less likely to vote
for equality than participants in the 90% condition (Kay et al., 2002), as there were no
significant differences in votes or voting likelihood according to status quo likelihood.
The hypothesis that participants in the 60% condition would be influenced by individual
differences variables was partially supported (Kay et al., 2002). Individual differences
variables significantly predicted equality votes and voting likelihoods across all status
quo likelihood conditions. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, in the Housing Equality study, the
attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (and, marginally, their beliefs that lesbians and gay
men represent realistic and symbolic threats) of participants in the 60% condition were
significantly less likely to influence their likelihood to vote for equality than those in the
10% and 30% conditions. Additionally, although not hypothesized, in the Housing
Equality study, participants in the 10% condition were significantly more likely to be
influenced by their beliefs that lesbians and gay men represent realistic and symbolic
threats than participants in the 90% condition in their likelihood to vote for equality.
In the Marriage Equality study, contrary to Hypothesis 2, participants only
experienced significant differences for happiness (not all of the emotions) according to
status quo likelihood. In fact, this difference was opposite to what I had hypothesized in
that participants in the 10% condition experienced significantly less happiness than
participants in the 90% condition (Kay et al., 2002). However, participants in the 90%
condition experienced significantly more happiness than participants in the 30%
condition hypothesis, which partially confirmed Hypothesis 2. Again, contrary to
Hypothesis 2, in the Housing Equality study, participants in the 10% condition felt
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significantly greater amounts of fear and anxiety than those in the other three conditions
(Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). They also felt greater
amounts of anger and disgust than those in the 60% and 90% conditions (and 30%
condition for disgust). Contrary to Hypothesis 2, there were no significant differences
according to status quo likelihood for participants’ experience of happiness and joy and
participants did not differ in sexual minority system justification endorsement according
to status quo likelihood. As there were no significant differences according to status quo
likelihood for ballot votes and likelihood to vote for equality, mediation analyses were
not relevant. Thus, likelihood of a new status quo had little impact on emotions or
system justifications and its impact on voting decisions was only in conjunction with
individual differences variables.
Hypothesis 3. There were no significant differences between equality votes or
likelihood to vote for equality according to current status quo or status quo likelihood
failing to support Hypothesis 3. However, in support of Hypothesis 3 in the Marriage
Equality study, global beliefs in a just world significantly predicted a reduced likelihood
to vote for equality, but only in the affirmation condition. However, the relationship
between global beliefs in a just world and unlikelihood of voting for marital equality
appeared to be weaker for participants in the affirmation, 60% condition than participants
in the affirmation, 30% and 90% conditions (Kay et al., 2002). Contrary to Hypothesis 3,
although significant differences between the relationships between likelihood to vote for
marital equality and ATLG emerged according to status quo likelihood, these differences
were in the threat condition, with stronger relationships in the 10% condition than in the
30% and 60% conditions. Similarly, although beliefs in the realistic and symbolic threats

210
that lesbians and gay men pose significantly predicted likelihood to vote against marriage
equality, there were no significant differences according to current status quo or status
quo likelihood. Consistent with the findings for Hypothesis 2, in the Marriage Equality
study, GBJW significantly affected ballot decisions, but only in the affirmation condition.
Thus, once again threat appeared to disrupt this relationship.
Contrary to Hypothesis 3, in the Housing Equality study, the relationship between
negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and unlikelihood to vote for housing
equality appeared to be stronger in the 10%, 30%, and 90% conditions than in the 60%
condition (Kay et al., 2002). Similarly, the relationship between greater beliefs that
lesbians and gay men represent realistic and symbolic threats and unlikelihood to vote for
housing equality emerged as stronger in the 10%, 30%, and 90% conditions than in the
60% condition. Similar to the results for Hypothesis 2, and in contrast to Hypothesis 3,
although beliefs in the legitimacy of the American system significantly predicted a
reduced tendency to vote for housing equality, this relationship appeared in only the
threat, 90% condition, not the affirmation condition. Notably, a marginally significant
relationship existed between global beliefs in a just world and a reduced tendency to vote
for housing equality within the affirmation condition but the significant relationship
existed within the affirmation, 10% cell, rather than the 60% cell, in opposition to
Hypothesis 3. Rather than current status quo or status quo likelihood, the strongest
predictors for ballot decisions (whether in the Marital or Housing Equality study) were
the individual differences variables.
According to Hypothesis 3, threat condition participants emotions should vary
according to both threat (time 1) and status quo likelihood (time 2). In contrast,
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affirmation condition participants’ emotions should only vary as a function of status quo
likelihood. In confirmation, in both studies, threat condition participants felt significantly
greater fear and anxiety than affirmation condition participants after the current status
quo manipulation (Laurin et al., 2008). Also in support of Hypothesis 3, threat condition
participants felt significantly less fear and anxiety at time 2 than time 1. Although not
hypothesized, this pattern held for anger and disgust for threat condition participants.
These results appear to represent a pattern in which, after the current status quo
manipulation, participants felt significantly greater negative emotions (fear, anxiety,
anger, and disgust) in the threat condition, greater positive emotions (happiness and hope)
in the affirmation condition, but similar emotions across current status quo condition after
the status quo likelihood manipulation, i.e. at time 2. The exception to this finding
involves compassion, in which threat condition participants feel greater compassion than
affirmation condition participants at time 1, but both conditions feel greater amounts of
compassion at time 2. Although these results indicate that participants’ experiences of
negative emotions alleviated with time, they do not provide support for the third
hypothesis that voting in the initial ballot would alleviate initial emotions experienced
because there were no significant differences regarding voting behaviors (Brescoll et al.,
2013; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2007; Wakslak et al., 2007).
Contrary to Hypothesis 3, there were no significant differences according to status
quo likelihood for participants in terms of happiness, hope, fear, or anxiety (Kay et al.,
2002; Ortony et al., 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Rather, in the Marital Equality
study, significant time by status quo likelihood interactions emerged such that
participants in the 60% and 90% conditions were angrier at time 1 than time 2, but
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happier at time 2 than time 1. Participants in the 90% condition were also more hopeful
at time 2 and participants in the 10%, 60%, and 90% conditions felt greater compassion
at time 2. Thus, knowledge of marriage equality’s likelihood caused participants to
experience greater happiness, hope, and compassion, indicating that these individuals
may have already accepted the concept of nationwide marriage equality prior to the
study.
According to Hypothesis 3, participants should endorse sexual minority system
justifications according to both threat and status quo likelihood condition (Brescoll et al.,
2013; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2007; Kay et al., 2002). In contrast,
affirmation condition participants should only be affected by status quo likelihood
condition (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost, et al., 2007; Kay et al., 2002). Although, in the
Marital Equality study, threat condition participants were significantly less likely to
believe that lesbians and gay men have a history of experiencing discrimination within
the United States than affirmation condition participants, this result only provides partial
support for Hypothesis 3 because there were no significant differences according to
current status quo or status quo likelihood for any of the other sexual minority system
justifications. Similarly, in the Housing Equality study, although participants were more
likely to believe that sexual minorities have a history of discrimination at time 2 than at
time 1, there were no significant differences according to current status quo and status
quo likelihood for any of the sexual minority system justifications.
According to Hypothesis 3, emotions and sexual minority system justifications
should mediate the relationships between the manipulated variables (current status quo
and status quo likelihood) and the second ballot decisions. As current status quo and
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status quo likelihood conditions did not significantly predict the second ballot decisions,
mediation analysis was not relevant to the findings. The results for Hypothesis 3 suggest
that, although threat and status quo likelihood may affect emotional experiences and
system justification endorsement, manipulated variables only affected equality ballot
decisions in conjunction with individual differences variables.
Hypothesis 4. The results of both studies offered full confirmation for individual
difference effects in Hypothesis 4, such that greater negative attitudes toward lesbians
and gay men (ATLG), beliefs in American system legitimacy (SSJ), and global beliefs in
a just world (GBJW) predicted a reduced likelihood to vote for equality on both ballot
measures (Brescoll et al., 2013; Herek, 2004; Jost et al., 2004; Jost, Blount, et al., 2003;
Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003).
According to Hypothesis 4, participants should experience different levels of
emotions according to the individual differences variables and status quo likelihood
condition (Balzer & Jacobs, 2011; Cunningham et al., 2013; Embrick et al., 2007; Herek,
2004; Inbar et al., 2009; Zeichner & Reidy, 2009). Although not hypothesized, in the
Marital Equality study, a significant time by ATLG interaction emerged such that
participants with greater negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men felt significantly
greater fear and anger and less compassion at time 2 than at time 1. Similarly, these
participants only experienced anxiety at time 2. Interestingly, these participants also only
felt pity at time 2. The overall trend provided support for Hypothesis 4 in that
participants with greater negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men experienced
greater levels of negative emotions upon learning about marital equality. As there were
no differences according to status quo likelihood, mere exposure to the concept of
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nationwide marriage equality evoked greater experiences of fear, anxiety, anger, and pity,
but less compassion, for those with negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men.
Participants with greater negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men had significantly
stronger relationships between their attitudes and their feelings of disgust at time 2 in the
30%, 60%, and 90% conditions than in the 10% condition, indicating that greater marital
certainty elicited greater disgust. Similarly, this relationship was stronger for participants
in the 90% condition at time 2 than at time 1. For happiness and hope, participants with
less negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men had significantly stronger
relationships between their attitudes and their feelings of happiness and hope at time 2 in
the 90% condition than in the 30% and 60% conditions, indicating that greater certainty
of marital equality elicited greater happiness and hope for these participants (Zeichner &
Reidy, 2009). Similarly, this relationship was stronger for participants in the 60%
condition at time 2 than at time 1. Thus, attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, in
conjunction with status quo likelihood, greatly influenced the emotions participants
experienced with greater marital certainty eliciting greater disgust and less happiness and
hope for those with more negative attitudes. These results indicate that, while fear,
anxiety, anger, pity, and compassion may be influenced by the mere mention of marital
equality, disgust, happiness, and hope may require greater knowledge of marriage
equality certainty.
Although not hypothesized, in the Marital Equality study, a significant time by
SSJ interaction emerged such that participants with greater beliefs in American system
legitimacy and fairness felt significantly greater fear and less hope at time 2 than at time
1 (Zeichner & Reidy, 2009). Similarly, these participants felt a lack of compassion at
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time 2. In support of Hypothesis 4, participants had a significantly stronger relationship
between their beliefs in American system legitimacy and anger at time 2 than at time 1 in
the 60% condition (Herek, 2004). Similarly, significant relationships emerged for
participants such that greater beliefs in American system legitimacy predicted greater
anger (90% condition) and pity (60% condition) at time 2. There were no differences for
GBJW; thus, for the Marital Equality study, this aspect did not support Hypothesis 4.
Overall, these results indicate that exposure to marital equality and its likelihood led
those with greater beliefs in American system legitimacy to feel negative emotions,
especially as marital equality became more certain.
In the Housing Equality study, participants with less negative attitudes toward
lesbians and gay men were significantly more compassionate at time 2 than at time 1,
partially supporting Hypothesis 4. Similarly, significant relationships emerged between
negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and fear in not only the 60% and 90%
conditions (as hypothesized), but in the 10% condition (Zeichner & Reidy, 2009). This
relationship continued regarding anger and pity in the 90% condition, with greater
negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men predicting significant levels of anger and
pity felt (Herek, 2004). For happiness and hope, participants with less negative attitudes
toward lesbians and gay men had significantly stronger relationships between their
attitudes and their feelings of happiness and hope at time 2 in the 90% condition than in
the 60% condition (happiness) and 10% condition (hope). Similarly, this relationship
was stronger for participants in the 90% condition at time 2 than at time 1. There were
no differences for SSJ or GBJW; thus, for the Housing Equality study, this aspect did not
support Hypothesis 4. Overall, these results indicate that, for those with negative
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attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, exposure to housing equality elicited negative
emotions, especially when housing equality was almost certain.
According to Hypothesis 4, participants with greater negative attitudes toward
lesbians and gay men, beliefs in the legitimacy and fairness of the American system, and
global beliefs in a just world will be more likely to endorse sexual minority system
justifications; however, the extent that these participants endorse the justifications may be
impacted by current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations (Brescoll et al.,
2013; Herek, 2004; Jost et al., 2004; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003). For both equality studies,
the data fully confirmed Hypothesis 4 in that greater negative attitudes toward lesbians
and gay men (ATLG), beliefs that American society is fair, legitimate, and justifiable
(SSJ), and beliefs that the world is fair and that individuals are punished according to
dessert (GBJW) significantly predicted endorsement of sexual minority system
justifications. In addition, for the Marital Equality study, both current status quo and
status quo likelihood affected the relationship between GBJW and justification
endorsement such that, in the affirmation, 90% cell, greater global beliefs in a just world
predicted the belief that lesbians and gay men do not have a history of discrimination.
For the Housing Equality study, for the LGSelfish factor (i.e. endorsement of system
justifications that lesbians and gay men are selfish, immature, immoral, and desirous of
“special rights” above others) participants in the affirmation, 90% cell had a significantly
stronger relationship between ATLG beliefs and LGSelfish factor endorsement than those
in the affirmation, 30% and affirmation, 60% cells. Thus, the relationship between
negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and beliefs that sexual minorities are
selfish grew stronger with the certainty of housing equality. These findings do not
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support system justification theory in that, when housing equality became more certain,
those with negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men felt the need to disparage
lesbians and gay men. Furthermore, only those participants in the affirmation condition
felt the need to endorse these aspects of sexual minority stigma (Herek, 2004, 2007).
System justification theory would predict that affirmation, 90% participants should be
less likely to endorse system justifications than those in the less certain conditions (Jost,
Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost, et al., 2007; Kay et al., 2002). However, the findings provide
overall support for the theoretical components of system justification theory in that those
with negative attitudes toward sexual minorities felt the need to disparage lesbians and
gay men when the minority group was most likely to gain equal rights to the majority
(Alexander, 2001; Blain, 2005; Goldberg-Hiller & Milner, 2003; Hargis, 2000; Herek,
2004; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004). These results indicate that some majority
group members use stereotypes to denigrate minority groups in order to maintain the
current, hierarchical status quo (Glick & Fiske, 2001a; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al.,
2004; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009; Kay and Jost, 2003; Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005).
This difference was also found between the affirmation, 90% and threat, 90%
cells, such that those in the affirmation condition had a stronger relationship between
ATLG and LGSelfish endorsement, thereby suggesting that threat disrupts this
relationship. These findings indicate that negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men
lead to greater system justification when threat does not disrupt the general status quo and
when the likelihood of equality is almost certain. Similarly, participants in the
affirmation, 60%; affirmation, 90%; and threat, 10% cells had significant relationships
between ATLG and their belief that sexual orientation relates to an individual’s ability to
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contribute to society. Finally, a significant effect emerged for the threat, 90% cell such
that, at time 2, greater global beliefs in a just world was significantly related to the belief
that lesbians and gay men do not have a history of discrimination in the threat condition.
This last finding supports Hypothesis 4 showing that the effects of status quo likelihood
in conjunction with individual differences on sexual minority system justification may be
more complex than originally hypothesized. Overall, the results for Hypothesis 4
indicate that individual differences variables have a very large impact on voting
tendencies, emotions, and system justification endorsement, especially when the general
status quo is not threatened and as sexual minority equality becomes more certain.
Limitations
Both design issues and factors outside of the research limited the current
investigation. The research was conducted between late April and early June, 2015. By
this time, following the Supreme Court’s Windsor opinion (2013), courts throughout the
United States had ruled on the issue of marriage equality, usually by allowing same-sex
couples to marry. A few federal and state courts had ruled against marriage equality,
which led to the United States Supreme Court’s choice to hear the issues involved. The
widely publicized nature of the issue gave individuals the chance to hear the competing
arguments regarding marital equality and to decide where they stood on the issue. The
results of the current investigation indicate that voters became firm in their beliefs
regarding marital equality as they were not swayed by either current status quo or status
quo likelihood manipulation, as has been the case with other issues outside of sexual
minority rights (e.g., essentialist beliefs in gender differences (Brescoll et al., 2013),
tendency to justify institutional differences among the poor and minorities (Jost, Pelham,
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et al., 2003), desirability of political candidates according to likelihood of being elected
(Kay et al., 2002)). In addition, the high levels of publicity about marital equality may
have influenced participants within the housing equality condition, such that exposure to
the arguments for marital equality may have led to a more egalitarian mindset regarding
sexual minority rights, in general. Thus, the historical context may have limited the
current investigation. Had the study occurred prior to the Windsor decision, the
manipulations may have had a greater effect. Similarly, conducting the housing equality
study in a year or more may produce different results.
A methodological design limitation involved the choice of the items in the sexual
minority system justifications. I utilized the arguments used in court decisions and
specific anti-sexual orientation equality campaigns as they appeared to represent the most
likely arguments that people might have used against sexual minority equality. However,
it is possible that the average voter uses different arguments and beliefs to justify their
votes. I drew the justifications from the writings of court justices but they were not the
sample of participants in this research. A qualitative study in which voters were sampled
from the relevant population may provide a better set of items that individuals may use as
justifications for voting both for and against equal protection.
In this investigation, I chose not to focus upon the religious aspects potentially
involved as the courts, in their opinions against marriage equality, specifically stated that
their decisions were not based upon religious concerns. However, religion is often used
to justify current social systems (Jost et al., 2014; Kay et al., 2008; Kay, Whitson, et al.,
2009) and, potentially more relevant to the current research, marital equality opponents
have used to justify not allowing same-sex marriage (Geiger, 2014; Kitchen, 10th Circuit,
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2014). Courts’ refusals to admit the influence of religion upon anti-marital equality
legislation masks religion’s potential influence and provides another possible limitation
of the current research. Future studies could focus, again, on how justices make
decisions and how lay people (i.e. voters) make decisions in equality contexts.
Several methodological design problems may limit the current research. The
repeated measures design was used so that the effect of each manipulation could be
explored by itself and in conjunction with the other manipulation. However, given that
participants voted on the same ballot initiative twice within a short period of time, few
changed their decisions, which limited the effects of the manipulations. Potential
solutions include creating a larger interval of time between manipulations so that
participants could forget their original decision or conducting both manipulations at the
same time. Each solution brings its own set of limitations. Another methodological
problem involves the use of an online, research setting. It is difficult to know the extent
that voting for a ballot in a hypothetical situation equates with actually voting in a state
ballot initiative. Additionally, ballot initiatives usually involve extensive politicization of
the issue in question. Thus, the atmosphere for a voter may be much different from that
of the experimental research participant. However, the widely publicized nature of the
current investigation may have made it comparable to what participants experience in a
real ballot initiative. Another methodological issue of the current investigation involved
the possibility of the sexual minority system justifications priming participants’ votes on
the second ballot as they provided exposure to reasons one may choose to not vote for
sexual minority equality. However, as participants did not change their decisions
regarding the ballot initiatives, this potential limitation is unlikely. Another potential
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issue with the sexual minority system justifications was that participants in an
experimental study completed them without pre-testing to determine whether they
correctly measured underlying attitudes. Given the inter-item correlations found for two
factors in both experimental studies at different times, it is likely that the system
justifications are measuring latent traits. Latent trait testing prior to conducting the
current investigation (to better understand the underlying traits) might have improved the
methodological foundation of the current investigation.
One final potential limitation of the current investigation involves the use of
online research participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk. These participants may
be more technologically sophisticated than the average voter they are intended to
represent. In addition, it is unknown, at present, the extent to which these participants
represent that population. One way to mitigate this problem would be to conduct another
study comparing responses from participants from both online pools and the relevant
community to see whether they differ according to individual differences variables.
Differences between the populations may explain the large tendency of participants in the
current investigation to vote for equality.
Contributions of the Current Investigation
In spite of the limitations, the current investigation provided strong evidence of
the influence of individual differences variables upon sexual minority stigma. Current
status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations only predicted ballot decisions with
statistical models that included individual difference variables as moderators or controls.
In fact, in some of these models, threat only served to disrupt the influence of individual
differences variables, suggesting that threat acted as a moderator on when participants’
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individual differences variables affected their ballot decisions. The current investigation
provided strong evidence that individuals with greater negative attitudes toward lesbians
and gay men, strong beliefs in the legitimacy of the American system, strong global
beliefs in a just world, greater beliefs that lesbians and gay men represent realistic and
symbolic threats, and greater feelings of intergroup anxiety toward lesbians and gay men
are significantly less likely to vote for sexual minority equality. Given the requirements
of Romer (1996) that laws that distinguish between groups of people not do so on the
basis of animus, the current investigation’s findings regarding the influence of bias in
decision making calls into question laws that classify according to sexual orientation.
Additionally, the exclusion of sexual minorities from suspect or quasi-suspect
classification in Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection clause should be reconsidered
given the established influence of bias on legal decision making.
The current investigation also examined system justification theory within a
previously unexplored context, i.e. sexual minority stigma and heterosexism. In fact, the
current research calls into question whether system justification theory is useful to sexual
minority issues. Although many courts throughout the United States had ruled in favor of
marital equality, the current, relatively conservative Supreme Court could have created
feelings of uncertainty helpful to the threat manipulation. The timing had the potential to
be ripe for this research. However, the current status quo and status quo likelihood
manipulations did not affect participants’ ballot decisions. Three possible reasons for this
finding include the timing of the study, the publicity surrounding the issues and affected
group involved, and the possibility that system justification theory does not explain
sexual minority stigma. As discussed in the limitations section (above), this research
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took place after many courts had ruled in favor of marital equality. Perhaps people had
too much time to consider the issue and were firmly for or against equality. Similarly,
the publicity involved in the marital equality issue likely made the issue prominent in
peoples’ minds such that they were forced to consider the important aspects involved.
Although timing and publicity provide potential reasons for why system justification
failed to predict ballot behavior in the marital equality study, they do not account for the
housing equality study. Housing equality does not have the precedential history of
marital equality. At the time of this research equality in housing as a policy issue did not
share the highly visible status of marital equality in the public eye. Yet, similar results
occurred for the housing equality study. One potential reason could be that the
discussion of marital equality within the local, state, and national spheres led people to
hold broader beliefs and opinions regarding lesbians and gay men as a group. Rather
than focusing only upon marital equality, perhaps the thoughts, feelings, and beliefs
regarding sexual minority marital equality spread to other issues involving sexual
orientation to create a general, overall attitude or belief system more favorable towards
lesbians and gay men. This could explain why housing equality, a topic rarely, if ever,
discussed, matched marital equality not only on the ballot variables, but often on
emotions, sexual minority system justifications, and individual differences variables.
One final possibility regarding the lack of differences according to system
justification theory could be that system justification simply does not explain sexual
minority stigma. However, the existence of a hierarchical system in the concept of
heterosexism (Herek, 2004) and the strong, negative sentiment towards sexual minorities
that still affects legislation throughout the United States both suggest that aspects of
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system justification theory could still be relevant to sexual minority system justification.
Although many people appear to accept sexual minority equality, this research shows that
a large minority of individuals (for the initial ballots, 30.3% for marital equality and
16.9% for housing equality) do not accept equality. The fact that neither group (i.e. those
who voted for and against equality) were swayed in their votes according to the main
manipulations suggests that system justification may not be as relevant to sexual minority
stigma as other theories. However, this research represents the first attempt to understand
sexual minority stigma through the lens of system justification theory. Perhaps careful
consideration of the issues measured and the construction of materials could aid in
understanding the causal relationship between threat and sexual minority stigma. What
the current investigation indicates is that the traditional methods of gauging system
justification theory may not be readily applicable to sexual minority system justifications.
As threat and likelihood appear to affect emotions and some sexual minority system
justifications, the current research suggests that system justification theory may have a
place in the determination of what causes sexual minority stigma. The current research
thus provides a starting point for the exploration of system justification theory within the
sexual minority context.
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Appendix A: Informed Consent
Jordan A. Blenner, graduate student working under the supervision of Dr. Richard
Wiener, faculty member in the Psychology Department at the University of NebraskaLincoln, is conducting the present set of studies, “Psychology of Political Attitudes” (IRB
Approval number IRB#20150415013 EX). You are invited to participate in this project
because you are a community member. Participants in the states of Nebraska and
Alabama must be at least 19 years old or older to participate, participants in the state of
Mississippi must be at least 21 years old to participate, and participants in all other states
must be 18 years old to participate. Initially, you will complete a short demographic
form that will determine whether you are eligible to complete the larger set of studies.
You will receive $.10 for completing this form. If eligible for the studies, you will be
asked to complete four short studies that assess your attitudes regarding different political
topics. You will also be asked to complete a demographic sheet. Participation will take
place at a computer station of your choice. It will take about one half hour of your time.
You will receive $1 for your participation.
The potential benefits of the current study outweigh any cost that may
accompany participation. Knowledge generated through this study will help researchers
better understand how community members view various political topics. Such
knowledge about perceptions can lead to greater understanding of the current political
climate and the views of most Americans concerning political issues. Such experience
may add significantly to participants’ education.
There are no known risks or discomforts associated with this research. If you do
not feel comfortable answering a question during the session, you can choose not to
respond. The alternative to participating in this study is non-participation. Your
participation is voluntary. You are free to decide not to participate in this study or to
withdraw at any time without adversely affecting your relationship with the investigators
or the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty
to you or loss of any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
The results of this study may be published, but your name and identity will not be
revealed and all of the data and information collected from you will remain anonymous.
You may review the privacy policies of Amazon Mechanical Turk at the following
website: https://www.mturk.com/mturk/privacynotice. All data will be identified with
numbers that have no links to you as a research participant and will be kept in a locked,
secure lab in Burnett Hall for a period of 5 years after which it will be destroyed.
Nonetheless, some of the questions on the demographic sheet ask about, among other
things, your gender, your ethnicity, and your age. Feel free to leave any of those items
unanswered if you feel that the answers may reveal your identity.
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Jordan A. Blenner is conducting this study, along with Richard L. Wiener of the
Legal Decision Making Lab and the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Psychology
Department. She will be happy to answer any questions or concerns about the study at
(402-472-9639) or by email at jordan.blennerDS@gmail.com. To obtain more
information about your rights as a research participant or to report any concerns about the
study, please contact the University of Nebraska – Lincoln Institutional Review Board
(IRB) for Human Research at (402) 472- 6965.
If you wish to participate in this study, please read and endorse the following
statement:
I have read and understood the information presented above.
The researchers have answered all the questions I had to my
satisfaction. I consent to take part in this study.
If you consent to take part in this study, please click “Yes” below. Please print a copy of
this Informed Consent sheet for your records.

Jordan A. Blenner, M.A., J.D., doctoral student, Primary Investigator,
jordan.blennerDS@gmail.com
Richard L. Wiener, Ph.D., M.L.S., Secondary Investigator,
LegalDecisionLabUNL@gmail.com
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Appendix B: Short Demographic Screening Form
(1) Please provide your age.

______

(2) Please provide your ethnic origin and/or race. (Check one)
___ European American

___ African American

___ Asian American

___ Latino/a

___ Hispanic

___ Native American

___ Other

Please specify _____________________________

(3) Gender
____ Male

____ Female ____ Transgender MTF or FTM

(4) Please provide your sexual orientation.
____ Straight
____ Mostly straight with some same-sex interest
____ Bisexual
____ Mostly gay/lesbian with some straight interest
____ Gay/Lesbian
(5) Marital Status: What is your marital status?
___ Single

257
___ Dating
___ Cohabiting (i.e. living with another person in a romantic relationship, but not
engaged)
___ Engaged
___ Married or marriage-like relationship
___ Divorced
(6) Please provide your highest level of education achieved.
____ Less than high school diploma
____ High school diploma/ G.E.D.
____ Some college/ In college
____ College degree (Associate’s or Bachelor’s)
____ Advanced degree (Master’s degree, Doctorate, etc.)
(7) Do you have a current driver’s license?

____ yes

(8) Where are you currently registered to vote?
____ I am not registered to vote

____ Select State

(9) Do you currently live in the state in which you are registered to vote?
____ yes

____ no

(10) In what state do you currently live?

____ Select State

____ no
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(11) Are you a convicted felon?

____ yes

____ no

(12) Are you a citizen of the United States?

____ yes

____ no

(13) Have you ever served on a jury?

____ yes

____ no
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Appendix C: Description and Instructions for the four research studies
Research Description: The current research project involves the completion of four,
unrelated research studies. Each study asks you to convey your beliefs, attitudes, and/or
opinions regarding specific political topics. Each study will have specific instructions
relevant to that study. Thank you for your time in completing this important research.
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Appendix D: System Condition Manipulation
Study A: News Article Reactions Study
Instructions: Recently, an article published in a well-respected, national newspaper
reported the results of an in-depth investigation into the level of satisfaction of ordinary
Americans with the state of the country. The current study is interested in your reactions
to the summarized findings of the study. Please read the following excerpt:
1. System Affirmation Condition
“These days, despite the difficulties the nation is facing, many people in the United States
feel safer and more secure relative to the recent past. Many citizens feel that the country
is relatively stable in terms of social, economic, and political factors. It seems that the
US is enjoying better social, economic, and political conditions than many other
countries. Very few Americans express a willingness to leave the United States and
immigrate to other nations.”
2. System Threat Condition
“These days, many people in the United States feel disappointed with the nation’s
condition leading them to feel less safe and secure relative to the recent past. Many
citizens feel that the country has reached a low point in terms of social, economic, and
political factors. It seems that many countries are enjoying better social, economic, and
political conditions than the U.S. More and more Americans express a willingness to
leave the United States and immigrate to other nations.”
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Appendix E: System Threat Condition Manipulation Check, Emotion measures, Suspect
class justifications, and Marital and Housing justifications
Instructions: Think about the statement that you just read. Below are 8 emotions that
may or may not describe the feelings that you have about this statement. Please answer
the following questions based on the way you feel at this moment. There are no right or
wrong answers. We are interested only in your feelings.
1

2

3

4

5

Very slightly or
not at all

A little

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

Happy, angry, fearful, disgusted and hopeful items (Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS), Watson & Clark, 1994; Batson, 1987)
Happy:
1. How happy do you feel when you think about the statement?
2. How cheerful do you feel when you think about the statement?
3. How joyful do you feel when you think about the statement?
Angry:
4. How angry do you feel when you think about the statement?
5. How irritated do you feel when you think about the statement?
6. How hostile do you feel when you think about the statement?
Fearful:
7. How fearful do you feel when you think about the statement?
8. How anxious do you feel when you think about the statement?
9. How afraid do you feel when you think about the statement?
10. How nervous do you feel when you think about the statement?
11. How frightened do you feel when you think about the statement?
Disgusted:
12. How disgusted do you feel when you think about the statement?
13. How scornful do you feel when you think about the statement?
14. How loathful do you feel when you think about the statement?
Hopeful:
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15. How hopeful do you feel when you think about the statement?
16. How optimistic do you feel when you think about the statement?
17. How much anticipation do you feel when you think about the statement? (1 = very
little or none at all; 5 = very much) (Batson, 1987)
Compassion (Batson, 1987) (1 = very little or none at all; 5 = very much)
18. How much compassion do you feel when you think about the statement?
19. How much empathy do you feel when you think about the statement?
20. How much sympathy do you feel when you think about the statement?
21. How much pity do you feel when you think about the statement?
Instructions: Please complete the following measures regarding the news article you just
read by selecting one response.
1. How did the article report that the United States is doing relative to other
countries? (Manipulation Check)
a. The United States is doing worse than other countries with regard to safety
and security.
b. The United States is doing better than other countries with regard to safety
and security.
2. According to the article, how do most Americans feel about the condition of the United
States? (Manipulation Check)
a. Most Americans feel that the country is stable in terms of social,
economic, and political factors.
b. Most Americans feel that the country has reached a low point in terms of
social, economic, and political factors.
Sexual Orientation as a Suspect Class Items (Developed by researcher to address system
justifications for denying suspect or quasi-suspect class status to sexual minorities)
1
Disagree

2

3
Neither Agree
nor Disagree

4

5
Agree

1. _____ Lesbians and gay men have a history of experiencing discrimination in
the United States.
2. _____ Sexual orientation is immutable (i.e. it cannot be changed).
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3. _____ Sexual orientation is related to an individual’s ability to contribute to
society. (reverse-scored)
4. _____ Lesbians and gay men, as a group, have enough political power to
achieve their goals through the ordinary political process. (reverse-scored)
System Justification Marital and Housing Equality Items (Developed by researcher to
address system justifications used in anti-marriage equality cases and sexual minority
“special rights” cases)
1
Disagree

2

3
Neither Agree
nor Disagree

4

5
Agree

5. _____ Traditional marriage, i.e. heterosexual couple marriage, should be
protected. (preserving traditional marriage justification)
6. _____ States should move slowly when deciding whether to include same-sex
couples within the definition of marriage. (wariness of experimentation
justification)
7. _____ Restricting marriage to heterosexual couples encourages natural
procreation. (natural procreation justification)
8. _____ Heterosexual, married couples provide the ideal parenting environment
for raising children. (ideal parenting/ raising children justification)
9. _____ Lesbians and gay men are a privileged group. (sexual minorities as
privileged minority justification)
10. _____ Lesbians and gay men want “special rights” that others don’t have.
(sexual minorities as wanting “special rights” justification)
11. _____ Lesbians and gay men try to get “special rights” through undemocratic
means (i.e. through judge-made law). (sexual minorities as using undemocratic
means to secure “special rights” justification)
12. _____ It is wrong to try to get “special rights”. (“special rights” – general –
justification)
13. _____ Lesbians and gay men are selfish because they put themselves before
others. (sexual minorities as selfish – specific – justification)
14. _____ In general, lesbians and gay men are selfish. (sexual minorities as selfish
– general – justification)
15. _____ In general, lesbians and gay men are immature. (sexual minorities as
immature – general – justification)
16. _____ In general, lesbians and gay men are immoral. (sexual minorities as
immoral – general – justification)
17. _____ Homosexuality is unnatural. (sexual minority as unnatural item)
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Appendix F: Ballot Initiative
Study B: Ballot Initiative Study
Instructions: For this study, we are interested in your political views. Specifically, we are
interested in whether you would vote for a ballot initiative for amending your state
constitution. Please read the ballot initiative below and indicate if you would vote for it.
Study 1: Marriage Equality
1. Ballot Initiative 5: The definition of marriage will be changed throughout the state
by adding the following phrase to the state constitution: “Marriage shall include
same-sex couples as well as heterosexual couples”.
a. Question 1: Would you vote for this amendment to your state constitution?
i. Yes
ii. No
b. Question 2: How likely is it that you would vote for this amendment to
your state constitution?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very
Unlikely

Unlikely

Somewhat
Unlikely

Undecided

Somewhat
Likely

Likely

Very
Likely

Study 2: Housing Equality
1. Ballot Initiative 5: The classes included in housing discrimination protection will
be changed throughout the state by adding the following language to the state
constitution: “Private individuals and companies, as well as public organizations,
shall not exclude sale or rental of housing to others on the basis of sexual
orientation”.
c. Question 1: Would you vote for this amendment to your state constitution?
i. Yes
ii. No
d. Question 2: How likely is it that you would vote for this amendment to
your state constitution?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very
Unlikely

Unlikely

Somewhat
Unlikely

Undecided

Somewhat
Likely

Likely

Very
Likely
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Appendix G: Likelihood Conditions Manipulation
Study C: Political Science Report Study
Instructions: In this study, we are interested in your reaction to a political science report
published in 2014. It was published by experts in the fields of political science and law
in a highly respected research journal. Please read the following excerpt:
Study 1: Marriage Equality
“Although great change has occurred within the field of marriage, there is a 10%
likelihood that the entire country (all 50 states) will have same-sex marriage inclusion by
the year 2016.” (Lowest likelihood condition)
“Although great change has occurred within the field of marriage, there is a 30%
likelihood that the entire country (all 50 states) will have same-sex marriage inclusion by
the year 2016.” (Low likelihood condition)
“Although great change has occurred within the field of marriage, there is a 60%
likelihood that the entire country (all 50 states) will have same-sex marriage inclusion by
the year 2016. (Moderate likelihood condition)
“Given the great change that has occurred within the field of marriage, there is a 90%
likelihood that the entire country (all 50 states) will have same-sex marriage inclusion by
the year 2016.” (Highest likelihood condition)

Study 2: Housing Equality
“Although great change has occurred within the field of housing, there is a 10%
likelihood that the entire country (all 50 states) will have sexual orientation housing
protection by the year 2016.” (Lowest likelihood condition)
“Although great change has occurred within the field of housing, there is a 30%
likelihood that the entire country (all 50 states) will have sexual orientation housing
protection by the year 2016.” (Low likelihood condition)
“Although great change has occurred within the field of housing, there is a 60%
likelihood that the entire country (all 50 states) will have sexual orientation housing
protection by the year 2016.” (Moderate likelihood condition)
“Given the great change that has occurred within the field of housing, there is a 90%
likelihood that the entire country (all 50 states) will have sexual orientation housing
protection by the year 2016.” (Highest likelihood condition)
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Appendix H: Likelihood Condition Manipulation Check, Emotion measures, Suspect
class justifications, Marital and Housing justifications, and Second Ballot Initiative
Instructions: Think about the statement that you just read. Below are 8 emotions that
may or may not describe the feelings that you have about this statement. Please answer
the following questions based on the way you feel at this moment. There are no right or
wrong answers. We are interested only in your feelings.
1

2

3

4

5

Very slightly or
not at all

A little

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

Happy, angry, fearful, disgusted and hopeful items (PANAS, Watson & Clark 1994;
Batson, 1987)
Happy:
1. How happy do you feel when you think about the statement?
2. How cheerful do you feel when you think about the statement?
3. How joyful do you feel when you think about the statement?
Angry:
4. How angry do you feel when you think about the statement?
5. How irritated do you feel when you think about the statement?
6. How hostile do you feel when you think about the statement?
Fearful:
7. How fearful do you feel when you think about the statement?
8. How anxious do you feel when you think about the statement?
9. How afraid do you feel when you think about the statement?
10. How nervous do you feel when you think about the statement?
11. How frightened do you feel when you think about the statement?
Disgusted:
12. How disgusted do you feel when you think about the statement?
13. How scornful do you feel when you think about the statement?
14. How loathful do you feel when you think about the statement?
Hopeful:
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15. How hopeful do you feel when you think about the statement?
16. How optimistic do you feel when you think about the statement?
17. How much anticipation do you feel when you think about the statement? (1 = very
little or none at all; 5 = very much) (Batson, 1987)
Compassion (Batson, 1987) (1 = very little or none at all; 5 = very much)
18. How much compassion do you feel when you think about the statement?
19. How much empathy do you feel when you think about the statement?
20. How much sympathy do you feel when you think about the statement?
21. How much pity do you feel when you think about the statement?
Instructions: Please complete the following measures regarding the political science
report you just read by selecting one response.
Study 1: Marital Equality
1. According to the political science report, how likely is it that the United States
will have country-wide same-sex marriage inclusion by the year 2016?
(Manipulation check)
a. 10%
b. 30%
c. 60%
d. 90%
e. 100%
Study 2: Housing Equality
1. According to the political science report, how likely is it that the United States
will have country-wide sexual orientation housing protection by the year 2016?
(Manipulation check)
a. 10%
b. 30%
c. 60%
d. 90%
e. 100%
Sexual Orientation as a Suspect Class Items (Developed by researcher to address system
justifications for denying suspect or quasi-suspect class status to sexual minorities)
1

2

3

4

5
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Disagree

Neither Agree
nor Disagree

Agree

1. _____ Lesbians and gay men have a history of experiencing discrimination in
the United States.
2. _____ Sexual orientation is immutable (i.e. it cannot be changed).
3. _____ Sexual orientation is related to an individual’s ability to contribute to
society. (reverse-scored)
4. _____ Lesbians and gay men, as a group, have enough political power to
achieve their goals through the ordinary political process. (reverse-scored)
System Justification Marital and Housing Equality Items (Developed by researcher to
address system justifications used in anti-marriage equality cases and sexual minority
“special rights” cases)
1
Disagree

2

3
Neither Agree
nor Disagree

4

5
Agree

5. _____ Traditional marriage, i.e. heterosexual couple marriage, should be
protected. (preserving traditional marriage justification)
6. _____ States should move slowly when deciding whether to include same-sex
couples within the definition of marriage. (wariness of experimentation
justification)
7. _____ Restricting marriage to heterosexual couples encourages natural
procreation. (natural procreation justification)
8. _____ Heterosexual, married couples provide the ideal parenting environment
for raising children. (ideal parenting/ raising children justification)
9. _____ Lesbians and gay men are a privileged group. (sexual minorities as
privileged minority justification)
10. _____ Lesbians and gay men want “special rights” that others don’t have.
(sexual minorities as wanting “special rights” justification)
11. _____ Lesbians and gay men try to get “special rights” through undemocratic
means (i.e. through judge-made law). (sexual minorities as using undemocratic
means to secure “special rights” justification)
12. _____ It is wrong to try to get “special rights”. (“special rights” – general –
justification)
13. _____ Lesbians and gay men are selfish because they put themselves before
others. (sexual minorities as selfish – specific – justification)
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14. _____ In general, lesbians and gay men are selfish. (sexual minorities as selfish
– general – justification)
15. _____ In general, lesbians and gay men are immature. (sexual minorities as
immature – general – justification)
16. _____ In general, lesbians and gay men are immoral. (sexual minorities as
immoral – general – justification)
17. _____ Homosexuality is unnatural. (sexual minority as unnatural item)
Instructions: For this study, we are interested in your political views. Specifically, we are
interested in whether you would vote for a ballot initiative for amending your state
constitution. Please read the ballot initiative below and indicate if you would vote for it.
Study 1: Marriage Equality
1. Ballot Initiative 5: The definition of marriage will be changed throughout the state
by adding the following phrase to the state constitution: “Marriage shall include
same-sex couples as well as heterosexual couples”.
e. Question 1: Would you vote for this amendment to your state constitution?
i. Yes
ii. No
f. Question 2: How likely is it that you would vote for this amendment to
your state constitution?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very
Unlikely

Unlikely

Somewhat
Unlikely

Undecided

Somewhat
Likely

Likely

Very
Likely

Study 2: Housing Equality
1. Ballot Initiative 5: The classes included in housing discrimination protection will
be changed throughout the state by adding the following language to the state
constitution: “Private individuals and companies, as well as public organizations,
shall not exclude sale or rental of housing to others on the basis of sexual
orientation”.
g. Question 1: Would you vote for this amendment to your state constitution?
i. Yes
ii. No
h. Question 2: How likely is it that you would vote for this amendment to
your state constitution?
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very
Unlikely

Unlikely

Somewhat
Unlikely

Undecided

Somewhat
Likely

Likely

Very
Likely
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Appendix I: Situational System Justification scale, Attitudes toward Lesbians and Gay
Men scale, Global Beliefs in a Just World scale, Realistic and Symbolic Threats scale,
and Intergroup Anxiety scale
Study D: General Political Attitudes Study
Instructions: The purpose of this study is to assess your attitudes regarding a number of
political issues. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested only in your
attitudes. Indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements by writing the number on the scale that you feel is closest to your opinion next
to that item.
Situational System Justification Scale (Kay & Jost, 2003)
Instructions: Please rate the extent that you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements using the scale provided.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

3

4

5
Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

6

7

8

_____ In general, I find society to be fair.
_____ In general, the American political system operates as it should.
_____ American society needs to be radically reconstructed. (reverse-scored)
_____ The United States is the best country in the world to live in.
_____ Most policies serve the greater good.
_____ Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness.
_____ Our society is getting worse every year. (reverse-scored)
_____ Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve.

Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay men scale (Herek, 1988)
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5
Agree

9. _____ Male homosexuality is a perversion.
10. _____ Female homosexuality is detrimental to society because it breaks down
the natural divisions between the sexes.

9
Strongly
Agree
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11. _____ The idea of male homosexual marriages seems ridiculous to me.
12. _____ A woman’s homosexuality should not be a cause for job discrimination
in any situation. (reverse-scored)
13. _____ State laws regulating private, consenting lesbian behavior should be
loosened. (reverse-scored)
14. _____ Female homosexuality is a sin.
15. _____ Just as in other species, male homosexuality is a natural expression of
sexuality in human men. (reverse-scored)
16. _____ Male homosexual couples should be allowed to adopt children the same
as heterosexual couples. (reverse-scored)
17. _____ I would not be too upset if I learned that my son was a homosexual.
(reverse-scored)
18. _____ Male homosexuality is merely a different kind of lifestyle that should not
be condemned. (reverse-scored)
19. _____ Female homosexuality is a threat to many of our basic social institutions.
20. _____ Male homosexuals should not be allowed to teach school.
21. _____ Female homosexuality in itself is no problem, but what society makes of
it can be a problem.
22. _____ Homosexual behavior between two men is just plain wrong.
23. _____ I think male homosexuals are disgusting.
24. _____ The growing number of lesbians indicates a decline in American morals.
25. _____ If a man has homosexual feelings, he should do everything he can to
overcome them.
26. _____ Lesbians are sick.
27. _____ Lesbians just can’t fit into our society.
28. _____ Female homosexuality is an inferior form of sexuality.

Global Belief in a Just World scale (Lipkus, 1991)
1
Strong
Disagreement

2

3

4

5

29. _____ I feel that people get what they are entitled to have.
30. _____ I feel that a person’s efforts are noticed and rewarded.
31. _____ I feel that people earn the rewards and punishments they get.
32. _____ I feel that people who meet with misfortune have brought it on
themselves.
33. _____ I feel that people get what they deserve.
34. _____ I feel that rewards and punishments are fairly given.

6
Strong
Agreement
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35. _____ I basically feel that the world is a fair place.
Realistic and Symbolic Threat scales (Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999) – modified
Please indicate the degree to which you agree to the following statements:
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Somewhat
Disagree

4
Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

5
Somewhat
Agree

6
Agree

7
Strongly
Agree

36. _____ The values and beliefs of lesbians and gay men regarding moral and
religious issues are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most
Americans.
37. _____ The values and beliefs of lesbians and gay men regarding family issues
and socializing children are basically quite similar to those of most Americans.
(reverse-scored)
38. _____ The values and beliefs of lesbians and gay men regarding social relations
are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans.
39. _____ Lesbians and gay men should not have to accept heterosexual ways.
(reverse-scored)
40. _____ Lesbians and gay men get more from this country than they contribute.
41. _____ Lesbians and gay men are not displacing heterosexual workers from their
jobs. (reverse-scored)
42. _____ Lesbians and gay men should be eligible for the same health-care
benefits received by heterosexual persons. (reverse-scored)
43. _____ Lesbians and gay men are as entitled to subsidized housing or subsidized
utilities (water, sewage, electricity) as poor heterosexual persons are. (reversescored)
Intergroup Anxiety scale (Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999) – modified
Please indicate the extant that you would feel the following emotions when interacting
with lesbians and gay men.
1
Not at
all

2

3

44. _____ Apprehensive
45. _____ Uncertain

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
Extremely
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46. _____ Worried
47. _____ Awkward
48. _____ Anxious
49. _____ Threatened
50. _____ Comfortable
51. _____ Trusting
52. _____ Friendly
53. _____ Confident
54. _____ Safe
55. _____ At ease
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Appendix J: Manipulation Check
1. Does your state allow same-sex couples to marry?
a. Yes
b. No
c. I don’t know
2. Does your state provide lesbians and gay men with protection from discrimination
in housing?
a. Yes
b. No
c. I don’t know
3. Have you heard of the US Supreme Court case United States v. Windsor?
a. Yes
b. No
4. What did the US Supreme Court hold in this case?
a. That the federal Defense of Marriage Act did not violate Ms. Windsor’s
rights.
b. That the federal Defense of Marriage Act did violate Ms. Windsor’s
rights.
5. How many states currently allow same-sex couples to marry?
a. 27
b. 40
c. 37
d. 32
6. How many states currently provide state-wide anti-discrimination housing
protection for lesbians and gay men?
a. 32
b. 18
c. 25
d. 21
7. Are lesbians and gay men protected from housing discrimination by a federal
law?
a. Yes
b. No
c. I don’t know
8. Have you ever voted against same-sex marriage in a state or local ballot initiative
or referendum?
a. Yes
b. No
c. I don’t know
9. Have you ever voted against providing lesbians and gay men with housing
discrimination protection in a state or local ballot initiative or referendum?
a. Yes
b. No
c. I don’t know
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Appendix K: Demographic Survey
Instructions: Please complete the following questionnaire.
(1) Please provide your age.

______

(2) Please provide your gender.
_____ Man

______ Woman

______ Transgender MTF or FTM

(3) Please provide your ethnic origin and/or race. (Check one)
___ White, non-Latino/a

___ African American (Black)

___ Asian American

___ Latino/a

___ Native American
___ Other

Please specify _____________________________

(4) Urban vs. Rural: I would describe the location in which I grew up as a:
____ Large city

____ Medium-sized city

____ Small city or town

____ Very small town

____ Farm outside of town
(5) Childhood Residence: Which of the following best describes where you grew up?
____ Urban

____ Suburban

____ Town

(6) Do you have a current driver’s license?

____ Rural

____ yes

____ no
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(7) Are you currently registered to vote?

____ yes

____ no

(8) Are you a convicted felon?

____ yes

____ no

(9) Are you a citizen of the United States?

____ yes

____ no

(10) Have you ever served on a jury?

____ yes

____ no

(11) Please provide what best describes your current employment.
____ Employed full-time

_____ Unemployed

____ Employed part-time

_____ Student

(12) Please provide your current occupation.
________________________________
(13) Religion: What is your religion?
____ Protestant

____ Catholic

____ Muslim

____ None

____ Other

____ Jewish

Please

Specify____________________________________________
(14) What is your political affiliation?
____ Democrat

____ Republican

____ Green Party

____ Independent

____ Libertarian

____ No affiliation
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____ Other

Please

Specify_____________________________________________
(15) Please provide your political orientation on social issues.
___ Very conservative
___ Conservative
___ Moderate
___ Liberal
___ Very liberal
(16) Please provide your political orientation on economic issues.
___ Very conservative
___ Conservative
___ Moderate
___ Liberal
___ Very liberal
(17) Marital Status: What is your marital status?
___ Single
___ Dating
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___ Cohabiting (i.e. living with another person in a romantic relationship, but not
engaged)
___ Engaged
___ Married or marriage-like relationship
___ Divorced
(18) If you are not currently married, have you ever been married?
___ Yes
___ No
___ Currently Married
(19) Have you ever cohabitated with another person (i.e. lived with another person with
whom you have a romantic relationship, but with whom you are not engaged or married)?
___ Yes
___ No
(20) Do you believe marriage is important?
___ Yes
___ No
(21) Family Income/ Social Economic Status: I consider my family to be:
___ Upper class
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___ Upper middle class
___ Middle class
___ Lower middle class
___ Lower class
(22) Do you own or have you ever owned your own home?
___ Yes
___ No
(23) Have you ever rented an apartment, house, or other dwelling?
___ Yes
___ No
(24) Do you believe owning your own home is important?
___ Yes
___ No
(25) Do you have children?
___ Yes
___ No
(26) Please provide your highest level of education achieved.
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____ Less than high school diploma
____ High school diploma/ G.E.D.
____ Some college/ In college
____ College degree (Associate’s or Bachelor’s)
____ Advanced degree (Master’s degree, Doctorate, etc.)
(27) Please provide your sexual orientation.
____ Straight
____ Mostly straight with some same-sex interest
____ Bisexual
____ Mostly gay/lesbian with some straight interest
____ Gay/Lesbian

(28) Psychology Classes: How many psychology classes have you had in college or in
high school?
____ 0

____ 1

____ 2

____ 3

____ 4

____ 5 or more
(29) Please provide the first three digits of your zip code. _________
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Appendix L: Debriefing
Thank you for participating in this study. We ask that you please do not discuss this
research with anyone, as this is part of a series of studies the Legal Decision making Lab
will be running throughout the next few years.
The purpose of this research is to better understand stigma towards lesbians and gay men
in the marital and housing contexts. By having participants read that the country is doing
well or has reached a new low point in the eyes of most Americans, we sought to
understand how threatening the status quo would impact whether individuals would vote
for marital and housing equality measures. Previous research indicates that individuals
who feel threat to the status quo are more likely to support the current system (i.e.
inequality). However, individuals who believe a new status quo is likely to happen are
more likely to support the new status quo.
The ultimate goal of this program of research is to better understand what individuals
think about sexual minority equality. We sought to understand how thoughts, emotions,
and attitudes can impact whether one supports equality measures.
Because this research is currently being collected, we ask that you do not discuss this
research with future participants. You have devoted a good deal of time and effort
completing the materials for this study. The researchers have also spent a great deal of
time preparing the materials. If you discuss these materials with any other students, you
will have wasted your time and effort along with the researchers’ time and effort. If you
discuss the materials with anyone else that might be in this or a related study in the
future, we will not be able to use the materials or your data from this study.
If you have any questions or concerns, or would like to know the results of this project,
please contact faculty member Richard L. Wiener at LegalDecisionLabUNL@gmail.com.
Again, we thank you for your participation.

